


Resource Scarcity and Social Identity in the Political Conflicts in Burundi

by

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*Dissertation presented for the degree of Master of Political Science (International Studies) in
the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University*



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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

Since Burundi gained independence in 1962, this country has experienced periods of mass communal violence. Extensive scholarly research has focused on exploring the factors behind, and the nature of, the conflicts in Burundi from a socio-ethnic perspective. There has, however, been a persistent lack of attention paid to the inextricable relationship between environmental factors; particularly the scarcity of resources, coupled with rapid population growth; and Burundi's recent history of internal conflict. Noteworthy explanatory factors, which are often ignored in literature on the environment and conflict, have thus motivated this study. Burundi is an example of this reality because of a highly dependent agricultural economy and a constant growing population. This study used a descriptive analysis, as methodological tool; in order to gain an understanding of Burundi's land question - that is, how limited access to land and the constantly increasing population have led to environmental degradation, that served as motivational trigger factors for the violent political conflicts that occurred at various periods between 1965 and 1993 in this country. This study addresses this epistemological gap. In order to explore the nexus between environmental factors, land access, population growth and the political conflicts in Burundi, this study draws and builds upon Jared Diamond's (2005) five point framework of potential trigger factors to environmental collapse. Moreover, Diamond's (2005) ecocide theory argues that there are eight specific indicators to demonstrate how societies undermine themselves by damaging their own environment; thus resulting in an ecocide. This theory was applied to the two main environmental variables examined in this study. More specifically, this theoretical perspective provided a base for exploring how land issues, population growth, environmental degradation and political change can be understood as important precursors to the violent conflicts in Burundi. What may be surmised by this study; is that there is indeed a positive correlation between these forces, where the values of the independent variables (land access and population growth) are associated with the values of the dependent variable (violent conflict). This correlation, therefore, calls for an acknowledgement of the complexity of the Burundian conflicts and that ethnicity which has dominated contemporary conflict analysis is but one of several social rifts.

Key terms: *Burundi, political conflict, environmental scarcity, land access and population growth*

OPSOMMING

Sedert Burundi in 1962 onafhanklikheid verkry het, het hierdie land periodes van massa gewelddadige politieke konflik ervaar. Uitgebreide wetenskaplike navorsing het daarop gefokus om die faktore agter die gebeure, sowel as die aard van die konflik in Burundi vanuit 'n sosio-etniese perspektief, te ondersoek. Tog word daar steeds gebrekkige aandag geskenk aan die onlosmaaklike verhouding tussen omgewingsfaktore, veral gebrek aan hulpbronne, gepaardgaande met die voortgesette bevolkingsaanwas; asook Burundi se onlangse geskiedenis van interne konflik. Noemenswaardige gapings, wat dikwels in die verklarende literatuur geïgnoreer word, het dus hierdie studie gemotiveer. Burundi is 'n voorbeeld van hierdie werklikheid omdat die land baie afhanklik van landbou is; as gevolg van die kontstante bevolkingsaanwas in die land. Hierdie navorsing het beskrywende analise as 'n metodologiese instrument gebruik om insig te kry oor Burundi se grondkwessie – met ander woorde hoe die beperkte toegang tot grond en 'n toenemende bevolkingsaanwas gelei het tot die agteruitgang van die omgewing. Bostaande faktore het as motiverende sneller faktore gedien, wat aanleiding gegee het tot die gewelddadige politieke konflik, wat gedurende verskillende periodes tussen 1965 en 1993 in hierdie land ontstaan het. Hierdie studie poog dus om hierdie epistemologiese gaping aan te spreek. Ten einde die verband (nexus) tussen omgewingsfaktore, grondbesit, bevolkingsaanwas en die politieke konflikte in Burundi te ondersoek, steun en bou hierdie studie voort op Jared Diamond (2005) se vyfpunt raamwerk van potensiële sneller faktore, wat lei tot omgewings ineenstorting. Verder beweer Diamond (2005) se omgewings uitwissing (ecocide) teorie dat daar agt spesifieke aanduidings is om te demonstreer hoe gemeenskappe hulself ondermyn deur hul eie omgewing te beskadig/vernietig: wat uitloop op omgewings uitwissing (ecocide). Hierdie teorie is aangewend in die twee hoof omgewings veranderlikes, wat in die studie/ navorsing ondersoek is. Hierdie teoretiese perspektief het ook spesifiek 'n basis voorsien om te ondersoek hoe grondkwessies, bevolkingsaanwas, omgewings agteruitgang en politieke verandering verstaan kan word as belangrike aanwysers van die geweldadige konflik in Burundi. Deur middel van hierdie studie kan 'n duidelike opsomming gemaak word dat daar inderdaad 'n positiewe korrelasie tussen hierdie magte voorkom, waar die waardes van die onafhanklike veranderlike (toegang tot grond en bevolkingsgroei) geassosieer word met die waardes van die afhanklike veranderlike (gewelddadige konflik). Hierdie korrelasie verg dus 'n beroep om erkenning te gee aan die kompleksiteit van konflik in Burundi. Hierdie etniese debat, wat tans die oorheersende konflik aanvuur, is maar net een van die verskeie interpretasies van sosiale breekpunte in Burundi is.

Sleuteltermes: *Burundi, politieke konflik, gebrek in die omgewing, toegang tot grond en bevolkingsaanwas*

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated in loving memory of my dear brother, Abraham Wema Jengo (1984-2011), who passed away during the course of this study. Although, you are not able to see me through, your constant belief in me has been the greatest encouragement and I sincerely thank you for inspiring me to carry on.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABASA	Alliance Burundo-Africaine pour le Salut/Burundi African Alliance for the Salvation
ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
APRA	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Accord
AU	African Union
AV-INTWARI	Alliances des Vaillants/Alliance of the Valliant
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
CIGI	Centre for International Governance Innovation
CNDD	Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie/National Council for the Defence of Democracy
CNDD-FDD	Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie/National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence of Democracy
CNTB	Commission Nationale Terres et autres Biens/The National Commission for Land and Other Possessions
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EISA	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDD	Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie/Forces for the Defence of Democracy
FDN	Force de Défense Nationale/National Defence Forces
FNL	Forces Nationales de Libération/Front for National Liberation
FNL-INCANZO	Forces Nationales de Libération-ICANZO/Front for National Liberation-INCANZO
FRODEBU	Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi/Front for Democracy in Burundi
FROLINA	Front pour la Libération Nationale/National Liberation Front
GLRPI	Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative
GOB	Government of Burundi

ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP(s)	Internally Displaced People
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KAZE-FDD	Kaze-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie/Kaze-Forces for the Defence of Democracy
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo/United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MSP-INKINZO	Mouvement Socialiste Panafricaniste-INKINZO/Pan Africanist Socialist Movement-Inkinzo
NGO(s)	Non-Governmental Organisation(s)
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ONUB	Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi/United Nations Operation in Burundi
PALIPHEUTU	Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu/Party for the Liberation of Hutu People
PALIPHEUTU-FNL	Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales de Libération/Party for the Liberation of Hutu People-National Forces of Liberation
PARENA	Parti pour le Redressement National/Party for National Recovery
PDC	Parti Démocratie Chrétien/Christian Democratic Party
PIT	Parti Indépendant des Travailleurs/Independent Labour Party
PL	Parti Libéral/Liberal Party
PP	Parti du Peuple/People's Party
PRP	Parti pour la Réconciliation du Peuple/People's Reconciliation Party
PSD	Parti Social Démocrate/Social Democratic Party
RPB	Rassemblement du Peuple Burundais/Rally for the Burundian people
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

TGoB	Transitional Government of Burundi
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
UPRONA	Union pour le Progrès National/Union for National Progress
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

MAP 1: POLITICAL MAP OF BURUNDI



Source: One World-Nations Online (2012).

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT

“Nowhere else in Africa has so much violence killed so many people on so many occasions in so small a space as Burundi during the years following independence”.

(Lemarchand, 2009:1)

Since 1965, when thousands died in what turned out merely as a presentiment sign of even greater ‘horrors’, the Burundian society has been torn by mass communal violence with acute conflicts in the years following its independence in 1962. Chronic political violence over unequal distribution of wealth and monopolisation of power between the Tutsi and the Hutu, and in turn growing tension along ethnic lines, is believed to be one of the dominant factors in the political issues prevalent in the Burundian society (Nindorera, 2007). At the centre of the conflicts, are the unjust policy structures instituted by the country’s various administrators (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). In most accounts, Burundi’s continual conflicts correspond to contemporary discourse of the failed neo-patrimonial state in which opportunistic elites mobilise ethnicity for economic gain (Daley, 2006).

Group identity, political structure and the economy, were all radically transformed during the Belgian colonial era (Nindorera, 2007). It is argued that the colonial administration had five major influences on the Burundian society, which are known to be central elements of the conflicts (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Firstly, the disenfranchisement of Hutu’s in relation to the fledgling state was intensified through the administrative reforms which shaped the structure of the state. Secondly, education was mainly directed towards Tutsi and the *ganwa*¹, therefore increasing the ethnic differential opportunities and cementing and politicising ethnic identities. In addition, the Belgians structured the economy for primary product export. Lastly, the state administration developed as the central locus of patronage and source of

¹ Of royal blood and Tutsi origin, a *ganwa* is a prince who came to be seen as a separate ethnic group and during the pre-colonial era they were the main authorities (Lemarchand, 1994; Banderembako, 2006).

wealth as opposed to the royal court (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Significant for the colonial era was that the Belgian rule qualitatively changed the relationship between the social groupings in the Burundian society.

In the post-colonial years, Burundi witnessed different politicisation of identities and their intersection with state formation. Ethnicity, Daley (2006) contends, has been the fundamental organising principle of the modern Burundian state with its successive policies of differentiation and exclusion². Throughout its post-colonial history, the Burundian state has not been a fully functioning sovereign state along the lines of its western counterparts (Daley, 2006). Yet, the citizens of Burundi, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, have not contested its territorial integrity (Daley, 2006). According to Daley (2006), the conflicts reflect competing claims for enrichment, representation and security as expected from a model state. The on-going violence is attributed to the increasing division of political elites, based on multiple cleavages within the Burundian society who mobilise ethnicity in their struggle for control of the state and thus usher a widening social division between Burundians (Daley, 2006). Moreover, the conflicts have been characterised as being an amalgamation of structural violence, extreme and increased poverty and the exclusion or marginalisation of the majority from the economic, political, social, human and cultural rights (SIDA, 2004). Recent peace negotiations³, aimed at correcting ethnic disparity through power sharing and reform of the institutions of governance have been put under question as there has been some debate regarding its incapacity to resolve the political crisis as they fail to move beyond a methodological pre-occupation of ethnic identities (Daley, 2006). Additionally, peace negotiations have failed to address the complex social reality of the Burundian society and to include the people of Burundi as part of a broader non-ethnic political community, which is regarded by some as a pre-requisite for a stable pluralistic democracy (Daley, 2006).

Oketch and Polzer (2002:90) maintain that there is a complex web of factors that have contributed to the outbreak of actual violence in Burundi as well as the nature in which the violence has taken. These include proximate historical factors such as triggering events, regional and international influences. In addition to those factors listed above, are influences endogenous to a captured state: the lack of legitimate and effective domestic conflict

² See description of Lemarchand (2000) exclusion thesis under the sub-heading 'Theoretical framework' within this chapter.

³ The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000 and 2004 aimed at institutionalising power-sharing between the Tutsi and Hutu (Falch, 2008).

resolution mechanisms and the role which has accrued to ethnicity over decades of colonialism and post-colonialism.

Within this milieu, analytical shortcomings and the persistent lack of adequate literature concerning the violent conflicts in Burundi have thus encouraged further research to be explored and examined. The issue of how environmental factors have served as triggers for political conflicts in Burundi, have received increasing attention and gradually becoming more internationalised.⁴ Moyo (2008) argues that such international interest developed from the global financial world as global capital is gradually entwined in conflicts over natural resources, minerals and land in Africa. More importantly, the fundamental issue concerning access to land and population growth in Burundi has not sufficiently been explored. Although the land issue (limited access to land) has received a growing policy focus, the context in which Burundi's land and agrarian matters are investigated ignores the detailed nature of the land concern, the effects on development coupled with a population density which almost mirrors a 'Malthusian trap'.⁵

The land concern in Burundi should therefore be understood in correlation with the nature of the struggles for access to land and its use. Population growth in Burundi amalgamated with access to land and land rights, are unfortunately, insufficiently explored. While the unequal patterns of land distribution may be more localised and occur on smaller scales than has been characteristic of land distribution debates elsewhere, they do amount to a socially significant phenomenon. Inadequate scholarship conceptualising Burundi's land question, conflict and population growth, has thus encouraged this research. This study therefore indicates that environmental factors⁶ can serve as important triggers when examining the conflicts in Burundi. Although Burundi's population is predominately rural, there is also a positive growth rate of the urban population and in the context of scarce non-agricultural employment

⁴ This thesis acknowledges the scholarly research done by Kumar Rupesinghe, Tania Paffenholtz and Peter Wallensteen, on the issue of how environmental factors have contributed to political conflict in Burundi.

⁵ This term was founded by Thomas Robert Malthus (1798), who argued that population increase is limited by means of subsistence (for example, food production) and that when subsistence increases so does population concurrently. However, Malthus (1798) predicted that population growth would surpass the carrying capacity of the earth or certain countries, because food production grows arithmetically and population increase exponentially. As such, a population has the tendency to expand to consume all available food without leaving a surplus; hence, the rate at which a population grows is faster than the growth rate of food production, which in turn will lead to a number of challenges in the future (Malthus, 1798).

⁶ Environmental factors within the framework of this study are defined as access to land and population growth in Burundi. These terms will be used interchangeably throughout this study. More importantly, environmental factors defined within this thesis' framework are not to be confused with Diamond's (2005) concept of environmental factors.

in Burundi; there is still a great dependence on the socioeconomic reproduction on access to adequate land.

Against this backdrop begs the fundamental exploration within this study, namely: to examine whether there is a complex and intractable picture of competition for resources in Burundi and whether a challenge exists between urban and rural development and investment policy priorities and industrial and agricultural demands. Moreover, this study investigates whether there is a glaring schism between the country's southern and northern regions, in addition, this study assesses whether this has had far-reaching implications for the conflicts that has prevailed in Burundi. The alleged ethnic debate has served to draw attention away from the concrete structural conflict of interests between the elite and the rural majority. In light of this, this study does not aim to determine the range of factors that explains the current incident of political conflicts (dependent variable), rather it examines if resource scarcity and human population growth (independent variables) have acted as trigger factors for the political conflicts in Burundi.

1.1.1 Research Aim and Question

The link between environment and conflict is a subject worth examining in the Burundian context. The interrelationship has, however, been established in various contexts within the developed world where questions concerning matters of natural resources are a critical facet of the quest for political and economic stability. This interrelationship has in addition, functioned as a searching tool for strategic goals around the world regarding this area. The role of environmental factors as triggers to the Burundian conflicts are examined with no attempt made to exhaustively define the nature of each conflict, therefore, the rationale of this study is to examine whether environmental factors need to be assessed for their impact.

In particular, this study solicits: have population growth and limited access to land impacted the previous political conflicts in Burundi? Within this study, access to land and population growth are also addressed as environmental factors, for the broader term. The main research question is subsequently formulated against this backdrop. This study, therefore, seeks to answer the following questions:

- i. How have environmental factors, more specifically, population growth and (limited) access to land impacted the previous 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993 political conflicts in Burundi?*

An expansion of the principal research question further advances into two sub-questions with the objective to:

- ii. *Examine whether a nexus can be found between environmental factors and the political conflicts in Burundi?*
- iii. *To what extent has the latest Peace Accord (the Arusha Agreement of 2000) addressed these environmental factors?*

Objectives for this research are to develop an understanding of how population growth and land access functioned as trigger factors for the violent conflicts in Burundi. Furthermore, the research aim is also to contribute to the further development of conceptual tools for researching environmental variables, such as population growth and land access to conflict linkages. This study will attempt to connect the conflicts in Burundi to the above mentioned environmental factors. Central to this, is an attempt to contest matters that could prove valuable for sustainable environmental management initiatives and perhaps to assist in the development of conflict preventative measures through management of land and population structures, both pre- and post- conflict conditions in Burundi. This study will employ limited access to resources (land) and population growth in Burundi to investigate this matter. As such, matters pertaining to policies on natural resource scarcity and conflict, should, ideally, be seen as an integral part of both development and conflict prevention.

1.2 THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY

1.2.1 Introduction to the study

In the 19th century, the scramble for the African continent witnessed vast atrocities as European countries were battling over the African natural wealth. Followed by decolonization in the 20th century, the continent seemed to move toward a prosperous promise of freedom at a political, economic and social level. However, in the 21st century conflict is still a continuous feature of political life on the continent. In the years following independence, one of the countries, which emerged as one of the most hopeful candidates in light of a multiparty democracy, was the Republic of Burundi. The small central east African state is landlocked between Rwanda in the north, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the west, and the Republic of Tanzania in the east and south. Though promising at

independence, Burundi has become one of the most intractable and protracted cases on the continent, plagued by gruesome genocidal conflicts and political instability.

The conflicts in Burundi, which erupted after its independence in 1962, are generally presented as merely ethnic in motivation; a conflict between the two main ethnicities in Burundi, the Tutsi and the Hutu (Banderembako, 2006). The population of Burundi consists of three ethnic groups⁷, Hutu (85 per cent), Tutsi (14 per cent) and Twa (1 per cent) (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000). Five major conflicts have been recognised in Burundi, the first conflict was in 1965, the second in 1972, the third in 1988, the fourth in 1991 and lastly, 1993 until present (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000). There is no doubt amongst scholars that the conflicts have caused vast human and economic loss with the 1993 conflict being characterised as a fully-fledged civil war and highlighted as the longest and most detrimental in terms of its economic costs (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). According to Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000), Burundi has experienced one unstable and two stable equilibriums since its independence. The first stable equilibrium existed during the initial years of independence and the second stable equilibrium from 1972-1988. The first unstable equilibrium is dated back to 1965-1966 and is argued to be critical in terms of its impact on the future of the country (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000). The 1993 crisis is the second unstable equilibrium and viewed as a result of the break-up of the 1972-1988 equilibrium following political liberalisation that has taken place since 1988 (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000).

Burundi has been mired in an unending cycle of conflict; successive waves of violence have increased ethnic and regional divisions, while deepening already extreme poverty. Brachet and Wolpe (2005) maintain that while the Burundians initially did not mobilize politically in relation to their ethnic identities, the recurring violence in the post-independence years brought a mass dimension to what is fundamentally an elite-driven and manipulated conflict. Repeated inter-communal massacres have made the population susceptible to ethnically framed political appeals (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005). In contrast to Rwanda where there was a strong focus on the division between the Hutu and Tutsi from the onset of the colonial era, the Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi were brought together by their common commitment to, and

⁷ It is difficult in defining an 'ethnic group' especially in the case of Burundi. The concept usually refers to different identities, with clear distinguishable traits, such as culture, language, geographical space or physiological features normally shared by members of the same group (Horowitz, 1985). A large amount of attention has been directed toward Burundi's ethnicity leaving it a contested topic, it is however important to note that the Burundian case is special. This study recognises that there are differences amongst Burundians; yet, there are also similarities, such as language and geographical space. The purpose here, then, is to draw attention to the (sometimes) ambiguous classification of these differences.

identification with, the monarchy (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005). The members of the *ganwa* aristocracy functioned as the provincial governors, ruling the various areas of Burundi in the name of the *mwami* (the King) (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005). It is apparent that during the years under Belgian rule, the Belgians themselves depended more on solidarities and divides within the clan system than the Hutu/Tutsi division, as was the case in Rwanda (Brachet and Wolpe 2005: 2). The World Bank's Conflict Analysis Framework⁸, assert that ethnicity is only one in a number of factors present in the Burundian society. Furthermore, whereas the ethnic divide is understood to be more important "because of four decades of manipulation of socio-ethnic identities, there are however, significant clans, regional and class-based divides", it is argued that these divides were aggravated by the degree of difference with regard to social opportunities, a history of violence and impunity, poor economic performance, inequality and environmental stress, failed governance and institutions, and the spillover effects of regional conflict among Burundi's neighbours (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005: 1).

With the shift from conservationist ecological approaches to more socio-cultural political ecology during the 1970s in the political world order, saw a significant rise of approaches surrounding the investigation of the connection between human and nature at a general level. What this signified was a step toward scrutinizing what Clover (2005:80) reports as: "the relationship between the nature of marginal environments and comparisons of causative processes and relationships across those environments". The Brundtland Commission Report of 1987 on environment and development was formed against the backdrop of the book, *Limits to Growth*⁹ (Clover, 2005; Gleditsch and Theisen, 2010). Amongst other things, the Brundtland Commission Report of 1987 stated the importance of seeing development and the environment as intertwined and not simply as two independent factors (Brundtland et al., 1987). Furthermore, the Brundtland Commission Report also stressed the importance of more managerial and systematic approaches to the problems faced on the African continent, more specifically, the environmental issues that are increasing with the consumption of resources, which Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999) refers to as resource scarcity. It has been twenty six years since the Brundtland Commission Report was published and matters concerning the environment have grown increasingly important in the socio-political world order. Suffice to

⁸ Cited in Brachet and Wolpe (2005).

⁹ This book was written by Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jörgen Randers and William W. Behrens III in 1972. *Limits to Growth* looks at the nature of and limits to exponential growth. The authors examine how exponential growth interacts with finite resources.

say, this has produced a shift worth debating. This study, therefore, uses this knowledge as a starting point for further inquiry.

While ethnicity, political and economic factors have been at the centre of assessing the conflicts in Burundi, the environmental issues and ecological interpretations have repeatedly been significant trigger factors in conflicts throughout the world and the case of Burundi is no different (Kok et al., 2009). The mounting climate crisis is perhaps one of the greatest long-term challenges the global world is confronted with. Within this context, the control for natural renewable and non-renewable resources, such as land, water, cropland, forest, fish stocking, minerals and oil has been a principal issue in many of the prolonged conflicts and civil wars in Africa, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (De Soysa, 2002; Urdal, 2005; Binningsbø, 2006; Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Kok et al., 2009). Broad academic research and scholarly literature reveal that there has been a significant deterioration of the environment within the Great Lakes region of which Burundi forms part of (André and Platteau, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kameri-Mbote, 2005; Diamond, 2005; Banderembako, 2006; Raleigh and Urdal, 2006). One of the consequences has been the intensification of exposure to the degradation of the environment, thus fuelling people's vulnerability and reducing the carrying capacity to manage such perils. With the case of Burundi, the milieus of appropriating such carrying capacities are further intensified by the high rate of population growth (Kameri-Mbote, 2005).

In his analysis, Banderembako (2006) trace the link between land, environment, employment and conflict in Burundi. Banderembako (2006) explains that subsistence crop production has grown particularly slower than the population whilst export crop production has plunged. Moreover, Burundi's limited and unequal access to land coupled with low income, was and still is an intricate issue. In particular, the decline in coffee and tea production is mainly due to the declining yields from coffee and tea plants. Additionally, access to land also needs to be understood in the context of coffee and tea prices which were plummeting on the global market scene demanding more land in an attempt to benefit from the same income one had previously (Banderembako, 2006). Significant for his analysis is that the major structural constraint on agricultural production is low productivity which stems from the high density of the rural population in Burundi (Banderembako, 2006:2). Banderembako (2006) further argues that the economic effects of the lack of cultivable land in Burundi, presents a strong tendency toward a cause and effect relationship. In so doing, the author states that subsistence crop production and high population growth amongst the rural population, contribute to

environmental deterioration in Burundi (Banderembako, 2006). The so-called vicious cycle of land scarcity-environmental degradation-conflict in Burundi, Banderembako (2006) maintains that this has led to an altercation across the social, economic and physical spectrums. In addition, Banderembako (2006:2) advocates a strong opinion that although the conventional rationale explaining the political conflicts in Burundi is mainly ethnic, scant and poorly distributed resources lead to tiny elite appropriating public resources and cash crops, and the rural population struggling for subsistence land.

Following Jared Diamond's (2005) argument on the subject of environmental problems, there seems to be a strongly authenticated argument that there are specific processes by which societies have undermined themselves by damaging their own environments. Diamond (2005:7) refers to this phenomenon as 'ecocide'. The ways in which societies undermine themselves fall into eight categories, namely: deforestation and habitat destruction, soil problems¹⁰, water management problems, overhunting, overfishing, the effects of introduced species on native species, human population growth and finally, increased per capita impact of people (Diamond, 2005). However, a society does not necessarily have to experience all of these conditions at once, these 'ecocides' are somewhat portraying the environmental problems in which societies face and have been seen in relation with the most significant factor, society's response to its environmental issues (Diamond, 2005). Similar to the case of Rwanda is Burundi with its constant growing human population. Diamond (2005:21) explains that this growth poses a threat to the environment and can thus lead to a failed and collapsed state, in which the fight for resources and land scarcity has become the epitome for explaining the conflicts within the Great Lakes region.

Burundi's repeated conflicts since 1962 have become tantamount with two significant matters; high human population growth and genocide (Diamond, 2005). The small mountainous country has an estimated population¹¹ of 10 million people merely living over 27, 834 km² and an astounding growth rate of 3.4 per cent per annum, making Burundi one of the two most densely populated countries in Africa¹² and among the most densely populated in the world (CIA Factbook, 2011). Over 90 per cent of the population depend on subsistence agriculture and overpopulation places increased demands on land, a resource which is very

¹⁰ Such as erosion, salinization and soil fertility (Diamond, 2005:20).

¹¹ Estimates for Burundi explicitly take into account the effects of excess mortality due to AIDS; this can result in lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality, higher death rates, lower population growth rates, and changes in the distribution of population by age and sex than would otherwise be expected (July 2011 est.) (CIA Factbook, 2011).

¹² Currently, the most densely populated country in Africa is Rwanda (Accord, 2009).

much limited in Burundi (Kok et al., 2009). In a collaborative study conducted by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Madariaga College of Europe Foundation, Kok et al., (2009:17) completed interviews and desktop research with representatives of civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations and international institutions. Amongst these representatives, ACCORD and Madariaga College asked for their reflections and perspectives on the role that natural resources and the environment can play in complex conflict conditions. Kok et al., (2009:17) underlined that land as a material of survival and a factor of production is of high importance in the case of Burundi and its violent conflicts. Considering Burundi's economic activity, agriculture is perhaps the most significant and vital form of income that also represents a level of security. Kok et al., (2009:17), therefore, highlight in their study that subsistence agriculture is critical to family security. Moreover, the study found that land is usually acquired through means of inheritance, purchase, gift, lease or individual and state expropriations (Kok et al., 2009:17). Similarly, the competition for access to arable land is also in high demand (Gahama et al., 1994:94). In the past, this has degenerated into social tensions and has also been a triggering factor for violence within families and among neighbours wishing to expand their land in Burundi (Gahama et al., 1999:94). Besides the value of land in subsistence and small-scale agricultural production, it is also a fundamental element of stability, identity and belonging in Burundi (Kok et al., 2009:17). Within their research, the authors conducted several interviews with Burundians and found that most Burundians want to live on the land that once belonged to past generations of their respective families. However, this can and has been a controversial subject when internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees return to their communities and find that their land has been occupied or utilised by others. Likewise, the fact that the Burundian government have had to move groups of people from a piece of land in an attempt to implement development policies has further created tensions (Kok et al., 2009).

In spite of the high fundamental value that land holds, survival from subsistence agriculture by itself is becoming gradually less feasible in Burundi for a number of reasons. Oketch and Polzer (2002) maintain that land continues to operate as the principal capital for most households and so increases competition for land. Increased sub-division of land between sons, especially in the rural densely populated areas of Burundi, has also decreased the economies of scale accruing from larger fields (Oketch and Polzer, 2002; Diamond (2005). As a result, this has led to the surfeit and degradation of land, reduced productivity and

increases in food prices due to scarcity (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Burundians are also migrating to vulnerable, yet more fertile and uninhabited areas causing further erosion on the hillsides, hence urban migration – specifically to the capital, Bujumbura – is growing (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:122). As a result, individuals and family groups often have to part from their land in the rural areas. Corresponding to the land issue, Oketch and Polzer (2002), focus their study on coffee production, which accounts for 80 per cent of Burundi's foreign exchange receipts. The authors assert that over-reliance on a single cash-crop leaves this small country particularly susceptible to volatile global markets and also puts pressure on subsistence in conditions of land scarcity (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).

Through a re-examination of the conflicts in Burundi and the conflict management initiatives, Oketch and Polzer's analysis (2002) point to the role of environmental and ecological factors in causing violence in Burundi. Their theme is focused on the predatory state-dominated systems in Burundi, where the authors attempt to link the production and marketing of coffee and tea to the country's long running civil war (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:5). Their sound and acclaimed argument share the same perspective as many other scholarly researchers on Burundi whom have emphasised the importance of competition for control of the state. Oketch and Polzer (2002) maintain that the state and the predatory activities of the elite who control it, is both the underlying driver of violent conflicts, and the connecting link between the exploitation and degradation of Burundi's natural resources and the conflicts. Hence, the control of the state is a powerful political tool which brings with it the power to decide the allocation of (all) Burundi's resources (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). For this reason, the concern, according to Oketch and Polzer (2002), lies within the role that the exploitation and control over the Burundi's agricultural produce played in fuelling the conflicts. Lastly, Oketch and Polzer (2002) assert that where there is violent appropriation of land, this takes place in the context of much wider structural violence, whose main target is the state, not the land itself. There are various definitions of structural violence; however, this study indicates that structural violence as form of violence where social structure or social institutions harm those who belong to a certain social order (Huggins and Clover, 2005).

The fragile peace currently being enjoyed in Burundi could be undermined by inadequate preparation to deal with population growth and ineffective institutions for addressing land disputes. Central to this, is the Arusha Peace Accord signed in 2000, an agreement that remains a foundation in the peace process. The environmental resource base upon which all

economic activity eventually depends includes ecological systems that produce a wide variety of services (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). This resource base is finite. Furthermore, imprudent use of the environmental resource base may permanently decrease the (carrying) capacity for generating material production in the future (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). All of this implies that there are certain thresholds to the carrying capacity of Burundi. It is, of course, possible that improvements in the management of resource systems, accompanied by resource-conserving structural changes in the economy, would enable economic and population growth to take place despite the limits of the environmental resource base, at least for some period of time (Goldstone, 2002). However, for that to even be conceivable, Kameri-Mbote (2005) propose that signals which effectively reflect and respond to increasing scarcities of the resource base need to be generated within the economic and political system, which puts the Arusha Agreement into question. If the peace negotiations are not continued with the necessary changes and progress in the short term, Burundi's future looks gloomy. The negotiations are crucial for success as their collapse could result in the parties turning to military means to resolve the problems in the country, leading to instability, and chaos (Goldstone, 2002).

1.2.2 Theoretical framework

The nature of the conflicts in Burundi is multi-dimensional and compounded by diverse sources of conflict. Given the nature and manifestation of the conflicts in Burundi, it is necessary to adopt a systems approach. While there has been emphasis from scholars on the debate about resource-rich countries¹³ and their resource-curse¹⁴, there is also common consent amongst scholars who are more concerned with 'political ecology' and the discourse of environmentally related conflicts. As such, the emphasis is on the relationship between conflict and weak/weakened states with natural resources that are more directed towards conflict (Keen, 1998; Berdal and Malone, 2000; UN, 2001; Collier, 2004).

Scarcity, the area under discussion in this study, is more concerned with and encompasses natural resources: land, fertile soils, fresh water and forests, to mention a few. The scarcity approach builds on Thomas Robert Malthus' school of thought – which introduced the concept known as the 'Malthusian trap'. This notion was developed as early as in 1798 and in his book *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, Malthus (1798) claimed that hunger was

¹³ Countries that are rich in natural resources such as oil, minerals and diamonds.

¹⁴ Resource curse refer to resource-rich countries that perform poorly in terms of socioeconomic development and therefore their natural resources impede sustainable growth (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001).

predictable because the human population grows in a linear fashion for the reason that population growth proceeds exponentially, while food production only increases in a linear pattern. In essence, what the ‘Malthusian trap’ denotes is that there is a fundamental difference between how population grows and how food production grows. Because when a population increase, the additional people added to the existing population also reproduce themselves, thus symbolising a vicious cycle whereby “*interest itself draws interest*” (Diamond, 2005:312). Food production, on the contrary, does not further increase yields; rather, it only grows arithmetically (Malthus, 1798). Consequently, Malthus (1798) stressed that the world’s carrying capacity the point at which human population will outgrow the growth of food due to its growth pattern. Moreover, this study does not apply the ‘Malthusian trap’ theory to the Burundian case study; its reference is merely used as a contextual starting point. Instead, the conceptual framework within this study will make use of Jared Diamond’s (2005) five point framework of potential trigger factors to environmental collapse. Additionally, Diamond’s (2005) ‘ecocide’ theory, which argues that there are eight specific indicators as to how societies have undermined themselves by damaging their own environment¹⁵, is applied to the Burundian case.

The main purpose of this section is to outline Diamond’s (2005) five point framework and his ‘ecocide’ theory with brief associations to the Burundian case. The intention is merely to provide an insight into the five different factors and the eight indicators which leads to ecocide. However, in chapter four, a further elaboration of Diamond’s (2005) claims will be applied when assessing the research question.

1.2.2.1 The five-point framework

Why are some societies more fragile than others? What is the obvious problem? The fact that societies collapse is a complex subject, but how to make sense out of the complexities of this subject? These key questions explored by Diamond (2005) formulate his five-point framework of potential contributing factors in trying to understand environmental collapse. Diamond (2005) employs his framework as a kind of checklist in trying to understand and analyse society’s collapse. The main emphasis within the context of the five-point framework, will not be on all of these factors in this study, however, the main focus will be on society’s (Burundi) response to its environmental problems thus on land and population growth, which is the last factor in Diamond’s (2005) framework.

¹⁵ Thus resulting in what Diamond (2005) refers to as ‘ecocide’.

In the event of a society's collapse, there are always contributing factors, as Diamond (2005:11) asserts, "environmental damage cannot be the sole factor". Diamond's first factor within his framework, deals with environmental damage that human and/or societies unintentionally impose upon their environment. Here, the emphasis lies on the properties of the environment and Diamond (2005) divides them into two categories; fragility (susceptibility to damage) and resilience (potential for recovery from damage), which in turn helps to understand why some societies choose to fail "suffered environmental collapses involving either exceptional imprudence of their people, exceptional fragility of some aspects of their environment, or both" (Diamond, 2005:11). Connected to Burundi's land degradation, which presented worrying signs of land depletion as early as the mid-1960s, the land area in Burundi has revealed itself as fragile due to the overutilization of land as a result of demographic pressure. As the case of Burundi, more people thus create more demand.

The second factor within the five-point framework is that of climate change. This is perhaps the most complex factor within Diamond's (2005) framework as the term climate change is itself ambiguous. Although some theories look at climate change as a result of global warming caused by humans, Diamond (2005:12) disputes this claim. He contends that climate change, in fact, has little or nothing to do with humans per se, but climate change is more the result of changes in natural forces that drive climate. In reference to this, Diamond (2005:12) exemplifies his argument by stating that "such forces include changes in the heat put on the sun, volcanic eruptions that inject dust into the atmosphere, changes in the orientation of the Earth's axis with respect to its orbit, as well as changes in the distribution of land and ocean over the face of the Earth". Diamond (2005:12) further argues that in many historical cases, it was not the depletion of environmental resources itself that was the prime cause of a society's collapse, but a combination of the aforementioned and climate change. Put differently; if a society did not partly or wholly deplete its environmental resources, then that society may well have been capable of surviving the resource exhaustion caused by climate change (Diamond, 2005). What this means is that both factors complement each other and that neither one of them can be taken alone in order to prove or disprove to be fatal.

The third possible contributing factor is hostile neighbours. Here the emphasis is on the fact that relations with neighbouring societies might have been close enough in order to have some interaction and that these relations might have been erratically hostile, if not constantly so (Diamond, 2005:13). Adding to this, Diamond (2005:13) asserts that a society has the possibility to 'hold off' its enemies only on the basis of it being strong; otherwise a society

will capitulate when it becomes weakened for any reason, including environmental damage. Moreover, Diamond (2005:13) maintains that the proximate cause of any collapse in this regard, will then be military invasion and the definitive cause would have been the factor that caused the weakening. Consequently, collapses within societies that occur due to ecological reasons or other reasons are by and large masquerade as military defeats (Diamond, 2005).

The fourth set of factors is (un)friendly trade partners, whereby the partner and the enemy could be one and the same neighbour –all but a few historical societies have had friendly trade partners in addition to neighbouring enemies (Diamond, 2005:14). The example given is the trade relations between ‘first world’ and ‘third world’ countries, where there is an increase in risk if the respective trade partners become weakened for any reason (like environmental damage) and are no longer able to supply the essential import or the cultural tie necessary, then the receiving society may also become weaker as a result. Here, Diamond (2005:14) refers to ‘first world’ countries that depend on oil from ecologically fragile and politically troubled ‘third world’ countries.

Finally, the fifth factor in Diamond’s (2005) framework is society’s response to its environmental problems. An investigation of how the Burundian society’s response to its environmental issues, which in this context is limited access to land coupled with population growth, has, if at all, been appropriated will be discussed in chapter four. According to Diamond (2005), it is important to acknowledge that the first four factors may or may not prove significant for a particular society, but the fifth factor, always proves to be significant and thus serves as the most prominent one, which corresponds with the broader outline of this study, namely to show how limited access to land and population growth can serve as trigger factors to the political conflicts in Burundi. In accordance with the fifth factor, this study also stresses the importance of understanding that environmental problems cannot be assessed as a single factor. While it is no secret that different societies respond differently to similar problems, the salient purpose, evidently, is that a society’s, in this case Burundi, response to environmental problems is entirely within its control, which is not always true of the other factors. Put differently, as the authors subtitle denote, a society can “choose to fail or survive” (Diamond, 2005:13).

1.2.2.2 Ecocide

Another comprehensive argument put forward by Diamond is his ‘ecocide’ hypothesis. ‘Ecocide’ is a process by which societies have undermined themselves by damaging their

environment. The author points to recent discoveries made by archaeologists, climatologists, historians, palaeontologists and palynologists¹⁶, where unintentional ‘ecocide’ has been confirmed. According to Diamond (2005:6), ‘ecocide’ applies to triggering effects of ecological problems in which people unintentionally destroy the environmental resources on which their societies depend on.

Eight categories are identified where their relative significance varies from case to case and that are ‘signals of doom’; deforestation and habitat destruction; soil problems (such as erosion, salinisation and soil fertility losses); water management problems; overhunting; overfishing; effects of introduced species on native species; human population growth; and, finally, increased per capita impact of people. In addition to the abovementioned categories that undermined past societies, the environmental problems confronting societies today are understood with four additional categories: human-caused climate change; build-up of toxic chemicals in the environment; energy shortages, and lastly, full human utilisation of the earth’s photosynthetic capacity (Diamond, 2005). Societal collapses like the ancient Anasazi, the Maya and the Greenland Norse, to name but a few, proved certain tendencies to follow parallel courses denoting variations on a theme (Diamond, 2005:6). For instance, the implementation of particular intense methods of agricultural production (for example, irrigation, terracing and double-cropping) was a result of population growth and thus forced people to adopt such means. Moreover, the expansion of farming from first the main land, into further marginal land with the purpose of feeding the increasing amount of hungry people (Diamond, 2005:6). Furthermore, unsustainable practices, Diamond (2005:6) states, resulted in environmental damage of one or more of the eight categories of ‘ecocide’, consequently ensuing in agriculturally marginal lands having to be abandoned once more. The damage and effects for a society thus included; food shortages, starvation, and wars amid large numbers of people fighting for a small amount of resources as well as deposed governing elites by disillusioned masses (Diamond, 2005:6). The population of the society ultimately decreased owing to war, disease or starvation and thus society suffered the loss of some of the political, cultural and economic complexity that it had attained at its peak (Diamond, 2005).

Diamond (2005:6) acknowledges that this grim trajectory is not one that all past societies followed consistently to the end; dissimilar societies collapsed at different degrees and in

¹⁶ More commonly referred to as pollen scientists (Diamond, 2005:6).

relatively diverse ways, while many societies did not collapse at all. Somalia and more importantly, in this case, Burundi and Rwanda; is used as an example of a modern society where Diamond (2005:7) maintains that both the Burundian and Rwandese society have ‘developed’ into collapsed societies. Perhaps for the purposes of this study, Diamond’s (2005:10) reflection on the controversies and complexities about past and present ecological collapse and his assertion that not all societies are doomed to collapse due to environmental damage, is the most important factor to consider. Maybe the real question is why only some societies illustrated fragility or resilience and what then distinguished those that collapsed from those that did not? The type of fragility referred to is the way(s) in which some societies are more susceptible to environmental damage than others.

Within the context of this study, the case of Burundi can be understood using Diamond’s (2005) framework, namely; the intersection of environmental damage and population growth as key contributors to conflict. This study chooses to use Diamond (2005) as the theoretical description when analysing the research question set out earlier in this chapter. Diamond (2005) highlights important factors and contributors which need to be explored when analysing violent conflicts, similarly, this thesis also investigates the Burundian conflicts within this framework. Another aspect where this study and Diamond’s (2005) framework intersect is the emphasis on important factors regarding environmental damage and how this can lead to collapse and also provide as dynamite for violent conflict. Moreover, Diamond (2005) also underlines how such grim trajectories are prevalent to humanity, however, society’s incidence of collapse and violent conflict intensifies with environmental degradation, population pressure. As such, the thread that connects this study to Diamond (2005) is the examination of environmental damage and the social effects merely serve as trigger factors of gruesome violence.

1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Within the specific research objectives, the purpose of this study is a descriptive analysis, where the prime focus is on secondary sources which are undertaken as the main data base to be used for this specific study. The methodology which is employed for this study includes literature study, review of scholarship and factual data sources. Moreover, the research method involves analysing existing data obtained from qualified literature on the topic of Burundi. The literature study also forms part of an overview of the theoretical methods of the conflicts in Burundi. The process by which the gathering of data has been carried out is an

extensive collection and examination of written material merely in English, specifically books and journal articles. In addition to this, relevant newspaper and magazine articles and various official reports have been utilised. Within this research, the proposed case study focuses on Burundi¹⁷, thus a single-state case study and will accordingly, form the crest of the study. Consequently, the unit of analysis will be the state of Burundi.

This research design employs empirical and qualitative analysis to answer the research questions stated previously in this chapter. In addition, quantitative data is presented in order to substantiate the analysis. The timeframe of the study covers the period from the pre-colonial era of Burundi until 2005. Rather than being a mere longitudinal study¹⁸, this study examines the events in a chronological order beginning in the pre-colonial era, circa 1300, until 2005 when the first National Assembly elections were held after the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000. In 2005, the term of the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) ended due to the aforementioned elections.

1.4 OPERATIONALISATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

Some of the ways to address certain research problems lie at the heart of conceptualising and operationalising key variables used in a study. The ways in one defines key concepts and variables in a study effects the success of the research. According to Babbie and Mouton (2008:136), many concepts in the social sciences have complex and varied meanings and it is therefore crucial to explicitly clarify what is meant by the concepts and how they will be measured in a study. Within this study, the following concepts will be defined against the backdrop of this study's purpose.

The environment is the external surroundings in which humans live in a geographical place; environmental conflict is therefore measured as conflict that arises due to natural renewable and non-renewable resource degradation and scarcity.

Population growth forms part of the environment, and will be measured in terms of the annual growth rate of the Burundian population from 1960 to 2012; this will also include returning refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs).

Land refers to an area of ground especially in terms of its ownership and/or use.

¹⁷ A case study is an intensive examination of a single unit (Babbie and Mouton, 2008).

¹⁸ According to Babbie and Mouton (2008:93), longitudinal study involves the collection of data at different points in time; observations are done over an extended period of time.

Land access refers to the right or opportunity to use, manage, and control land and its resources. It includes the ability to reach and make use of the resources for growing crops, running stock, hunting, access to water, gathering wild foods, fuel, building materials, medicinal herbs.

Scarcity is a concept which entails the condition of something being deficient; it will be measured in terms of having an inadequate amount of something that has value and in this study it is the scarcity of land in Burundi.

Resource(s) is an available source of wealth that has economic value, relates to access and control over territory, material, economic and natural resources. Resources are mainly divided into two groups; renewable resources (sources of livelihood such as land, fresh water, forests, fertile soils and fish stocking) and non-renewable such as oil, minerals and iron ore (ACCORD, 2009). Likewise, renewable sources may not be accessible to all people in a geographical area and may be corrupted by use or mismanagement. Land as a renewable resource, is the main variable used in this research.

Resource scarcity is measured as deficient per capita availability of a renewable resource, in this case, land. Consequently, increasing scarcity is influenced by a declining resource base and/or increased demand and dependence for the resource, such as land, through a growing population pressure coupled with an increase in consumption.¹⁹ A good example of this is population growth, which can reduce a resource' per capita availability by dividing it among more and more people.

Social identity refers to how individuals regard themselves in relation to a society, most commonly, a society in which they live. Social identity is measured by how behaviour and identity differ based on Burundians' flexible concepts of themselves as either individuals or as members of groups.

Conflict is indicated as armed violent struggle between civilians, armed forces, and the state or rebel forces. Within this study it is measured as the violence amongst Burundians in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralise, injure, or eliminate rivals (Coser, 1956:8). There is no strict severity threshold measured in this study, conflict is however quantified as deadly violence between civilians, groups and/or the state. Moreover, conflict is quantified as an act that arises due to scarcity of natural renewable resources (land)

¹⁹ Homer-Dixon (1999) refers to this as environmental scarcity.

in Burundi. In order to clarify the scope of this concept, this study will measure the four conflicts in Burundi; 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993.

Violence is in essence, an act of aggression, an intentional expression of physical or verbal force against others. Violent conflict is therefore operationalised as a situation that occurs among individuals or groups. Behaviour intended to hurt damage or kill someone.

1.5 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

There are some limitations to this research that are of significance. Firstly, limitations regarding this study have to delimit the data and material that will be included in this research due to the constraints that are obligatory both by time and space which do not allow an extended examination of the various aspects that apply to this subject. This further signifies that only the foremost issues relating to the research question shall be considered.

Secondly, this study is limited by the fact that a specific case study is examined and that a comprehensive investigation of the entire (Great Lakes) region or continent therefore falls outside the boundary of this analysis.

Thirdly, as the research in this study is mostly based on secondary sources, an independent examination has therefore not been executed in order to obtain primary research to supplement the secondary sources. It is for this reason that a thorough reflection of a wide range of sources is needed in order to draw on various viewpoints as is possible within the specific limitations of the study. Furthermore, Babbie and Mouton (2008: 150) hold that a case study has specific limitations due to the fact that the researcher may be “blinded by personal bias”.

The discourse on conflict has seen the use of various conflict analyses as a method of assessment. Conflict analysis per se, however, usually involves the verification of whether one is dealing with a conflict; defining conflict system boundaries and using specific conflict analysis tools to determine and zoom in on any characteristics of the conflict together with organising significant information (Mason and Rychard, 2005). Within the context of the violent conflicts in Burundi, a broad academic and policy literature has been instructed accordingly. A wide range of theories and debates, such as the ‘Greed versus Grievance’ debate, the ‘Ethnic’ debate, the ‘Greenwar’ thesis, to mention but a few have been used not only as a description, but also as an application to the conflicts in Burundi. With this in mind, the spectres for such theories are too complex and comprehensive for this study to explore; in

any attempt possible given the unavoidable constraints due to time and space for this study-delimitation in such matters falls naturally. More importantly, the specific research question investigated in this study does not coincide with these theories and debates and have thus not been the focus or correlation to the specific research question within this study.

Finally, in addition to the primary sources written in English, the researcher of this study has acknowledged that scholarly and policy work has been written in Kirundi and French – the two official languages in Burundi. Kirundi and French are widely spoken in Burundi along with English and Swahili. Materials in Kirundi and French have been inaccessible to the researcher of this study; and therefore a delimit to this study, however, this study holds that the English sources are sufficient in order to make this study viable.

1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS




Figure 1: Outline of the remainder of the study

CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The main focus of chapter two is the history of Burundi from the pre-colonial era to the 2005 political election. A historical exploration of the role and relationship between the monarchy and the colonial authority of both German and Belgian rule is highlighted. Furthermore, a brief outline of the 1965, 1972, 1988 and the 1993 conflicts which occurred in Burundi are discussed as well as the transition period and the 2005 election.

CHAPTER 3: ANALYSES IN PERSPECTIVE

Formed alongside chapter two, chapter three begins with an examination of the power-sharing agreement signed in 2004 and the negotiated constitution. In order to further develop our understanding of this subject matter as a whole, this chapter looks at the key actors in the conflicts that this study deems important; namely, regional actors, the United Nations

Operation in Burundi and external economic aid. It will be useful to have an understanding of the various factors involved in the conflicts and its nature, therefore, this chapter illustrates to what extent these factors are of any significance. The central focus of this chapter sees the introduction of Jared Diamond, an examination of his book, *Collapse* and Diamond's (2005) interesting case study on Rwanda, which draws significant similarities to Burundi.

CHAPTER 4: ASSESSING LAND AND POPULATION GROWTH

This chapter illuminates important factors that retain fundamental to the impetus and history behind conflicts over land in Burundi coupled with population pressure. This chapter discusses the topographic landscape in Burundi and also the differences between the rural and urban provinces and how this has an effect on agricultural production due to the vast ecological differences. Moreover, the role of the state is briefly discussed and its function to land administration. In order to effectively grasp and evaluate the land question and rising population in Burundi, it is necessary to provide an overview of the complex and context-specific nature of land distribution, land tenure, the demographic growth in Burundi and its threats within the historical framework from pre-colonial to the post-conflict era. Limited access to land, scarce resources in Burundi due to the intense dependence on agriculture and a constant growing population are thus be examined in this chapter. The return of Diamond and his environmental analysis will again assess Burundi's environmental variables. An evaluation of whether the Arusha Peace Accord addresses these environmental factors and what kind of (if any) legal framework has afforded such issues, will also be highlighted.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

This final chapter will serve as the connection between the various aspects that have been observed throughout this study. The findings will be observed in unison, providing an overall conclusion as to the impact of population growth and land access on the political conflicts in Burundi. A general discussion of the limitations that the study incurred will be discussed followed by recommendations for future research.

Chapter 2

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Colonialism may have planted the seeds for ethnic conflict but, as Mahmood Mamdani (2001) argues, blame must be partly attributed to the post-colonial state, which failed to promote a more inclusive vision of society that transcends external concepts of race and ethnicity. Acknowledging Burundi's heterogeneous population leads us to a more nuanced explanation for the persistence of conflict and the struggle over the state (Daley, 2006). Rivalries between clans, communes and families permeate the social structure and cut across ethnic boundaries. Because of the heterogeneity of the Tutsi group, its dynastic families, and the variety of social bases for inter-ethnic relations, observers such as Lemarchand (1994), have long challenged the simplification of social identities in the discourse about conflict in Burundi. Daley (2006) argues that in the post-colonial state, the Hutu/Tutsi binary has only limited explanatory value. One can identify five distinct cleavages around which conflict occurred in Burundi: intra-aristocracy, between the old guard and the young modernised elite, between Hutu and Tutsi, intra-Tutsi, between the military and the political elite, and lately intra-Hutu (Daley, 2006). The first civil conflict occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s with the rise of nationalist movements. As Mamdani (1996:20) writes: *"The politics of Africanization was simultaneously unifying and fragmenting; unifying the victims of colonial racism [but dividing] the same majority along lines that reflected the actual process of redistribution: regional, ethnic, and at times just familial."*

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the historical events which took place in Burundi from the pre-colonial era, to the elections in 2005. The importance of including the historical account in Burundi is to better understand the kind of system that was present both pre and post-colonial rule. Cultural and political differences that brought with the shift from a hegemonic government to colonial rule are also discussed in this chapter. Moreover, an assessment of the four political conflicts that broke out in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993, respectively are discussed and will thus form the backdrop of this study.

2.2 PRE-COLONIAL BURUNDI (c1300-1890)

The current ethnic differentiations in Burundi have their origin in patterns of human settlement which began to take shape in the 15th century. Oral traditions and archaeological evidence suggest that the gradual advancement of eastern Bantu agriculturalists on the indigenous hunter-gatherer societies that originated in the Congo Basin (known as the Twa or Pygmies), derived from Mali and the Central African Republic in the 12th century. The Bantu speakers also introduced animal husbandry namely, cattle, sheep and goats (Bentley and Southall, 2005:32-33). A patchwork of polities emerged after a while in the densely populated areas of the Great Lakes Region and by the end of the 18th century these had been consolidated into six large kingdoms, four in Uganda and the kindred states, Rwanda and Burundi (Bentley and Southall, 2005:32).

A highly structured hierarchy emerged in Burundi which was concentrated around a divine king (*mwami*) whose officials, drawn from royal princes (*ganwa*), created the ruling oligarchy that governed through large autonomous chiefdoms (Oketch and Polzer, 2002; Bentley and Southall, 2005). The chiefdoms themselves were overwhelmingly dominated by a wealthy cattle owning warrior elite who, together with the king and royal court officials, formed the Tutsi ruling class that comprised about 14 per cent (Bentley and Southall, 2005; Mthembu-Salter, 2008). The substantial majority of the population (85 per cent) were peasants engaged in agriculture and were called Hutu's, but there was also a small number of Twa (1 per cent) who were economically and socially marginalised (Mthembu-Salter, 2008:152). Oketch and Polzer (2002) add that the social system in Burundi was divided between royals and commoners, specifically the *ganwa*-Tutsi on the one hand and the non-royal Tutsi on the other. Hutu's were also categorised as commoners. The Twa however, were at that time treated as social outcasts, exactly as they are now (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Consequently, when Burundi entered recorded history in the mid-19th century the kingdom was already a complex integrated social structure connected together by a collective loyalty to the monarchy. This was due to the extensive system of government and administration that had been developed in conjunction with the sophisticated bonds of personal client-patron relations that tied the people of various strata of society to one another (Bentley and Southall, 2005). What was of more significance was the fact that Burundians shared a common language, religion and ethno-political identity (Kimber, 1996).

Social identity, certain privileges and social obligations depended on a number of factors. These included lineage, cattle ownership and usage, occupation and standing in the complex social and political hierarchies that exercised executive and judicial power. In addition to this, these hierarchies controlled the distribution of land (Mthembu-Salter, 2008). The classifications Hutu, Tutsi and Twa came to refer primarily to lineage and occupation and these groups were stratified internally along lines of wealth and socio-political standing (Mthembu-Salter, 2008). According to Oketch and Polzer (2002) neither internal nor external identity boundaries were rigidly determined at birth and one could move upwards and downwards in class within these structures and even between them. In this manner, *"Hutus could 'become' Tutsi by achieving certain levels of wealth in cattle or influence"* and they *"enjoyed significant positions of responsibility and authority and were accorded property rights"* (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:91). This was further cemented by intermarriages between Tutsi's and Hutu's.

In the second half of the 19th century conflict within the *ganwa* between two competing royal lineages, the Bezi and the Batware led to Bezi ascendancy over their rivals and the Batware were displaced from positions of power; the rivalry between the two groups was later to be exploited by the colonial authorities (Bentley and Southall, 2005:36; Mthembu-Salter, 2008:152). To effectively strengthen their monopolistic power, the Bezi centralised the administration of the kingdom resulting in the transformation of the client-patron relationships that had hitherto bound Burundian society together into feudal like structures of lordship and bondage with society. This rigidly divided Tutsi overlords and the Hutu's who had been reduced to serfdom, with both under the domination of the Bezi who now controlled access to land and cattle (Bentley and Southall, 2005:36; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:91-121). Technically all land belonged to the king and was dispensed by him; under the centralised polity, effective control of land was in the hands of the *ganwa* who used their power of distribution to cement their control over the Hutu peasants (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:122). In this way Tutsi and Hutu indemnities lost their fluidity and took on the features of a ridged caste system (Bentley and Southall, 2005:36). Banderembako (2006) explains that this search for political and social stability and integration took a different turn in the second half of the 19th century as land became increasingly scarce and population density grew. This led, on one hand, to centralisation and stronger government and, on the other hand, to the strengthening of trade relations and the growth and hardening of feudal-type relationships under the so-called *ubugabire* and *ubugererwa* systems (Banderembako, 2006:19).

2.3 COLONIAL RULE

2.3.1 German Colonialism (1890-1916)

At the Berlin Conference in 1884 and 1885, the partition of Africa was victim of the European powers allocating the territories of modern Rwanda and Burundi to Germany (Bentley and Southall, 2005:32). In 1890 the kingdom of Urundi (now Burundi) and the neighbouring kingdom, Ruanda (now Rwanda) were formally incorporated into German East Africa, but it was only in 1896 that the first military presence was established in Usumbura (Bujumbura) (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2001). Moreover, in 1899 was Urundi-Ruanda constituted as a military-administrative district administered from German East Africa (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2001). The process of German occupation was facilitated by inter-dynastic power struggles within the royal family, between the Bezi and the Batware, which the Germans exploited by siding with the Bezi in exchange for their recognition of German rule (Bentley and Southall, 2005).

Due to a lack of manpower and resources the Germans retained all existing social and political structures and rule was exercised through the monarchy and its existing state formations controlled by the Bezi lineage (Mthembu-Salter, 2008). This effectively modernised and centralised the existing state (Bentley and Southall, 2005). Alongside this, the Germans attempted to strengthen the power of the chiefdoms to counter the growing power of the monarchy by empowering the subordinate chiefdoms, thus further solidifying the caste system that had emerged over the previous half century, with a wealthy Tutsi minority dominating a dispossessed Hutu majority (Mthembu-Salter, 2008; Bentley and Southall, 2005). In line with late 19th and early 20th century social Darwinian thinking, the Germans viewed Burundi's caste structure as reflecting a past in which the Tutsi "were descended from superior and more advanced people who had migrated, variously, from Ethiopia, ancient Egypt, Melanesia or Asia Minor, or even the lost continent of Atlantis, and they had carried monarchical institutions with them and superimposed them upon the original Hutu and Twa inhabitants" (Bentley and Southall, 2005:33). The colonial beliefs regarding Hutu's and Tutsi's, merely brought more tension amongst the two ethnic groups. The German colonial approach to create such caste structure only provided an even more disconnect amongst Tutsi's and Hutu's. The effect of this pseudo-scientific discourse was to reconstruct castes as ethnic identities and to provide a racially prejudiced justification for relations of domination and subordination and of minority Tutsi control of wealth, privilege and power at

the expense of the majority Hutu's (Bentley and Southall, 2005; Oketch and Polzer, 2002). This creation of mutually exclusive ethnic identities, and their coupling with differentiated access to control of resources and opportunity, put into motion the forces of social conflict that would tear the Burundian polity apart (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).

The introduction of a money-based economy had an unexpected disintegrative outcome on traditional social structures, since wealth accumulation and social status no longer depended primarily on the ownership and distribution of cattle (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). In cash economy, the distinction between Tutsi and Hutu that the Germans had sought to develop and enforce, were not merely irrelevant, they were ineffectively unsound (ISS, 2005). Coffee was of particular significance as a cash crop, which was introduced by missionaries and was promoted by the German authority as a means of generating revenue (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:123).

The short period of German rule was brought to an end with the outbreak of World War I and the following Belgian occupation of Burundi in 1916. However, the German system of indirect rule and their transmutation of socio-economic groups into ethnicities, were inherited and advanced by their Belgian successors (Bentley and Southall, 2005:37; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:92).

2.3.2 Belgian Colonial Rule (1916-1962)

After the outbreak of World War I, the Belgians invaded and occupied Urundi-Ruanda, ejecting the Germans and callously controlling native resistance (ISS, 2005). The territory remained under military occupation until 1923 when, in terms of the Treaty of Versailles, it was allocated to Belgium as a mandate territory under the League of Nations (Bentley and Southall, 2005:32). The Belgians continued the German strategy of indirect rule, effectively governing Urundi and Ruanda as separate territories through the agency of their monarchies (Bentley and Southall, 2005:32). In Urundi the power of the *ganwa* and particularly that of the Bezi royal lineage, was consolidated and the dominance of Tutsi's over Hutu's was reinforced (Mthembu-Salter, 2008:152). To bolster the loyalty of the Tutsi's, the Belgians established the ethnic divisions created by the Germans by ensuring unequal access to educational opportunities, creating a class of literate, 'westernised', aristocratic Tutsi's to rule over the illiterate, 'traditional', peasant Hutu's (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:93). Tutsi's in general, and the Bezi in particular, had privileged access to mission schools, facilitating their rapid conversion to Catholicism, which provided them with the literacy required to enable

them to occupy the rungs of the colonial bureaucracy (Bentley and Southall, 2005:37; Mthembu-Salter, 2008:152).

Largely excluded from education and the civil service, the Hutu's were strongly subordinated to the Tutsi elite and subject to "a draconian system of forced labour whereby mostly Hutu were drafted to work for the state without pay" and subjected to land expropriation often with inadequate compensation (Bentley and Southall, 2005:37). As soon as resistance had been broken the Belgians set about cementing administrative control and making the new territories pay their way (ISS, 2005). They imposed poll taxes and forced labour obligations which were brutally extracted, burdens which fell particularly heavy on the impoverished Hutu peasantry (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:124). They further used the German system of indirect rule to enforce the planting of cash crops, especially coffee, and the implementation of poll taxes in cash was designed to encourage coffee planting to raise cash to pay taxes, and to force those who could not do so to offer their labour on the mines of the Belgian Congo, as much as to raise revenue for the colonial administration (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:93-124).

Belgian rule was thus a continuation of what the Germans had implemented years earlier. Over time direct intervention became more frequent and wide reaching and the extraction of wealth more naked and violent. Not surprising, were the peasant uprisings in the 1920s and 1930s (Kimber, 1996). In the 1930s as Belgium intensified its rule more directly through its own structures and administrators, the power of the monarchy and traditional socio-political structures were henceforth undermined in terms of its powers. Similarly, a class colonial administration was generated largely drawn from the *ganwa*-Tutsi (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:92). In 1933 the distinctions between Tutsi and Hutu were formalised and entrenched by the issue of ethnically based identity cards (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:93).

In the period after World War II, specifically in the 1950s "the arrival of a new generation of [Belgian] priests and administrators who were more open to egalitarian ideas and democracy did bring about a reorientation of attitudes towards the Hutus, who were now increasingly favoured by policies in church and state" (Bentley and Southall, 2005:40). As a reaction to the demands for independence amongst the Tutsi elite, the Belgians attempted to win the support of the Hutu's in their efforts to stay. The Belgians abolished the traditional feudal relations between Tutsi and Hutu and began to redistribute cattle, thus negating the basis of traditional caste distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi (ISS, 2005).

From 1959 onwards, with the decentralisation of legislative power to an indirectly elected legislative council, the new structures were modelled on those of Belgium, leading to the import of practices such as universal suffrage, party-based elections and the accountability of authorities to the electorate (Peterson, 2006). This was supplemented by the formation of a territorial guard, which was to become the basis of a national army recruited from Hutu's and Tutsi's. Elections, which had been conducted with open voting, were reformed to mandate secret ballot – in order to remove voting by Hutu's from public scrutiny and encouraging the growth of Hutu ethnic parties (Daley, 2006). These measures were seen by Tutsi's as a direct threat to their long-term rule over the majority of the population, and therefore to their wealth, power and physical security (Peterson, 2006). This sense of vulnerability was underpinned by massacres of Tutsi's in Rwanda and a flood of refugees southward in the wake of 1961 (Bentley and Southall, 2005).

In Burundi, the politics of nationalism and the struggle for control of the state, initially divided the well-established, essentially Tutsi political class (Daley, 2006). At the same time, Hutu consciousness of their potential political power rose with the prospect of a majoritarian electoral democracy. Additionally, the struggle for self-determination occurred simultaneously as the global political restructuring of the Cold War created aftershocks locally as the superpowers vied for political leverage over newly independent territories (Daley, 2006). The old rivalries in the Tutsi aristocracy primarily between the two Baganwa clans, the Bezi and Batware re-surfaced in the two leading nationalist parties; the Bezi-led *Unité pour le Progrès National* (UPRONA) and the Batware-controlled *Parti Démocratique Chrétien* (PDC) (Daley, 2006). UPRONA was founded by members of the Bezi aristocracy, and unofficially headed by the eldest son of the *mwami* (King) Mwambutsa IV, Prince Louis Rwagasore. The formation of UPRONA in 1957 functioned as a vehicle to defend the privileges of the ruling Bezi, but the rapid deterioration of the situation in Rwanda led to the repositioning of UPRONA as a trans-ethnic nationalist party (Bentley and Southall, 2005:42). Additionally, the charismatic leadership of Prince Rwagasore and the loyalty that many Burundians still felt towards the monarchy, UPRONA was able to unite Hutu and Tutsi anti-colonialists under the slogan 'unity and progress' (Daley, 2006). Significant for UPRONA was its progressive nationalist rhetoric and opposition to colonial rule with a strong association to the monarchy. These aspects of UPRONA garnered widespread Hutu support and saw itself as a confident winner in the legislative elections of 1961 (Daley, 2006). Frightened by this wave of popularism, the colonial authorities branded UPRONA as

communist and threw their weight behind the rival PDC and promised a more Belgium-friendly government after independence (Bentley and Southall, 2005:42). Rwagasore's murder on the 13 October 1961, supposedly planned by the PDC leadership with the tacit approval of the Belgians, led to the termination of the PDC and left the Batare as a competing political force (Daley, 2006). The colonial state had to admit defeat momentarily, as UPRONA formed the independent government in 1962. As social mobility was largely dependent on political patronage, young Hutu's, without access to state elites, embraced the patronage of younger Belgian clerics, fresh from the Walloon/Flemish factionalism in their home country (Daley, 2006). Hutu's were schooled and politicised in such a way as to see the Tutsi, and not the colonial state, as their oppressors (Daley, 2006). Despite the support from the missionaries, Hutu parties such as Parti du Peuple (PP) lacked a traditional power base to mobilize and, therefore, could not compete with the Baganwa-backed parties (Daley, 2006).

In order to get a thorough understanding of the period leading up to the political conflicts as well as why the violent political conflicts emerged - it is important to briefly mention the four major crises that contributed to the polarisation of ethnic sentiments in Burundi. At the peak of the change of government, a crisis of legitimacy rose concerning governmental institutions in relation to monarchical institutions. In November 1961, when the independence constitution was adopted, (but not implemented), King Mwambutsa IV gained extensive powers, while legislative power was shared by him with Parliament (Bentley and Southall, 2005). However, it was only after its independence on the 1st of July 1962 that Burundi changed from a kingdom to a constitutional monarchy under the King and subsequently his son; Ntare V (Mokoena, 2005). According to Lemarchand (1970:437) the disparity between monarchical and government institutions signifies the dominant feature of Burundian politics until the proclamation of the republic in 1966. Following his argument, Lemarchand (1970) maintains that this crisis of legitimacy was the first issue that led to the polarisation of ethnic reactions. Yet, within this period many Hutu's had a positive disposition towards the crown and they remained mostly part in support of UPRONA, a party associated with the monarchy (Lemarchand, 1970).

Monarchists in opposition to republican legitimacy did not take place until after independence, and only came into power when the monarchy exhibited tendencies towards royal autocracy (Mokoena, 2005). Lemarchand (1970) notes that the position of the king was in essence, agreed to be that of a position in the political system, however, with the ongoing

ethnic tensions, the position of the king changed from that of “an impartial arbiter to an active participant to the point of virtually eliminating all traces of government autonomy” (Lemarchand, 1970:353). The king kept control over an ever fractious country and his own divide-and-rule strategy, primarily aimed at balancing Hutu and Tutsi representation in the four successive governments he formed between 1963 and 1965, in actual fact exacerbated matters further, engendering fear amongst the Tutsi’s and a sense of disappointed expectations amongst the Hutu’s (Bentley and Southall, 2005:42). The result was a growing spiral of communal violence and a growing alienation of all the protagonists from the monarchy itself (ISS, 2005). The fact that the Burundian society, both Hutu and Tutsi, still associated themselves with the king, illustrate how the Burundian social order for many years, was formed along the monarchy. As such, it has been important to highlight the influence that the colonial rule played in creating artificial separations between the Hutu and Tutsi (Diamond, 2005).

In January 1965 the King replaced a Tutsi with a Hutu prime minister only to see the new incumbent assassinated three days later and alarmed by the deteriorating situation, the King called new legislative elections in May 1965 (Bentley and Southall, 2005). Despite the fact that Hutu candidates won 23 of the 33 seats, King Mwambutsa IV appointed a Tutsi, Léopold Bihumugani as Prime Minister (Bentley and Southall, 2005:42). This decision led to an attempted coup by Hutu politicians, supported by Hutu soldiers and policemen, which was vigorously suppressed by troops led by the Tutsi head of the territorial guard, Captain Michel Micombero (Bentley and Southall, 2005:42). About 500 Tutsi civilians were massacred by Hutu’s in retaliation, and Micombero unleashed a bloody purge of Hutu’s from the security forces, the elimination by massacre of the small Hutu educated elite that was not able to flee into exile and widespread killings of Hutu peasants throughout the country (Daley, 2006). King Mwambutsa IV fled to Zaïre²⁰ and dispatched his son to govern as regent, but in July 1966 the latter abolished the Constitution, deposed his father, claimed the throne as Ntare V and appointed Captain Micombero as Prime Minister (Mthembu-Salter, 2008). However, in November 1966 Micombero brought the monarchy to an end, proclaimed Burundi a republic and declared himself president, Ntare V fled to West Germany (Bentley and Southall, 2005; Mthembu-Salter, 2008). The outcome of this was the domination of the Tutsi controlled

²⁰ Currently known as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

UPRONA as well as the military and through such organs, the control of Burundi (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).

Louis Rwagasore was elected Prime Minister designate prior to the country's independence, he was, however, assassinated in October 1961 even before forming a government (Lemarchand, 1970). Not only did the assassination of Rwagasore represent one of the principal shocks that destabilised Burundi it also deprived the country of its most capable leader as well as the destruction of the nascent ethnic unity he had struggled so hard to achieve (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2000). As a charismatic leader of UPRONA and having strong relations to the crown, Rwagasore's death also conveyed a loss of leadership for UPRONA along Hutu-Tutsi lines (Lemarchand, 1970:294). It is argued that the murder of Rwagasore and the situation followed by his death was the second crisis that led to polarisation of ethnic sentiments (Lemarchand, 1970; Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2000). Following Rwagasore's death, the struggle for the heart of UPRONA was the third crisis. The battle for UPRONA was mainly characterised by Paul Mirerenko, a Hutu leader of UPRONA against André Muhirwa²¹. The alleged leadership crisis took effect in August 1962 with Mirerenko accusing Muhirwa of ethnic favouritism and nepotism as well as holding Muhirwa accountable for being disloyal to Rwagasore's dream of independence (Lemarchand, 1970). The situation at the gathering reached uncomfortable heights and the then Minister of Defence, Zénon Nicayenzi, ordered the military force to arrest Mirerenko and to separate the gathering, only to find that about 80 people (mainly Hutu) rallied around Mirerenko (Lemarchand, 1970). UPRONA became polarised between the Hutu and Tutsi factions and in an attempt to diffuse the circumstances, however not at the gathering, Mwambutsa called for the election of a new executive committee of UPRONA. Joseph Bamina (Hutu) was elected President in September 1962 and with him were the three Vice-presidents: Mirerenko, Muhirwa and Thaddée Siryuyumunsi (Mokoena, 2005). It is believed that ethnic tensions had then spread to the parliamentary and administrative organs of state (Mokoena, 2005). Mokoena (2005:43) gives an example of how this tension was present, stating that the National Assembly "was now divided in the middle between the Monrovia (Hutu) and Casablanca (Tutsi) groups". However, Monrovia, capital of Liberia and Casablanca, city in Morocco, did not have any association with the Burundian alignments of the 1960s, but with

²¹ André Muhirwa was the first Prime Minister of an independent Burundi (Lemarchand, 1970).

the sole purpose to differentiate in terms of descriptions for Hutu and Tutsi (Lemarchand, 1996:64).

What appears to be the fourth crisis took place following the Rwandan Revolution between 1959 and 1962 (Lemarchand, 1970; Mokoena, 2005). The effects of the Rwandan Revolution were the increase of ethnic solidarity and the 'corrupted' effect of republican ideas (Mokoena, 2005). The effects of the republican ideas were particularly powerful with Hutu elites educated in Catholic missions whom also understood the advantages of democracy as demonstrated by the case of Rwanda. According to Lemarchand (1970), Tutsi personalities invited Tutsi refugees from Rwanda to Burundi to act as a guarantee against a possible Hutu insurrection. Furthermore, a militia group among these refugees arrived from DRC to Burundi in December 1965. This group, which was violently uprooted from Rwanda during the revolution, had strong anti-Hutu sentiments and planned for a triumphant return to Rwanda. This was to be a major aspect of conflict in Burundi in the period following independence (Lemarchand, 1970). In light of the aforementioned issues occurring in post-independence Burundi, Lemarchand (1970:343) argues that the so-called 'Hutu awakening', was a factor in the polarisation of ethnic sentiments which occurred in Burundi and that "a sudden manifestation of ethnic hostility where none had seemed to exist previously". Mokoena (2005) further states that this polarisation of ethnicity can be explained by the characteristics of multi-ethnic societies that tend to experience a swift politicisation of residual ethnic ties at the approach of independence. Arguably, this is what occurred in Burundi.

Mokoena (2005) argues that at a specific level, two distinct aspects can be highlighted; 'anticipated reactions' is the first concept which is used to explain the first element. With this, Mokoena (2005) argues that a specific experience and estimate of the Rwandese situation, in the coming to power of the Hutu majority, were projected into the context of Burundi politics. For instance, the former Belgian president became an active supporter of the pro-Hutu People's Party (PP) (Lemarchand, 1970). Nzongola-Ntalatja (2001:65) further argues that the Belgian ideologies that had created the illusion of total authority by Tutsi's, found it expedient to portray the Tutsi as an aristocracy of alien origins that should relinquish power to the oppressed Hutu indigenous majority. 'Self-fulfilling prophesy' is the other concept used to describe the second element, according to Mokoena (2005). Hutu politicians attributed objectives that Burundian Tutsi at first did not have, but to which they eventually

gave credibility, executing malicious Hutu expectations of Tutsi (Lemarchand, 1970:344, 384; Lemarchand, 1996:66). Motives such as the close association of Burundian Tutsi with Rwandan Tutsi refugees were included. Moreover, a deterioration of diplomatic relations was as much a symptom as a cause of worsening Hutu-Tutsi relations in Burundi (Lemarchand, 1996:66).

In preparation for independence elections were conducted in September 1961, in which UPRONA won 80 per cent of the vote and 58 of the 64 seats in the new National Assembly, as well as control of most of the communes (Mthembu-Salter, 2008:152). As previously discussed, the assassination of Prince Rwagasore in October 1961 saw UPRONA being weakened by ethnic driven factionalism (Bentley and Southall, 2005:42). On the 26th of November 1961 a new Constitution was promulgated that gave wide powers to the King and under which Burundi attained independence on the 1st of July 1962 (Banderembako, 2006).

2.4 CHRONOLOGY OF THE POST INDEPENDENCE CONFLICTS

2.4.1 1961-1966: and the 1965 Conflict

The monarchy was to a certain degree the only remaining source of stability in the uncertain period post-independence, it was also a period characterised by a swing between hope for national unity and peace, and the beginning of the systematic exclusion and violence, which would continue to shape the post-independence history of Burundi. The first cycle of violence, according to Peterson (2006) was evident in this period, where the Tutsi elite excluded Hutu's from power, Hutu rebellion as well as extreme repression against educated and high-profiled Hutu by a Tutsi-controlled government. Increasing exclusion of Hutu's from powerful positions also took place after Rwagasore's death. Peterson (2006) state that one of the reasons it culminated in an attempted coup d'état by Hutu politicians against the King and monarchy, was the fact that there was a systematic exclusion of Hutu's from public positions as well as the King's decision to not allow them to form a government. Hutu leaders, politicians²² and those who attempted the coup d'état, were executed, which in turn furthered a massacre of 500 Tutsi civilians in the Muramvya province by Hutu's (Peterson, 2006). This resulted in massive army repression against the Hutu's across Burundi as well as

²² Politicians such as Paul Mirerenko and Gervais Nyangoma (Lemarchand, 1970).

a vacuum of Hutu leadership potential due to Hutu's fleeing the country (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).

As a result, UPRONA now became an "exclusive domain of Tutsi" (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:93). The effects of the first scale violence on the allocation of power had extensive consequences for the political progress of the country and for later conflicts. It is argued that the extermination and/or expulsion of nearly all educated, influential and wealthy Hutu led to a concentration of power, wealth and influence in Tutsi hands, and prevented competition for power for at least a generation (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Furthermore, this meant that the Tutsi, in essence had control over the national means of responding to future conflict. This was debated by scholars as resulting in negotiated politics or through violent repression, subsequently making all conflict resolution dependent on the interests of the ruling elite Tutsi's (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).

On 8th of July 1966, Ntare V acceded to the throne under the protection of the army (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). As previously discussed, with the dismissal of the Bihumugani's government the same year, Ntare V appointed Captain Micombero as the new Prime Minister. However, with the appointment of Captain Micombero yet another military coup was carried out to the defeat of Ntare V (Daley, 2006). With this, the first republic and principally Tutsi government, was declared in 1966. Subsequent to the coup emerged a 'republican-kinship' combined with 'neo-patrimonial polity' which was formed around a group of personal, kinship and ethnic-ties (Daley, 2006). A new dimension of illegitimacy emerged and so parliament was abolished and new institutions of government instituted with the principal being the 17 member National Revolutionary Council led by Micombero (Daley, 2006). Micombero also appointed himself as President and Prime Minister of Burundi, Minister of Defence and President of the now single-party UPRONA (Daley, 2006). The instability in the years after independence until 1966 was followed by a number of incidents. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2000) state that the assassination of Hutu labour unionists in 1962 and Hutu prime minister, Pierre Ngendandumwe in 1965, remained unpunished and thus raised suspicions within the Hutu elite.

These aforementioned events have been crucial shaping the more recent conflicts in Burundi. Not only have these events reflected conflicts between monarchists and republicans, but also the then growing conflict between Hutu and Tutsi. Moreover, these events which took place

within this period reveal the first military intervention in politics, which was to set the stage for the remaining conflicts of post-independence Burundi.

2.4.2 1966-1972: and the 1972 Insurgency

The period of government under Micombero, was marked by the accelerated purging of Hutu's from the army and the state and the consolidation of the Tutsi elite's dominance in the economy and higher education, and specifically domination by Tutsi's from the Bururi province (Mthembu-Salter, 2002; Bentley and Southall, 2005). In 1969 a bloody purge of remaining Hutu's from the military followed an alleged Hutu coup attempt (Bentley and Southall, 2005). This increasing marginalisation of Hutu's led to growing popular discontent. Similarly, another alleged coup attempt provided the opportunity to imprison rival Tutsi leaders from Muramvya province (ISS, 2005).

Worse followed in April 1972, when a Hutu insurrection began near Bujumbura, in which 2000 to 3000 Tutsi's lost their lives, followed by genocide reprisals instigated by the armed forces eliminating almost the entire educated Hutu population (Mthembu-Salter 2008). The consequence of this Hutu insurrection was the massacre of between 100 000 and 200 000 Hutu's by Tutsi's with a further 150 000 Hutu's displaced to neighbouring countries, mostly the DRC (Boshoff et al., 2010). The little that remained of the Hutu intelligentsia had been killed or driven into exile, which had been done with the purpose of terrorising the Hutu majority into submission as well as preventing any repetition of Hutu victory as was the case in Rwanda (Boshoff et al., 2010). The 1972 insurgency has been classified as the most extreme violence carried out in post-independence Burundi due to the fact that it ushered fear of genocide amongst both ethnic groups, as seen in Rwanda (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Parallel to the 1965 political conflict, the Burundian government and army killed with impunity. As Barnes (1999:711) observes: "The fact that the government was able to complete what the UN Genocide Convention refers to as a 'genocide in part' without any sanctions, domestic or international, had significant implications for the future development of both politics and Hutu-Tutsi relations in Burundi and the region as a whole."

Micombero attempted to suppress opposition and create a show of national unity by imposing a one-party state²³, under his centralised direction on Burundi. In reality, however, Burundi was effectively under military rule (Boshoff et al., 2010). This *façade* masked deep regional

²³ In this case, referring to UPRONA.

divisions within the Tutsi ruling elite and the army, and especially among the ruling Bururi Tutsi's, as they struggled for control over state income and resources (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2002). From independence onward, the Burundian economy had been in a downward spiral. The withdrawal of Belgian expertise and capital and the loss of access to markets in DRC and Rwanda decreased the commercial base of the economy, while growth and investment was strangled by social conflict and the use of the state by ruling factions as a means for private wealth accumulation (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2002:5). Moreover, Micombero presided over an unstable government that channelled resources into a growing but ineffectual and economic unproductive bureaucracy and military that was parasitic on the declining economy (Bentley and Southall, 2005).

The expanding state bureaucracy and army not only consumed resources unproductively, but became sites of conflict over access to resources and patronage power between Tutsi's regional factions, specifically between the ascendance of the Hima clan from the southern Bururi province and the previously dominant Banyaruguru clan who were increasingly marginalised (Peterson, 2006). Micombero's violent, disruptive and incompetent rule provided the justification for a successful military coup in November 1976 led by Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, who promised to end the military rule and to create a democracy sensitive to social justice (Mthembu-Salter, 2008:152).

A further effect of the pogroms was that from 1972 onward there were large numbers of Hutu's from Burundi in refugee camps in Tanzania, Rwanda and the DRC. The Hutu refugees would play an important part in the later violent political conflicts in Burundi in addition to conflicts within the region.

2.4.3 1972-1993: and the 1988 Insurrection

With the 1972 massacre coming to an end, also referred to as Burundi's first civil war, this period began with a certain level of serenity. Noteworthy for this era was the increased international pressure together with an economically weakened government, which brought about political reform (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). However, despite the relative tranquillity, another round of violence followed in 1988, which will be addressed later in this section. Paradoxically, the political reform that bolstered hope for a democratic Burundi, generated an "extremist backlash, which led to the fighting that continues today" (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:98).

On coming to power in November 1976, President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza attempted to defuse inter- and intra- ethnic tensions by a series of liberalisations. He returned Burundi to civilian rule in 1977 and Hutu's were incorporated into the government, an anti-corruption drive was launched and eventually a limited land reform programme was embarked upon (Bentley and Southall, 2005:43).

Parliamentary elections were held on the 22nd of October 1981²⁴ and a new constitution was approved by a constitutional referendum in November 1981, yet Burundi remained a one-party state under UPRONA (Mthembu-Salter, 2008:153). In terms of the constitution, National Assembly elections were held in October 1982 and Bagaza was elected President in 1984 with 99 per cent of the votes in a one-man race (Bentley and Southall, 2005). The reforms were thus cosmetic in character, the state remained dominated by UPRONA and the army, and both continued to serve as the instruments of political and economic domination of Burundi by the Tutsi's.²⁵ The Hutu majority, however, remained marginalised and disempowered (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU) was founded in 1980 in a refugee camp in Tanzania during the authoritarian years of Bagaza's rule (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:98). Though not recognised as significant at the time, PALIPEHUTU was formed by Hutu refugee rebels in order to organise resistance toward Tutsi domination amongst Hutu refugees in the DRC (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).

Tutsi's continued to receive preferential access to education and to employment in the organs of state (Bentley and Southall, 2005). As the state centralised all decision making and information distribution it came into conflict with the Catholic Church. The church provided an alternative means for access to health-care, education and social mobilisation to that of the Tutsi controlled state, as a result of which it was "accused of assisting Hutu resistance" (Bentley and Southall, 2005:45). This conflict culminated in the expulsion of missionaries and the nationalisation of catholic schools in 1985 (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2002). The failure to engage in meaningful political, economic and social reform and the persecution of the church by the state, led to increased dissent. This dissent was dealt with by even greater brutality from 1984 onwards, through arrests and torture of government opponents (Mthembu-Salter, 2008).

²⁴ The first since 1965 (Boshoff et al., 2010).

²⁵ In particular, the Bururi based Hima clan.

The early years of Bagaza's government were characterised by massive state investments financed through foreign loans. Since these investments were made to create new sources of income and patronage for the Bururi-Tutsi elite, and not to reach economic developmental goals, they had no long-term viability. They placed enormous demands on the country's balance of payments as it struggled to service foreign debt (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2002:6; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:98). The deteriorating human rights situation led to conflict with Burundi's major foreign donors, especially Belgium and France, who began to pressure the government for meaningful reform by withholding aid, which made up 50 per cent of government expenditure (Bentley and Southall, 2005:44; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:98). By 1986 the economic situation had become untenable and Bagaza was forced to adopt a structural adjustment programme imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank that included massive cuts in military and state spending (Kimber, 1996; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:98). This proved to be Bagaza's undoing, for the Tutsi elite and the military would not countenance the loss of jobs, income and patronage power this entailed, and he was deposed in September 1987 in a military coup led by Major Pierre Buyoya (Kimber, 1996).

From the onset, the military regime led by Pierre Buyoya that came to power in September 1987 articulated the intention to broaden the popular basis of the government by incorporating Hutu's into government (Daley, 2006). This created tension amongst Tutsi radicals and armed forces that feared this could instigate a course that would mirror the anti-Tutsi genocide in Rwanda (Daley, 2006). Buyoya released hundreds of political prisoners and relaxed the persecution of the church (Mthembu-Salter 2008). Buyoya, however, failed to move quickly; his first attempt was the compromise to appease hard-liners within the ruling elite which only resulted in disappointment and frustration amongst Hutu's, thus exacerbating a new uprising in the north of the country in August 1988 (ISS, 2005). The Hutu uprising led to massacres of hundreds of Tutsi civilians and reprisals quickly followed as 20 000 Hutu's were killed by the army and it is believed that another 60 000 fled to Rwanda (ISS, 2005). In October 1988, the President responded by accommodating more Hutu's into government including the Prime Minister, Adrien Sibomana a member of the Hutu led party; Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) that had been founded in 1986 (Daley, 2006). What distinguishes the 1988 crisis from previous outbreaks of violence, according to Oketch and Polzer (2002), is that the army could not carry out its brutal repression without its consequences.

After 1988, Burundi experienced regional and international attention, criticism as well as pressure on the government to introduce reforms with regard to democratisation and power sharing. As a result, the Buyoya regime incorporated the formation of a National Commission to study the question of National Unity. The Commission was, in addition, assigned to investigate the causes and perpetrators of the 1988 violence (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Along with these reforms and in an effort to build national unity, the Commission was equally balanced with Hutu and Tutsi members as well as a substantial number of Hutu's who were given administrative positions in the institutions of the state. Moreover, entries for Hutu's into higher education were also relaxed. Hutu's were included into government unity and a timetable was set for a transition to civilian rule (Kimber, 1996; Bentley and Southall, 2005:44). The government's cautious steps in the reform process provoked several coup attempts by Tutsi hardliners who feared that power was slipping from their hands (Bentley and Southall, 2005:44; Mthembu-Salter, 2008:153). Nevertheless, the reform process pressed on. During the first half of 1989 there were several attempted coups by Tutsi activists, hardliners and supporters of Bagaza. The Commission of National Unity published its report in April 1989 which was followed by intense public debate when Buyoya announced plans to fight discrimination against Hutu's in employment, education and in the armed forces. Civil unrest, however, did not abate either; there was significant violence and unrest in November 1990, when inter-ethnic tensions and violent confrontation took place in Bujumbura, as well as north-west of the country. According to unofficial sources, there were more than 3000 casualties, but the government of Burundi only gave evidence of 551 casualties (Mthembu-Salter, 2008:153).

Burundi witnessed yet another violent outbreak in April 1992 along the border with Rwanda. PALIPEHUTU were held responsible for this and authorities claimed that they had been trained and armed in Rwanda (Mthembu-Salter, 2008). In lieu of the violent outbreak, the issue of ethnic factionalism was openly debated and a draft charter by the Commission for National Unity was adopted in February 1991. Followed by a new Constitution²⁶, which was endorsed in a national referendum in March 1992 where 90 per cent voted in support of the proposed new Constitution, though it was rejected by PALIPEHUTU and other opposition groups (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:99). The new constitution gave birth to free elections and a multiparty system.

²⁶ Followed by pressure from Belgium and France, this constitution was amongst other things, introduced in order for Tutsi's to enjoy protection as the country moved towards a return to democracy through elections in 1993 (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).

Elections were held on the 1st of June 1993 in terms of the new constitution and FRODEBU's leader Melchior Ndadaye defeated Buyoya in the presidential race, winning 65.7 per cent of the votes whilst Buyoya received 32.9 per cent (Basedau, 1999). Pierre-Claver Sendegeya of the monarchist Parti pour la Réconciliation du Peuple (PRP) came in third with 1.4 per cent of the votes (Daley, 2006). PALIPEHUTU remained banned but did take part in the election. FRODEBU also won the subsequent National Assembly elections on the 29th of June taking 65 of the 81 seats with 72.6 per cent of the vote, while Buyoya's UPRONA won the other 16 with 19.8 per cent of the vote; the four other contesting parties failed to win the minimum 5 per cent needed for representation (Daley, 2006). An UPRONA member, Sylvie Kinigi²⁷, became Prime Minister and a multi-ethnic government of national unity was subsequently formed (Basedau, 1999).

Oketch and Polzer (2002:99) maintain that this period was by and large known for enhancing and uplifting Hutu political participation, there was, nonetheless, no change of the Tutsi dominated army, leaving the minority with the monopoly of the armed forces.

2.4.4 1993-2003: and the 1993 Resurgence of conflict

With the new government in office, Ndadaye began bringing his supporters into the civil service through the recruitment of FRODEBU supporters; the new government also initiated drafting plans for an extensive army reform (Basedau, 2004:135). The prospects for the democratically elected Hutu President led to discontent amongst the army and unsuccessful coup attempts were carried out by military officers in late June and early July 1993 (Bentley and Southall, 2005). Significant for Ndadaye's presidency was the persuasion of a reconciliation policy of which Tutsi army officers were appointed to command key posts. Ndadaye also legalised PALIPEHUTU and established a Council of National Unity to advice on ethnic issues (Banderembako, 2006).

According to Oketch and Polzer (2002:100), four specific reforms were made during the change of regime. Firstly, the Ndadaye government enabled small businessmen of who most were Hutu, to benefit from privatisation by reducing bid bonds by 80 per cent. Secondly, the government also probed the conditions under which the right to refine and export gold had been granted to a Belgian firm, just before the elections (Banderembako, 2006). Thirdly, there was also a significant return of Hutu refugees, whom had been living in exile since

²⁷ A Tutsi woman

1972 and attempts were made to regain their land and property (Banderembako, 2006). Lastly, the government replaced many Tutsi civil servants with Hutu's. Moreover, Ndadaye sought to engage with the economic crisis caused by the regime of President Bagaza by embarking on an IMF formulated Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (Kimber, 1996). This however, required sudden price increases for basic goods, a depreciation of the currency and privatisation of parastatals which led to widespread hardship and thus alienated the Hutu masses at a time when Ndadaye most needed their support to check the army (Kimber, 1996).

President Ndadaye's dream of a peaceful Burundi saw its end on October 21st 1993, when a coup attempt was launched by pro-Bagaza army members who assassinated the president and other high-ranking officials of FRODEBU (Boshoff et al., 2010:6). The assassination of the president sparked the longest and perhaps bloodiest conflict in Burundi. As remaining members of the government sought refuge abroad, the armed forces declared a state of emergency by closing the Bujumbura airport and national borders. There was however, immediate international condemnation of the coup and communication was restored on the 27th of October (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). Although the armed forces declared a state of emergency, the coup itself did not have the required support of key elements of the military, which in turn left the FRODEBU government in control (Boshoff et al., 2010). By now Hutu's had killed thousands of Tutsi's as an act of vengeance, including Hutu members of UPRONA and it is estimated that in the three months after the assassination of Ndadaye 50 000 to 100 000 people were killed and one million had fled the country (Banderembako, 2006). This exacerbated a backlash by the army and the violence that arose was not quelled for weeks.

Meanwhile in the power vacuum, a 'creeping coup' intensified (Boshoff et al., 2010). 'Creeping coup' is defined by Boshoff et al., (2010:6) as: "the steady seizure of power by opposition Tutsi forces with the complicity of the military", which had four crucial components. The first component dealt with the army and local youths, who were employed to execute urban and rural violence to threaten members of FRODEBU, this prevented the government from effectuating its duties (Boshoff et al., 2010). Secondly, the opposition took advantage of a propaganda campaign in which the government, mainly FRODEBU, was accused of Tutsi genocide. The third element of the 'creeping coup' in Burundi was that state institutions were weakened by manipulation of the Constitutional Court (Boshoff et al., 2010:6). Lastly, the government was forced into granting more and more power to Tutsi

extremists. In essence, the ‘creeping coup’ which occurred in Burundi allowed the Tutsi elite to be reinstated into power under a Hutu president (Boshoff et al., 2010:6).

In November 1993, the Constitutional Court decided that presidential powers should pass to the Council of Ministers, acting in an intellectual capacity, awaiting new presidential election to be attained within three months (Mthembu-Salter, 2004:136). One man who rejected these proposals was the new leader of FRODEBU, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya²⁸ who argued that elections should wait until internal security difficulties had been resolved (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). After intense debates amongst Hutu and Tutsi militias as well as inter-party negotiations, FRODEBU deputies in the National Assembly amended the Constitution in early January 1994. With the amendment of the Constitution it was now possible that the republican President could be elected by the National Assembly (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). Ndadaye’s minister of agriculture, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was elected President of Burundi by the National Assembly and assumed office on February 5th 1994 (Mthembu-Salter, 2004:137). With regards to international force, the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU) agreed to the deployment of a protection force, to comprise some 180 civilian and military personnel for a period of six months. UPRONA as well as Tutsi opposition protested, claiming that Burundi’s sovereignty and territorial integrity were being compromised. Endless political compromises, renewed communal violence and ethnic tension increased steadily after Ntaryamira came to power. This resulted in divisions within FRODEBU between those supporting Ntaryamira’s policy of disarming all militias and those led by Léonard Nyangoma, whom opposed operations against Hutu militias without first removing Tutsi extremists from the army (Banderembako, 2006). In addition, Tutsi ministers now made up 40 per cent of the government. The violent invasion of armed Hutu militia from the DRC was a catalyst in the split within FRODEBU with Nyangoma establishing the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD) and the birth of the military wing Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) (Banderembako, 2006).

A new power vacuum was developed following the death of President Ntaryamira and Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana in an airplane crash on the 6th of April 1994 (Mthembu -Salter, 2004:136). The aircraft was brought down by a rocket attack above Kigali airport and crashed on landing (Banderembako, 2006). Hutu’s influence in Burundi was weakened due to the genocide in Rwanda, which unfolded in April the same year as a

²⁸ Speaker of the National Assembly from December 1993 to October 1994 (Mthembu-Salter, 2004).

response to the killing of Habyarimana (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:101). With the special agreement on a government of National Unity, which composed both of UPRONA and FRODEBU, Ntibantunganya was elected new President by the National Assembly in September 1994. The election of Ntibantunganya occurred despite the fact that the constitutional provisions were violated (Basedau, 1999). The FDD began to wage a guerrilla war against the army and the situation was intensified by an influx of 200 000 Hutu refugees from Rwanda²⁹ in the second half of 1994 (Basedau, 1999:155). Mthembu-Salter (2004:136) holds that while Burundi managed to avoid a large scale civil war, ethnically motivated killings were carried out throughout the country, which also involved murders of prominent politicians and government officials.

With the endemic violence occurring in Burundi due to the increased violence between Hutu rebels and Tutsi government forces, Ntibantunganya was forced to declare a state of emergency by mid-1995 (Basedau, 1999). According to Mthembu-Salter (2004), Burundi was on the edge of a full scale civil war by February 1996. Regional initiatives which were supported by the United Nations (UN) were unsuccessful in making improvements in the negotiations between the various parties or in reducing the violence in the country and so the security situation continued to deteriorate. Initial meetings were held in Mwanza, Tanzania in April and June 1996³⁰ with FRODEBU and UPRONA (Boshoff et al., 2010). Arusha I, was an attempt from Tanzania's former President Julius Nyerere to pressurise the Burundian government to accept a regional peace keeping force (Boshoff et al., 2010). No success was made and the pressure rose to a point where yet another military coup was staged by Major Buyoya³¹. This meant a definite return to authoritarian rule and the consequences that followed were full economic sanctions by neighbouring countries, which demanded a return to a constitutional order (Basedau, 1999:155). With the international sanctions and lack of humanitarian aid due to the coups combined with the alleged civil war, Burundi's economy worsened. This led to a further threat on social development and political stability such as high population growth alongside technologically stagnant and agriculturally based subsistence economy (Bentley and Southall, 2005). It is precisely this threat on Burundi's social development that this study is examining, namely, how environmental factors have impacted violent political instability.

²⁹ Who had fled from the advancing Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) (Mthembu -Salter, 2004:136).

³⁰ Known as Arusha I: the road to peace negotiations (Boshoff et al., 2010).

³¹ Major Buyoya was the former President from 1987-1993 (Kimber, 1996).

Conflicts between Hutu militia and UPRONA continued and intensified under the rule of Buyoya where the major Hutu military organisations ranged against UPRONA government. The Tutsi controlled army consisted of the CNDD, the FDD, PALIPEHUTU with its armed wing, Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) and the Front pour la Libération Nationale (FROLINA) (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). These armed forces drew most of their recruits from the refugee camps in Tanzania and DRC and since it has been estimated that 700 000 people fled from Burundi, mainly Hutu, Oketch and Polzer (2002:102) maintain that the numbers of the guerrilla forces operating against the government were expanded. Although general disruption did occur due to the violence, the humanitarian situation in Burundi did not improve as the government implemented a policy to guard Hutu's from rebel attacks and counter-insurgency attacks by placing them in so-called protected camps (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). These counter-insurgency tactics were created with the intention of cutting Hutu rebels off from their supply base in Burundi (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). These camps were occupied by Hutu's mostly from the rural areas and it is estimated that at one point up to 800 000 people were staying at these camps, naturally, poor health conditions inside these camps were growing and also creating more concern (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Withholdings of international financial aid coupled with regional sanctions led to the closing of the camps in 1998. In spite of this, the rising hunger threat was a remaining factor and Bundervoet (2009) maintains that in 1998 approximately 345 000 people were dependent on food aid.

In addition to this, Burundi experienced a massive influx of Hutu refugees who had once fled the country, that were now returning back to Burundi due to the overthrow of Mobuto Sese Seko in the DRC (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). Moreover, the movement of Burundian refugees from Tanzanian refugee camps were also persistent during this time and disputes between the army and Hutu insurgents did occur. The government did, however, manage to resume control of 12 of the 17 provinces in Burundi, though the other five provinces, Bujumbura and Makamba in particular, remained a battle field between the government and its opponents (Mthembu-Salter, 2004:139). In an attempt to lift the economic sanctions and international pressure, Buyoya began talks with FRODEBU who initially had been driven out by UPRONA and these talks culminated in a new power sharing agreement in May 1998 (Mthembu -Salter, 2004). Although an interim Constitution was implemented, and the National Assembly was further developed as well as the inclusion of FRODEBU members in government, the external wing of FRODEBU rejected the agreement of a three year transition

to civilian rule (Bentley and Southall, 2005). The external wing proceeded with their fight whilst conflict continued to rage and deaths increased.

These measures, according to Bentley and Southall (2005), did not lead to a lifting of sanctions; Buyoya therefore accepted a peace process under the auspices of Julius Nyerere that began in Arusha in June 1998. Seventeen parties to the Burundian conflict were present at the first round of negotiations; the government of Burundi, the National Assembly, FRODEBU, UPRONA, CNDD, FROLINA, PALIPEHUTU, PRP, Parti pour le Redressement National (PARENA), Parti Libéral (PL), Parti Indépendant des Travailleurs (PIT), Parti Social Démocrate (PSD), Alliance Burundo-Africaine pour le Salut (ABASA), Mouvement Socialiste Panafricainiste (MSP-INKINZO), Alliances des Vaillants (AV-INTWARI), Rassemblement du Peuple Burundais (RPB), as well as the Civil Society, which was represented by the Chamber of Commerce, women's and youth' organisations (ICG, 1998:2). In 1999, a second phase of peace talks was arranged in Arusha by the Regional Peace Initiative (Boshoff et al., 2010). Five commissions were created to deal with various aspects of the negotiations and the government of Burundi agreed to a political partnership with parliament and to maintain talks with rebel groups (Boshoff et al., 2010). Due to the death of Nyerere in October 1999 former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela³², assumed the role as mediator in the negotiations with the strong support of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). In addition to the promising development established by Nyerere, Mandela proceeded with a forceful approach in order to bring the various parties to agreement (Bentley and Southall, 2005:71).

Conflicting party interests continued which led to faction amongst the two principal armed opposition groups (Bentley and Southall, 2005). This meant that the FNL broke away from PALIPEHUTU in 1999 and formed the Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales de Libération (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), the FDD broke away from CNDD and formed the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) under the leadership of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye (Bentley and Southall, 2005). Nonetheless, these groups were excluded from the peace process and thus continued the hostilities (Mthembu-Salter, 2004).

³² Nelson Mandela was South Africa's first democratically elected president. He served one term from 1994 to 1999 (Bentley and Southall, 2005).

On the 28th of August 2000, the Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation was signed by 13 of the total 19 parties included (Peterson, 2006). The Accord drew a scheme for power-sharing and the reform of key institutions, prescribing a 36-month transitional period that began on the 1st of November 2001 (Peterson, 2006). The Accord however, failed to include the CNDD-FDD or the FNL and also failed to address the questions of who would lead the security-sector reform as well as the overall transition (Peterson, 2006:127). Once signatures were settled, Mandela managed to convince Burundians to allow UPRONA leader Buyoya an 18-month term, after which the FRODEBU leader, Domitien Ndayizeye would take over the presidency for the remaining 18 months of the prescribed three-year transitional period (Peterson, 2006:127). The content of the agreement was organised in five committees, the arrangement of the themes were as follows: the first committee dealing with the nature of the conflict; the second committee on democracy and good governance; the third committee on peace and security; the fourth committee on reconstruction and economic development and the last committee dealing with the guarantees for implementation of the peace accord (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Moreover, the Arusha agreement provided for balanced representation of Hutu and Tutsi in the government, the professionalisation of security and justice institutions, and the creation of a national police force. Although the agreement hinged on reform of the security forces, as mentioned above, two primary rebel groups were not signatories. The agreement also mandated that those inside and outside the armed forces who were found guilty of involvement in the coups or war crimes, as well as violations of the constitution and human rights, were to be excluded from the new security forces (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). After the accord had been signed, the then South African Deputy President, Jacob Zuma took over an increasing amount of the Burundi mediation as Mandela considered his participation to be done since the agreement had been signed (Mthembu-Salter, 2004:141).

In spite of the Arusha Agreement, Mthembu-Salter (2004:157) argues that Burundi experienced: “a periodic scale incursion in the south and massive counter-insurgency operations by the army continued throughout 1998 to 2001”. Between 2000 and 2001, Burundi suffered a new wave of violence and the provinces bordering Tanzania were most affected, where the refugee camps served as catalysts for attacks in addition to bases for retreat (Mokoena, 2005). This resulted in yet another death toll of civilians and about 200 000 civilians in the rural parts of Bujumbura were once again forcibly moved into “protected camps” (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). The FNL continued military operations and in February

2001 they invaded the Kinama area of Bujumbura and managed to seize control for two weeks until the army were able to regain control of the whole capital (Bentley and Southall, 2005). The government's support from within the military was also put to its test when a failed coup came from within the military in 2001 (Bentley and Southall, 2005:76). While there were ongoing attempts to bring the FNL and CNDD-FDD to sign the peace agreement, it was further hampered by the factionalism within the respective groups. There was once again a breakaway where the FNL split into two factions: one under the leadership of Agathon Rwasa (the larger of the two) and the other one under the leadership of Alain Mugabarabona (later known as FNL-ICANZO) (Bentley and Southall, 2005). The CNDD-FDD also broke into two factions: the one headed by Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza (the larger of the two) and the other led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye (which later became Kaze-FDD) (Bentley and Southall, 2005).

2.4.5 2001-2005: Transitional Period: and the 2005 election

The arrival of the South African troops³³ in Burundi during the end of October 2001, the Transitional Constitution was laid out. What this signified was also the inauguration of UPRONA's Pierre Buyoya as the head of the multi-party transitional government with FRODEBU's Domitien Ndayizeye as Vice President. The inauguration of the two leaders on the 1st of November 2001 marked the beginning of the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) (Reyntjens, 2005). One of the challenges facing the TGoB was to bring the conflicts in Burundi to an end although conflicts continued to rage during this period and thus threatened to destroy the fragile transitional arrangements and disrupt the road to democracy (ISS, 2005). The period of the TGoB was dominated by quarrels over posts and positions such as reforming the Tutsi minority-dominated army in an attempt to make it more representative of the population, to curb its political power and subordinate it to the civil authorities and to bring the country's divided and quarrelsome political parties to agreement on a permanent democratic constitutional arrangement (Bentley and Southall, 2005). Moreover, the TGoB was confronted by the four Hutu rebel groups that were still active in military operations (Bentley and Southall, 2005). However, under the mediation of Zuma, the four rebel groups were engaged in a continuous effort to bring about negotiations that would in due course lead to their inclusion in the peace process. Peace talks only began in August 2002 between the government, the two CNDD-FDD factions and the smaller FNL-ICANZO

³³ The South African protection force was later transformed into an AU mission in April 2003, which again was changed to a UN mission in June 2004 (ISS, 2005).

(Bentley and Southall, 2005). With the commencement of the peace talks between the abovementioned parties a ceasefire agreement was formed between the FNL-INCANZO and Kaze-FDD, thus leaving the two larger and more active rebel groups still outside the peace process (Bentley and Southall, 2005:93). Bentley and Southall (2005:93) also note that an attempted agreement in December 2002 between Nkurunziza's divisions of the CNDD-FDD was left in a helpless situation due to the hostilities which escalated between it and the army.

In accordance with the provisions of the Arusha agreement, Ndayizeye was inaugurated President and Alfonse Kadege became Vice-President on the 1st of May 2003 (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). Continuous efforts were still made by regional leaders in an attempt to draw Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD into the peace process in addition to engaging Rwasas's FNL in negotiations, however, these efforts were made difficult by military offences by both rebel groups: in particular Rwasas's more active forces (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). Shortly after the inauguration of Ndayizeye a delegation of the AU force, also known as the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), began arriving in Burundi (Mthembu-Salter, 2004:142). In the meantime, the legislature adopted a bill providing for the formation of an international judicial commission of investigation into war crimes, such war crimes, which had been committed since end of 1962 (Mthembu-Salter, 2004:142). At long last, an agreement was reached between Ndayizeye and Nkurunziza in October 2003 and what followed was a ceasefire in December, which led to the CNDD-FDD inclusion into the government and its troops were eventually integrated into the national army (Bentley and Southall, 2005:103). Rwasas's FNL was nonetheless outside the peace process and it did not seem as if the faction intended to join the peace agreement with immediate effect as the FNL launched firearm attacks on Bujumbura and the military bases throughout Burundi (Bentley and Southall, 2005). The Global Ceasefire Agreement between TGoB and CNDD-FDD was signed in Dar es Salaam on the 16th of November 2003.

Direct contact between Ndayizeye and Rwasas was unexpectedly established in January 2004, though, this initiated a lengthy process that only bore fruit in 2006 (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). An agreement was signed by the various parties in August 2004 which set out the principles that were ultimately incorporated into a final Constitution for the post- TGoB period and a month later the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was created (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). Furthermore, the AMIB was deployed and they were further tasked with the implementation of the Arusha Agreement, and the ceasefire protocols as well as the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme (Boshoff et al., 2010).

This was replaced by the Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi (ONUB) in June 2004 and preceded the October 2004 commencement of the Arusha Agreement, which ended the period of the transitional government and called for national elections (Peterson, 2006). The TGoB was extended to April 2005, and again to August 2005, as it became evident that elections would not take place as planned in October 2004 (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). Vice-President Kadege was, in addition, fired and Frederic Ngenzebuhoro replaced his position in November 2004 (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). At the present time, it seemed as if Burundi was preparing for elections as the legislation established a new national army including all the rebel and government forces, was however, only put in place in January 2005 (ISS, 2005). In spite of the legal and administrative concerns being dealt with prior to the elections, Rwas'a's FNL still remained as an outcast in the peace process, systematically carrying out military operations in the rural parts of Bujumbura (ISS, 2005). A national referendum approving a new Constitution was held in February 2005 with a 92 per cent voter turnout (Peterson, 2006). The Constitution provided for power-sharing between the Tutsi and the Hutu: a President and two Vice-Presidents, government institutions would be 60 per cent Hutu and 40 per cent Tutsi (of which 30 per cent of these would be women), except for the National Defence Forces and Senate where the ratio is to be fifty-fifty per cent (African Elections Database, 2004).

National Assembly elections were held on the 4th of July 2005 with CNDD-FDD winning majority of 58 per cent of the votes and 59 of the 100 seats, FRODEBU obtained 22 per cent of the votes with 25 seats and UPRONA received 7 per cent of the votes with 10 seats (African Elections Database, 2004). In accordance with the Constitution, the results achieved a fair balance in the National Assembly with 35 per cent Tutsi and 25 per cent women, the INEC co-opted an additional 18 Members of Parliament to create the ethnic and gender balance required as well as three Twa members (Reyntjens, 2006). In addition to this, the communal councillors elected the members of the Senate, which resulted in the election of thirty CNDD-FDD members, three FRODEBU members and one CNDD member (Reyntjens, 2006). On the 19th of August 2005 the leader of CNDD-FDD, Pierre Nkurunziza was elected as President by a joint Parliamentary Congress, including members of the National Assembly and the Senate.

In accordance with the Constitution, President Nkurunziza appointed a male Tutsi from UPRONA and a female Hutu from CNDD-FDD as Vice-Presidents, respectively (Reyntjens, 2006). The new government consisted of 55 per cent Hutu and 45 per cent Tutsi with 35 per

cent of them being women, meeting the requirements that at the most, 60 per cent should be Hutu and 30 per cent women. However, the party representation did not conform to the constitution: leaving FRODEBU underrepresented and CNDD-FDD overrepresented – a situation UPRONA and FRODEBU accepted under protest (Reyntjens, 2006:130). On the 26th of August, the inauguration of President Nkurunziza marked the formal conclusion of the transitional process in Burundi. Along with this, Nkurunziza began to appoint CNDD-FDD to key positions in state institutions and set in motion the release of over 3000, mostly CNDD-FDD, political prisoners (Reyntjens, 2006).

At a summit of the Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi in Dar es Salaam on the 7th of September 2005, a comprehensive ceasefire agreement was endorsed by regional leaders and signed by President Nkurunziza, on behalf of the Government of Burundi, and by Agathon Rwasa, on behalf of FNL (Peterson, 2006). On the 10th of September 2005 the ceasefire entered into force, which provided for a cessation of all hostilities in addition to the integration of FNL combatants into the national security forces or their disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (Peterson, 2006).

2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

“The blood that was shed during the civil war and that was shed in other conflicts in this country should serve as a lesson. Most importantly, we must discard the old methods of exclusion, favouritism and bad governance that led us to disaster”³⁴

While Burundi’s democratic reconstruction is far from complete, the election on the 19th of August 2005 advocates that even the most violent and deeply divided societies can be restored, given sufficient political will and generous resources to support the process of negotiation and change. Most Burundians, Hutu and Tutsi alike, found themselves drained by the conflict and wishing it would end. Their appeals for peace grew steadily more insistent. Likewise, the international community, recognising the strategic importance for the entire Great Lakes region of ending the Burundian conflict, poured millions of dollars into the peace process, and frequently made high-level diplomatic interventions. It has repeatedly offered Burundi a range of inducements and reconstruction projects, including payment of salaries for virtually the entire civil service. In January 2004, donors pledged more than US\$1 billion for development assistance. But most critically, key factions within Burundi’s political

³⁴ Peterson (2006:128).

elite had come slowly to realise that they would gain more through compromise and by ending the exploitation of largely artificial social divisions than by continuing to ratchet up their debilitating power struggles. Thus it is not merely elections that explain Burundi's achievement. Nor has it been purely a matter of the usual components of nation building such as constitutions, treaties, and renovated institutions, though all these were involved. At its core, the story of Burundi has been the tale of an entire nation gradually but steadily transforming its behaviour and mindset at both the popular and elite levels to steer away from bloody conflicts and toward some sort of mutual accommodation. While Hutu and Tutsi were distinct ethnic categories in pre-colonial and colonial Burundi, the mobilisation of Burundians on the basis of these identities is a fairly recent phenomenon born of elite competition for political and economic advantage.

Chapter 3

ANALYSES IN PERSPECTIVE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter has three purposes. Firstly, it begins with a brief examination of the outcomes of the 2004 Power-Sharing Agreement, including a reflection and evaluation of its significance on the peace process in Burundi. Next, the chapter turns to a discussion about the various key actors in addition to factors in the political and violent conflicts in Burundi. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the last section of this chapter examines the opus of Jared Diamond's *Collapse*. These main ideas are consolidated in the reflection section, and these three points also form the crux of this chapter.

3.2 THE NEGOTIATED CONSTITUTION: IN RETROSPECT

3.2.1 Examining the 2004 Power-Sharing Agreement

This section provides a brief assessment of the outcomes of the Power-Sharing Agreement which was signed in 2004 as part of the 2003 Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi. Prior to the examination, a brief overview is discussed in order to better grasp the lessons learned from the 2004 Power-sharing Agreement.

Power-sharing as a mode of governance in Burundi sprung out of three developments in the country's political history (Vandeginste, 2009). The first development was the reform process initiated under President Pierre Buyoya. The second development was the Constitution of the 13th of March 1992, in which the Constitution also introduced a multi-party system. The third development was the agreements that occurred between political parties as a consequence of the failed coup d'état of 21 October 1993 (Vandeginste, 2009:65). As a result, these historical roots have in their own way influenced Burundi's current power-sharing regime (Vandeginste, 2009). In addition to the aforementioned, these three developments present crucial analytical insights and as a whole, these three developments within Burundi's political history demonstrate the country's struggle with the tensions between what has been referred to as 'the three keystones' of Burundi's political liberalisation process namely: power-sharing, democracy and elections (Vandeginste, 2009:65).

In 1994, 2000 and 2004, three major agreements were signed in Burundi, which included provisions for power-sharing during Burundi's most conflicting times. None of these

agreements however, completely contributed to building peace and good governance that were initially envisioned for Burundi (Falch, 2008). The power-sharing agreements in Burundi were implemented with varying degrees of success. The first formal agreement was the 1994 Convention of Government, which was aimed at introducing power-sharing to the political structure in Burundi; it defined itself as a blueprint for new consensus-based governance. The Convention of Government was signed by twelve political parties in 1994. Nevertheless, this occurred at a time when the country was contending with a situation of an emerging civil war and it was therefore little elite consensus among the signatories (Vandeginste, 2009). In conjunction with this, there was also a very outspoken resistance to the power-sharing arrangement by increasingly extremist politicians on both sides (Vandeginste, 2009). The second attempt to a durable peace in Burundi was the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement which represented a historic compromise between the two prominent conflicting ethnic groups, the Hutu and Tutsi (Van Eck, 2004). According to Van Eck (2004:3) the peace process has made significant steps toward reducing the bloodshed, however, the root causes of violence between Hutu and Tutsi have yet to be attended to. While the fragility of the peace accord has necessitated the presence of international troops, this can neither remain constant, nor substitute the need for Burundians to reach a genuine national consensus (Van Eck, 2004:3). The last implementation of change was the 2004 Burundi Power-Sharing Agreement, which will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. While all the agreements were signed in the context of an on-going civil war, none included all the parties involved in the conflicts, thus provoking the emergence of spoilers and prolongation of armed conflict (Falch, 2008).

The 2004 Burundi Power-Sharing Agreement reflected the spirit of the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement. In addition, this agreement provided a framework that assured Burundi's ethnic groups a proportional share of the political power following the democratic elections in 2005. In spite of several positive developments which have taken place since the implementation of the power-sharing agreement, Falch (2008) maintains that the prospects for enduring peace and democracy in Burundi continue to remain uncertain. Falch (2008:3) points to a 2006 termination of hostilities with the last remaining rebel group, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, which was eventually signed in May 2008 after violent confrontations between the government army and PALIPEHUTU-FNL a month earlier. Although the signing of the ceasefire illustrated hope for the peace process in Burundi, Falch (2008) argues that the consolidation of peace is dependent on a successful outcome of the still on-going negotiations between

PALIPEHUTU-FNL and the government.³⁵ Moreover, Falch (2008) holds that a continued lack of political dialogue in conjunction with attempts by the ruling party to monopolise power have in turn, led to an unstable political situation in Burundi, which makes it highly intricate to measure the 2004 power-sharing agreement as a success.

In reflection of the foregoing, what were the actual outcomes of the 2004 agreement? Vandeginste (2009) points to the power-sharing agreement as being instrumental in its short-term objective of terminating the war, in which Vandeginste (2009) gives Burundi credit for. Following his perspective, the agreement has also ‘de-ethnicised’ political competition and decreased the (possible) destabilising effect of elections Vandeginste (2009:63). However, when the agreement is measured against more bold state-building objectives, such as democracy, rule of law, accountable and effective governance; the agreement in Burundi has, hitherto, not met the desirable outcomes (Vandeginste, 2009:63). Lemarchand (2007) suggests that what is more important than the mechanics of power-sharing is the socio-political context which connotes the difference between success and failure.

Moreover, Lemarchand (2007) maintains that Burundi comes closest to institutionalising the consociationalism model when measured against countries such as Rwanda and the DRC. Consociationalism dates back to 1917 when it was first employed in The Netherlands. Lijphart (1991) further formulated and brought consociationalism under scholarly debate in the 1970’s and defines consociationalism as more than just power-sharing and a form of government in which its focus is on involving guaranteed group representation. Lijphart (1991) also maintains that consociationalism essentially is the notion of group autonomy. In which Lijphart (1991) implies that while on matters of common interest decisions are made mutually by all members of the coalition cabinet, on all other issues, autonomy is the rule with each community free to attend to its own affairs as it wishes (Lemarchand, 2007:3). The second notion of consociationalism measures proportionality, and is described by Lemarchand (2007:3) as “the basic standard of political representation, public service appointments and allocation of public funds” and by itself, proportionality acts as a guarantee for the fair representation of ethnic minorities. Minority veto is the third notion stressed by Lijphart (1991), again, explained by Lemarchand (2007:3) as “the ultimate weapon that minorities need to protect their vital interests”_and one which “works best when it is not used

³⁵ PALIPEHUTU-FNL was only registered as a political party in April 2009 after changing its name to ‘FNL’ and thus leaving out the ‘ethnically’ exclusive ‘PALIPEHUTU’ (Vandeginste, 2009).

too often and only with regard to issues of fundamental importance” (Lemarchand, 2007:3). Burundi has proven to be a unique case in offering a more faithful image of the consociational polity (Lemarchand, 2007:3). Furthermore, Burundi exemplifies a highly promising effort of power-sharing among a large and diverse number of parties through consociationalism.

Four points are noteworthy when assessing the 2004 power-sharing agreement. Firstly, the agreement was used as a tool to initiate political liberalisation after decades of one-party rule. Secondly, the agreement was utilised to provisionally preserve a minimum of institutional stability after democratic elections – the effects of which provoked a military coup (Vandeginste, 2009). The third point maintains that the agreement was used as a tool to address long-standing grievances of politically under-represented segments in society and lastly, to negotiate peace with rebel movements (Vandeginste, 2009:81). For each of these agreements, the objectives, dynamics, actors, driving forces and sources of resistance that shaped the reality of power-sharing varied considerably. An earlier experiment with power-sharing inevitably shaped the expectations, perceptions and use of power-sharing in a later one. Vandeginste (2009) notes that the Burundian case clearly shows how complex realities have an overwhelming impact on the effects of power-sharing and how, contrariwise, drawing conclusions on the merits and limits of power-sharing is particularly hazardous when making an abstraction of the specific setting in which the notion is being implemented. Vandeginste (2009:81) further proposes that the toolbox of consociationalism is formed on the basis of successful attempts to organise stable power-sharing democracies in divided societies, such as Burundi. The country has been instrumental in ending violent conflict, but still, in preventing or reversing the trend towards increased electoral authoritarianism and the use of (although selective, relatively small scale and well-targeted) violence as a way of exercising political authority, Burundi has yet to attain (Vandeginste, 2009). Beyond the distinct Burundian case, this also asks the question whether – and, if so, under what circumstances – complex, trial and error based and gradually fine-tuned power-sharing arrangements can indeed offer a more sustainable method of conflict resolution than the more frequently used ‘emergency power-sharing’ deals, such as the ones struck in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008 (Vandeginste, 2009).

In sum, an important lesson learned from the 2004 power sharing agreement is the limited ability of inclusion. Moreover, the agreement failed to move beyond ethnic categorisation,

with concessions granting the Tutsi community an exceptional degree of over-representation and a minority veto which has assisted 'ethnic' grouping, but also encouraged the PALIPEHUTU-FNL to precede its battle for a political system that reflects the demographic representation of the different communities in a more comparative manner (Falch, 2008:3). Moreover, Falch (2008) argues that the power-sharing agreement of 2004 left the disputes that initially fuelled the violent conflicts in Burundi³⁶ intact and consequently destabilised any attempts made to convey more inclusive democratic participatory politics. Even though constitutional conditions were meant to ensure power-sharing, it is not always enough to guarantee elite cooperation, albeit the 2005 constitution included several stipulations on this matter. Falch (2008) points out that loopholes in the system made it difficult for a weak and separated political opposition to control the executive. Suggestions have, therefore, been made to increase political will and commitment of the CNDD-FDD to initiate political dialogue and include other political parties in the decision-making process (Falch, 2008). Although international and regional actors' involvement in the peace process, has been instrumental in pushing the peace process forward, it has nonetheless, overshadowed the importance of finding home-grown solution to the conflicts.

3.3 KEY ACTORS IN THE CONFLICTS

This section examines the role of key actors in the conflicts in Burundi. Beginning with a brief outline of the regional actors and then proceeding to highlight the United Nations Operation in Burundi. Lastly, this section provides a brief outline of the kinds of economic relations and aid Burundi received during the conflicts.

3.3.1 Regional Actors

In addition to the peace negotiations initiated by Tanzania, the regional African neighbours also instigated a regional trust for peace in Burundi. The Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative (GLRPI), which was mainly represented by Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa; Kenya and the DRC were also constituted as key regional states in the peace process. The regional actors served to resolve the conflicts in Burundi (Mokoena, 2005). Daley (2007:7) contends that there were two specific mechanisms in which the regional states sought to exert influence over the peace process in Burundi. Firstly, regional states proposed for the establishment of a regional peace-keeping force and secondly, regional sanctions in the form

³⁶ Specifically during the period from 1994 to 2005.

of an economic embargo. Daley (2007:7) further notes that these initiatives were not as successful and effective as they were intended to be. However, the sanctions marked a significant step in the move by African neighbour states to find regional solution to their problems and, despite an almost international opposition, regional actors worked in a way that eventually brought the Burundian government to negotiations.

Spearheaded by South Africa, the African Union's (AU) AMIB mandate consisted of supervision, observation, monitoring and verifying the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in order to consolidate the peace process in Burundi (Boshoff et al., 2010). The responsibility of the AMIB also included the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of forces in Burundi (Boshoff et al., 2010:5). The achievements and challenges of the AMIB are extensive in detail and beyond the scope of this study; therefore, this study will only highlight the most significant achievements. The AMIB represented one of the most successful stories of the AU, in spite the lack of resources (Boshoff et al., 2010). As such, AMIB had "internal capacity and willingness to do its best under difficult circumstances" (Boshoff et al., 2010:69). Additionally, one of AMIB's greatest achievements was being able to encourage Nkurunziza's party, CNDD-FDD to formally participate in the peace process. The unaccompanied presence of AMIB, created an environment which proved conducive to peace, stability and democracy (Boshoff et al., 2010).

3.3.2 The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)³⁷

Due to the fact that the mandate of the AMIB did not include enforcement measures, the United Nations (UN) took over the peace mission in Burundi and the AMIB was subsequently transformed to the ONUB (Boshoff et al., 2010:5). Bentley and Southall (2005:28) assert that the official involvement of the UN in Burundi was represented in the reverberation of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda by means of the UN humanitarian relief organisation.

The role of the ONUB involved passing various Security Council resolutions, sending observer missions to Burundi and has since June 2004 maintained a peace mission in Burundi (Mokoena, 2005:12). Some of ONUB's directives are of importance and will thus be highlighted. Firstly, the ONUB's mandate was to ensure respect of the ceasefire agreements by monitoring their implementation and investigating violations. Secondly, the ONUB's

³⁷ In French: Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi (ONUB).

mandate was to promote the re-establishment of confidence between the various Burundian forces by monitoring and providing security at their pre-disarmament assembly sites, and collecting and securing weapons and military material as appropriate (Boshoff et al., 2010:75). Furthermore, ONUB also had the responsibility to carry out the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants as part of the national DDR programme (Boshoff et al., 2010:76). Moreover, in relation to the Security Council resolution the ONUB had the authorisation to execute its mandate collaborating with the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC³⁸ (Boshoff et al., 2010). The collaboration included the monitoring of illegal flow of arms across the borders between Burundi and the DRC. According to Mokoena (2005:70), this resolution gave another impetus to the peace process, especially relating to the proliferation of arms and the difficulties of providing security because of the porous borders, between Burundi and the DRC. However, the challenges concerning the mandate of ONUB and the peace mission in Burundi yet remain.

The cooperation between the INEC, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the ONUB, had clear defined roles during the 2005 elections in order to avoid any potential conflicts. The ONUB assumed the overall leadership and provided political and logistical operation support, whilst the UNDP headed the area of financial support.

3.3.3 External Economic Relations and Aid

While economic relations in Burundi present during the violent conflicts in the country, the people who benefitted the most from these economic interactions were perhaps only the government and rebel forces (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Burundi's neighbouring countries alongside industrial countries are the two main significant external spheres, which both profoundly and structurally, contributed in shaping the conflict and prospects for peace (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Burundi's main export commodities are coffee and tea, and with the economic sanctions imposed by the regional states, it was perhaps inevitable that normal economic relationships were replaced by illegal dealings and large-scale smuggling, including to rebel and military movements in Rwanda, Tanzania and DRC (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:108). Consequently, the economic sanctions which were imposed on Burundi in an attempt to pressurise the current regime³⁹ to return to democratic rule, put a strain on the

³⁸ In French: Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC).

³⁹ A response to the coup d'état staged by Major Buyoya in 1996 (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:108).

Burundian economy, this was nevertheless damaged by the constructed smuggling methods already established (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).

These economic sanctions had a devastating effect on the Burundian economy in conjunction with the international aid community; the rural poor were the ones who suffered the most (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Statistical data presented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggests that in 1995, Burundi experienced an overall positive balance of payments of US \$ 1.1 million; however, a drop to a deficit of US \$ 86.7 million in 1996 was a result of the alleged civil war taking place. Nevertheless, the heavy sanctions also played a crucial role in this regard. Whilst the sanctions, in essence were targeted at the elite and military, they managed to shirk the effects via smuggling networks with regional business groups, thus turning international aid and trade to their benefit by means of capturing the profits from international transactions (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:109).

With regard to the country's economic development, the international financial assistance took various forms. Firstly, aid lowered encouragement to build up a competitive strategic export sector, which resulted in the fact that export promotion strategies became inefficient (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Secondly, domestic savings remained wretched due to external assistance replaced by an effort to initiate internal resources. Consequently this aggravated an even minimal domestic capital accumulation (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:110). Finally, Oketch and Polzer (2002:110) note that donors and development partners chose to have a direct relationship with the government as opposed to the private sector and civil society associations. As the government administration benefited at the expense of the private sector, this further stifled competition and growth, consequently, the outcome of the interaction between aid and government in Burundi, only led to massive foreign debt and decreasing per capita income (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:110). Conversely, international aid also had success in pressurising for reform in the post 1988 violence, as political reforms were pushed through in fear of reduced aid (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).

3.4 FACTORS IN THE CONFLICTS

The nature of the conflicts in Burundi is incorporated into two clusters⁴⁰. The first category includes tangible and intangible themes such as history, identity, conflict, security and social justice. The second cluster discusses the malicious and 'genocidal' nature of the conflicts. For

⁴⁰ This particular kind of grouping, borrows heavily from Mokoena (2005).

matters of significance, an annotation with regard to the specific factors stressed in this section is of importance. This study has exclusively selected factors that are of relevance to the research topic thus forming and taking part in the background as well as discussions pertaining to the research question(s) set out in chapter one. Furthermore, this study acknowledges that several other factors have been, and still are, under scrutiny when examining the conflicts in Burundi.

3.4.1 Tangible and intangible themes

“Armed conflict is a product of motivation, opportunity, and identity”.

(Gleditsch and Theisen, 2010:1)

According to Herisse (2002:2), the massacres of both Tutsi and Hutu people which occurred during the political transitions in Burundi, were increased by ethnic concepts and misconceptions. In this context, the matter of identity and history plays a crucial role.

So called ‘mythico-histories’ have been a point of reference when looking at the issue of identity in the Burundian conflicts. ‘Mythico-histories’ have assisted in fuelling conflict between Hutu and Tutsi as such, myths merely pertain to a preordained social structure. Furthermore, a fallacy of the identity factor has also been exacerbated as the Europeans, more specifically Belgians, viewed the ‘brand’ of humanity as something superior⁴¹ whilst Hutu perceived this ‘superior brand of humanity’ as something associated with cruelty, conquest and oppression (Mokoena, 2005). Though ‘identity’ has served as a factor in the violent conflicts in Burundi, this factor has not been proven to be the main instigator.

For Kamungi et al., (2005), the nature of the Burundian society was established in the pre-colonial era, as the patron (*shebuja*) and client (*mugererwa*) relationship was historically significant. Kamungi et al., (2005), stress the importance of a historically informed perspective of Burundi in order to understand the violent conflicts in a more holistic manner. The Burundian society has historically been dominated by the patron-client relationship, which was based on property ownership and service, primarily concerning access to land and livestock keeping (Kamungi et al., 2005:207). Such relationships occurred through a specific contractual system, *ububagire or ubugererwa*, where an individual, the client (typically Hutu)

⁴¹ This is in relation to the classification (and perhaps the deliberate separation of Hutu and Tutsi) distinctively made by the Belgian colonialists, of Tutsi as “taller, more slender, paler-skinned, thin-lipped and narrow chinned” whereas Hutu being shorter, darker, flat-nosed, belonging to Bantu stock and agriculturalists. (Diamond, 2005:314).

would work for someone more privileged, the patron (typically a Tutsi or *ganwa*) (Kamungi et al., 2005:207). The manner in which such a relationship was set out came in the form of the client needing land, livestock or protection and the patron would therefore offer this in return for services in addition to offerings in kind (Kamungi et al., 2005:207). The authenticity of the patron-client relationship was, however, under scrutiny as exploitation and fairness of exchange was not always maintained. Moreover, property issues were also a factor as it was common that the client who lived on the particular land, often did not own the land *per se*, and prospects for such ownership were fairly low (Kamungi et al., 2005:207). This exacerbated certain ‘serfdom’ in which the client (who lived on that particular property, usually a Hutu) would in most cases, never have the opportunity to acquire such land and consequently, the prospects for the client and his family were thus relatively high in terms of exclusion (Kamungi et al., 2005). On the contrary, such dependency relations were not categorical and did allow for Hutu’s to economically and socially ‘become’ a Tutsi in a manner known as *kuhutura* (Kamungi et al., 2005:207). Conversely, Lemarchand (1996:12) adds that such patron-client relations often functioned as a context for “the institutionalisation of political ties”, whereby ethnic identities inevitably did not draw parallels with the status of the patron and the client. Lemarchand (1996:12) further states that this fostered the legitimacy of the institution.

Historically, the conflicts in Burundi have repeatedly been referred to as Hutu versus Tutsi, however, Kamungi et al., (2005:200) postulate that the national dynamics have in actual fact, been far more complex than that. The authors further assert that with the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement and the formation of the 2001 transitional government has developed to become even more convoluted, pointing to the small minority rule and state control (Kamungi et al., 2005:200). Similarly, the authors probe certain pathways in the aftermath of the colonial legacy and draw compelling conclusions where the colonial government is held responsible for the ethnic and possibly negative connotation of the terms Hutu and Tutsi (Kamungi et al., 2005). Likewise, Kamungi et al., (2005:208) hypothesise that in the pre-colonial era, social and political roles offered certain value and unity to the membership and camaraderie within communities that had been wrecked during colonial rule.

With regards to the history of Burundi, concurrences amongst researchers have not been corresponding as there have been difficulties in divorcing fact from fiction. In addition to this, question marks have been set concerning the issues of ethnic mobility and the degree of social unity between the two major groups; Hutu and Tutsi (Kamungi et al., 2005).

Remarkably, scholars contend that ethnic mobility was the exception rather than the rule in view of the fact that access to land, cattle, political and economic power as well as social influences, pivoted around the patronage of the royal court and was mediated through kinship relations and a political system based on the clan (Ndikumana, 2004). Researchers maintain that the system, initially designed to entrench the economic status quo, afforded social mobility only at the lineage level over a long term period, such that there was minimal opportunity for an individual to ‘change’ his/her ethnicity (Kamungi et al., 2005). Consequently, academics have claimed that pre-colonial relationships, including land tenure patterns, bred resentment and crystallized ethnic polarisation. Additionally, Uvin (1999:254) states that, the prime difficulty, in reaching a consensus with regards to the historical aspects of Burundi, is possibly the contemporary political importance of such history, in particular, different analyses of history offer the basis of building collective identities and justifications of current behaviour. Mokoena (2005:59) further claims that such contemporaneous behaviour has thus been “*pernicious and genocidal*”. Lastly, Uvin (2009) asserts that there were neither wars nor conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi during these years. However, this does not mean that equality prevailed or that stereotypes were absent. Uvin (2009) points to traditional proverbs which signified that there were no conflicts between the Hutu and Tutsi, but that the system displayed a fair degree of legitimacy and was capable of addressing social conflicts, is true in the case of Burundi. Moreover, Lemarchand (1997:10) notes that it was status and not ethnic identity, which was the key determinant of rank and privilege in Burundi.

3.4.2 The nature of the conflict in Burundi: Malicious and ‘Genocidal’ ?

Since World War II there have been over two-hundred armed conflicts worldwide. Thirty-one conflicts in twenty-two countries were active in 2005 (Gleditsch and Theisen, 2010:222). These conflicts have claimed some ten million deaths in battle-related violence in the world. The average number of battle-related deaths per year shows a long-term decline since World War II, with strong short-term variations, and the number of on-going armed conflicts has declined since the early 1990s (Gleditsch and Theisen, 2010:222). In spite of the reduction of these two types of wars; armed conflict remains a crucial component of human insecurity. In addition to the direct loss of life in battle-related conflicts, armed conflicts claim the highest human costs in terms of disease, refugee flows, and the destruction of societal infrastructure, although these indirect effects are much harder to quantify precisely (Gleditsch and Theisen,

2010:222).⁴² Genocide and other related forms of killings of individuals who are not engaged in armed resistance – a form of violence that by far exceeded battle deaths in the twentieth century – is also frequently linked to armed conflict (Harbom et al., 2006). Although the work summarised in this chapter mainly deals directly with conflict between organised parties engaged in armed conflict, an assumption is made that it has direct relevance for other forms of human insecurity as well. In any event, reducing armed conflict will make a major contribution to improving human security.

Within the contextual framework of the conflicts in Burundi, debates regarding its nature have been labelled as being malicious and ‘genocidal’. The ‘genocidal’ aspect is here referred to the structured violence and massacres that were carried out by both the Hutu and the Tutsi. Griggs (1997) maintains that Hutu’s in Burundi have operated under ‘Hutuism’, a concept which indicate *“to kill every member of every Tutsi generation”* (Griggs, 1997:8). ‘Hutuism’ was developed with the perception that Tutsi’s were European in their nature, thereby enslaving Hutu’s and carrying out unjustified killings. Moreover, ‘genocidal’ violence has also indoctrinated Tutsi’s to eliminate Hutu’s of special hierarchical order, such as; leaders, educated Hutu’s and the elite (Griggs, 1997). Mokoena (2005:59) also gives reference to Rwanda, as an example of the 1994 genocide being malicious and ‘genocidal’ in its nature.

There are various complex dimensions to the violent conflicts in Burundi, which has led to certain ‘classifications’ of the characteristics of the conflicts as malicious and ‘genocidal’. Social and cultural divides in Burundi are both vertical and horizontal and are of various kinds. Additionally, a country which carries an intense history of mass political mobilisation for conflict has consequently presented itself as a case of structural violence. Moreover, the key ideas behind the notion of structural violence, particularly points to a certain discomfort of social structures which are viewed as preventable, that distribute vulnerability to harm violence unevenly, for example, discriminatory or unequally. Harmful social structures position individuals and groups in a way that diminishes the range of choices they have and erodes the quality of choices individuals and groups have. Moreover, in understanding the violent conflicts, the cultural aspect of violence is also significant in this context. Similar to

⁴² The figures given in this paragraph are based on the Uppsala/PRIO conflict data, which include all armed conflicts with more than 25 battle-related deaths in a given year. See Gleditsch et al., (2002), Harbom et al., (2006), and www.prio.no/csw/armedconflict. The battle-death figures are from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) and www.prio.no/csw/cross/battledeaths. Indirect consequences of armed conflict are discussed in Collier et al., (2003) and Ghobarah, Huth & Russett (2003).

structural violence, the culture of violence is an ‘irrational factor’ in the conflicts in Burundi, where individuals and communities who experience such violence, develop trauma and certain cultural traits as a historical process. As such, structural violence resonates with the cultural aspect of violence as it should be considered in its social context as a form of social interaction (Buckley-Zistel, 2003:125).

Structural violence is arguably a form of injustice and dimensions of injustice are based on a person’s position in the social structure, which determine their vulnerability to structural violence. Furthermore, an individual’s position in the social structure is a function of: representation, such as a political institution, where entitlement comes in the form of rights. An individual’s position within the social structure is also a function of symbolic status, such as group identity of which recognition is the ‘remedy’. Material status, such as class identity also forms part of an individual’s position within the social structure and redistribution is therefore the antidote. Dimensions of injustice in the social structure that diminish rights to representation, recognition and redistribution increase individuals’ and groups’ exposure to harmful practices, experiences and conditions. Ndikumana (2004) points out that although structural causes of the violent conflicts in Burundi have been subject to the ethnic discourse, unequal distribution of economic resources and political power are conditions Burundi has found itself subject to. Consequently, such results in relative deprivation and differential access to life chances and choices⁴³ and are more appropriate explanations to the structural violence in Burundi. Such conditions have mobilised and manipulated culture along ethnic lines, and other identifying factors, in order to motivate support locally and to further consolidate their hold on power (Kamungi et.al, 2005).

Moreover, the Burundian conflicts have also shown tendencies of being prolonged and difficult in its nature. As various authors note, the Burundian conflicts have characteristics which are both tangible and invisible, thus presenting a challenging case with regards to conflict analysis. Symbolic values as well as the state’s failure to manage the crises in Burundi are pertinent to the characteristics of the conflicts.

3.5 ANALYSIS OF JARED DIAMOND’S *COLLAPSE*⁴⁴

3.5.1 Collapse

⁴³ This includes education, subsistence, security, leadership and participation (Ndikumana, 2004).

⁴⁴ Full title of the book, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (Diamond, 2005).

“Why did these ancient civilizations abandon their cities after building them with such great effort? Why these ancient collapses? This question is not just a romantic mystery. It is also a challenging intellectual problem. Why is it that some societies collapsed while others did not collapse? But even more, this question is relevant to the environmental problems that we face today — what if anything, can the past teach us about why some societies are more unstable than others, and about how some societies have managed to overcome their environmental problems. Can we extract from the past any useful guidance that will help us in the coming decades?” These are some of the questions Jared Diamond (2005:5) poses in his book, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*.

The fundamental message that Diamond (2005) seeks to convey throughout his book, is that our very persistence as a sophisticated society may depend upon well-led efforts to reduce the negative impact of our economic processes upon nature. This is an essential issue in *Collapse*, because Diamond’s goal in illuminating our understanding of the relationship between a society’s development and its environment is to prove that the two impulses are not negating. *Collapse* is partly a response to the dominant environmental discourse in the United States (US) today, which holds that environmental concerns are secondary to economic and security matters (Diamond, 2005). Environmental concerns are at least equal in importance and inextricably linked to all other aspects of a society’s success (Diamond, 2005). Poor environmental management leads to violent conflict and the brink of collapse. Moreover, Diamond (2005) tries to amalgamate a theory in order to explain why some societies fail or succeed. The notion of values also forms part of Diamond’s (2005) theory and one of the central themes in *Collapse*, is an attempt to stress the importance of evaluating the environmental impact of countries and/or societies values, whatever they are, and do something regarding the ones that do not work. “Perhaps the crux of success or failure of a society is to know which core values to hold onto, and which ones to discard and replace with new values” (Diamond, 2005:11).

Though Diamond’s (2005) definitions of collapse and society are vague in his book, they do encompass and point reference to the authors’ case studies presented in his book, but not beyond. The definition of collapse is explored through a historical review of various countries and time periods. The concept’s use stretches from the complete extinction (the Pitcairn Island), population crash (the Easter Island), resettlement (the Vikings), civil war (Rwanda), anarchy (Somalia and Haiti) and even the fall of a political ideology (such as the collapse of the Soviet Union). Furthermore, his definition of society is broad in scope and refers a variety

of society forms such as a settlement (for example, various Viking communities), a nation (reaching from Rwanda and Haiti, two of the smaller countries in the world, to China, one of the largest), a state (such as Montana in the US), and an island (the Easter).

The first general theme throughout *Collapse* is that most often a society collapses after its peak and secondly, there are often many subtle environmental factors that make some societies more fragile than others, and many of those factors are not well understood. Diamond (2005) subsequently asks; perhaps then, the crucial question: how could societies not perceive their impacts on the environments and stop in time? Why they fail to perceive the problems, or if they perceive them, why they fail to tackle them? And finally, if they fail to tackle them, why do they fail to succeed in solving them? These essential questions serve as precursors to the book's theme. Additionally, a hierarchical set of factors about why societies fail to solve their problems is developed by Diamond (2005) and illustrated in the book.

Diamond (2005) touches upon two generalisations in this area: firstly, where there is a conflict of interest between short-term interests of the decision-making elites; and secondly, the long-term interests of the society as whole, especially if the elites are able to insulate themselves from the consequences of their actions. According to Diamond (2005), where what is good in the short term for the elite is bad for the society as a whole, there is a real risk of the elite executing matters that would bring the society down in the long term. Diamond (2005) gives an example of the Greenland Norse, a competitive-rank in the society. What the chiefs of the Greenland Norse initially desired was more followers and more sheep and more resources to exceed the neighbouring chiefs. And that, Diamond (2005) argues, led the chiefs to do what is known as 'flogging' the land: overstocking the land hence forcing tenant farmers into dependency. As a result, this made the chiefs powerful in the short term, but led to the society's collapse in the long run (Diamond, 2005). It is precisely those same issues of conflicts of interest that are acute in the modern US, especially because the decision makers in the US are frequently able to insulate themselves from consequences for instance by living in gated compounds, by drinking bottled water and so forth, reports Diamond (2005:520). Within the last couple of years, it has been apparent that the elite in the business world correctly perceive that they can advance their short-term interest by doing things that are convenient in their interest although bad for society as a whole, such as draining a few billion dollars out of Enron and other businesses. Diamond's general conclusions about why societies make bad decisions are rooted in the principle of conflict of interest. To reiterate the

principle of conflict of interest, it is those matters that are good in the short term, is however, bad for society in the long term.

The other generalisation that Diamond (2005:246) stresses is that it is particularly hard for a society to make “good decisions when there is a conflict involving strongly-held values that are good in many circumstances but are poor in other circumstances”. Again, Diamond (2005) uses the Greenland Norse as an example of commitment. The author states that the Greenland Norse held together for four and a half centuries by their shared commitment to religion and by their strong social cohesion. However, in this difficult environment those two things—commitment to religion and strong social cohesion—also made it difficult for the Greenland Norse to change at the end and to learn from the Inuit (Diamond, 2005:246). Compared to the modern-day world, Diamond (2005) highlights how Australia managed to survive in the remote outpost of European civilisation for 250 years was largely due to their British identity. Diamond (2005:390) mentions that “just as the Norse settlers of Iceland and Greenland brought over the cultural values of their Norwegian homeland, so too did the British settlers of Australia carry British cultural values”. In contrast to the present day, the Australian commitment to a British identity is serving Australians poorly in their need to adapt to their (new) situation in Asia (Diamond, 2005:390). It is thus, particularly difficult to change course when the things that inconvenience you or society, are the matters that are also the source of one’s or society’s strength (Diamond, 2005).

Diamond (2005) poses the following question; what (then) is going to be the outcome today? Firstly, the dozen sorts of ‘ticking time bombs’ occurring in the modern world are of importance. These alleged ‘time bombs’ have fuses of a few decades to –all of them, not more than fifty years, and any one of which can, do us in. Whilst these ‘time bombs’ none of them has a fuse beyond fifty years, and most of them have fuses of a few decades – some of them in some places have much shorter fuses. At the rate at which humans are going now, Diamond (2005:12) contends that the Philippines will lose all its accessible forests within five years. Furthermore, the Solomon Islands are only one year away from losing their forests, which is the country’s major export. And that is going to be spectacular for the economy of the Solomon Islands. Diamond (2005) therefore asks: what is the most important thing we need to do concerning our environmental problems? The most crucial point is to disregard environmental factors as a single factor, but instead there are dozen factors, any one of which could do us in and we have got to get them all right. Diamond (2005) further argues that this is because if we solve eleven and we fail to solve the twelfth, we are in trouble. For

example, if we solve our problems of water, soil and population, but don't solve our problems of toxics, this inevitably leads to a dilemma (Diamond, 2005). The actuality is that our present course is a non-sustainable course, meaning that by definition, it does not have the capability to be sustained. Moreover, the outcome is going to be resolved within a few decades that means that those living today who are less than fifty or sixty years old will see how these paradoxes are resolved, and those who are over fifty or sixty years old may not see the resolution but their children and grandchildren certainly will (Diamond, 2005). The resolution is going to achieve either of two forms: either modern societies will resolve these unsustainable time fuses in pleasant ways of our own choice by taking remedial action, or else these conflicts are going to be settled in unpleasant ways not of our choice, namely, by war, disease or starvation (Diamond, 2005). But what is certain is that our unsustainable course will get resolved in one way or the other in a few decades.

For Diamond (2005), one of the most crucial aspects is the notion of choices. Does that mean that we should get pessimistic and overwhelmed? Diamond (2005) draws a reverse conclusion; the big problems facing the world today are not at all matters beyond our control. Diamond (2005), however becomes too figurative and ambiguous in his reasoning when he states that our biggest threat is not an asteroid about to crash into us, something we can do nothing about. Furthermore, the author goes on to say that: instead all the major threats facing us today are problems entirely of our own making. And since we made the problems, Diamond (2005:435) argues, we are obliged to solve them, which then means that it is entirely in our power to deal with these problems. Specifically, what can all of us do? Diamond's concluding remarks read as follows: there is a lot that we don't understand, and that we need to understand. And there is a lot that we already do understand, but aren't doing, and that we need to be doing.

3.5.2 Explaining Rwanda's Genocide from Diamond's perspective

It is clear that the central aim of Diamond's book was to demonstrate how some societies, both past and present, "*choose to fail or succeed*". Diamond (2005) maintains that when populations rise, some societies overuse resources which, in turn, leads to environmental degradation and, ultimately, social collapse. One of the cases he explores in his book is the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which he calls a modern day Malthusian crisis.

Based on the work of Malthus (1798) and the link from resource scarcity via overpopulation, to violent conflicts, has popularly been investigated by scholars (Diamond, 2005;

Yanagizawa, 2006). Diamond (2005:312) uses Malthus' highly contested argument that human population growth would be inclined to exceed the growth of food production. Supporting this argument, it has been argued that this is due to the fact that population growths increase exponentially; while food production increases only arithmetically (Diamond, 2005:312). In short, the Malthusian dilemma constitutes as follows: more food in addition to more people, therefore no improvement in food per person (Diamond, 2005). Diamond (2005:312) asserts; "population growth itself is halted by famine, war or disease or else by people making preventive choices"⁴⁵. Following Malthus' argument; the idea that we can promote human happiness purely by rapidly growing food production and concurrently lacking to moderate population growth, is destined to end in frustration (Diamond, 2005). Likewise, Diamond (2005), contends that this notion is still widespread in today's societies, such as the case of Rwanda.

3.5.3 Background to the Genocide's course

The Rwandese case study presented in *Collapse*, draw strong similarities to the Burundian case study examined in this thesis and therefore bring interesting viewpoints in relation to the violent conflicts, which occurred in both countries.⁴⁶ Before conducting this analysis, it is important (for the reader) to be informed about the complexity of the historical, social, economic and political mechanisms leading up to the genocide in Rwanda.

This section is aimed at giving a rather brief historical background of the genocide in Rwanda, in order to understand the analysis provided by Diamond (2005) more profoundly. Albeit the genocide was a conflict of ethnic character, the division and hostility between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority had not always been the same in scope and nature, but had rather evolved during decades of racial mythologizing, colonial divide-and-rule, and the use of ethnic propaganda for political purposes (Yanagizawa, 2006). As with Burundi, Rwanda's population is usually described as consisting of two major groups; approximately 85 per cent Hutu and 15 per cent Tutsi, along with Twa consisting of 1 per cent⁴⁷(Yanagizawa, 2006). While it is not certain which of the group's first settled in Rwanda, it is believed that the Twa was the first to arrive between 2000 BC and 1000 AD, while the agricultural Hutu immigrated around 1000 to 1500 AD, followed by the Nilotic pastoral

⁴⁵ Diamond (2005:312) suggests that this can be done through the use of contraception or delaying of marriage.

⁴⁶ While Rwanda's genocide is not something to be mistaken for Burundi's civil war, though similar in their 'ethnic' matter, the countries differ.

⁴⁷ The figure was roughly the same in 2006 as in the years before the genocide in 1994.

Tutsi's between 1500 and 1800 AD and apparently established themselves as overlords over the Hutu's (Diamond, 2005). During the colonial rule of Germany in 1897 and perhaps more under Belgian rule, Rwanda moved from an organised kingdom with a centralised rule exclusive to Tutsi's to a feudal-like society in the 19th century with policies that exacerbated the already existing ethnic cleavages (Diamond, 2005; Yanagizawa, 2006:16). Throughout the Belgian rule, it became obligatory to carry identity cards in order to classify themselves as either Hutu or Tutsi and the Tutsi's were also seen as a superior ethnic group for their seemingly Nilo-Hamatic appearance, which resembled that of a 'European' (Prunier, 1995; Diamond, 2005; Yanagizawa, 2006). In addition, this further intensified the racist ideologies.

During the period of 1959 and 1961 significant changes occurred as the monarchy was abolished, which was supported by the Belgians and the supposed 'Hutu Revolution' began as Hutu's in both Burundi and Rwanda, tried to overthrow the dominant Tutsi rule (Diamond, 2005; Yanagizawa, 2006). What followed was a series of killings of Tutsi, which in turn led to approximately 120,000 Tutsi's fleeing to neighbouring countries (Diamond, 2005). As independence took place in 1962, the Hutu had managed to gain power in Rwanda and in Burundi; it was the rule of the minority Tutsi which presided (Diamond, 2005). In the two decades following independence in Rwanda, approximately one million Rwandans, especially Tutsi's went into exile in neighbouring countries, however Tutsi's continued to invade Rwanda which again invoked "*retaliatory killings of Tutsi by Hutu*" (Diamond, 2005:314). In the midst of violence and instability, the military leader Juvénal Habyarimana came to power by means of a coup d'état in July 1973 (Diamond, 2005; Yanagizawa, 2006). In spite of his Hutu belonging, Habyarimana decided to unite the country by welcoming back the Tutsi and calling for a standstill of the violence against Tutsi's. Although Habyarimana introduced a one-party state, Rwanda's economy and social system prospered for nearly 15 years, with improvement in health, education as well as the economic sector (Diamond, 2005:315). However, the succession of development came to an end by drought and rising environmental matters and the situation did not improve as the world prices for coffee and tea⁴⁸ declined in 1989 (Diamond, 2005:315). Moreover, Habyarimana's relatively relaxed behaviour towards Tutsi's saw the awakening of extremist Hutu's who feared the loss of power as another Tutsi invasion occurred in 1990, however with no success (Diamond, 2005; Yanagizawa 2006). A transitional multi-party government was set up in 1992 leading to the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 1993 which called for a power-sharing agreement

⁴⁸ Rwanda's main export commodity (Oketch and Polzer, 2002; Diamond, 2005).

(Diamond, 2005; Yanagizawa, 2006). With the completion of the peace agreement, tension rose as trained militias began preparing to kill Tutsi's (Yanagizawa, 2006).

Tensions escalated and the killings ultimately broke out as the plane carrying Habyarimana and Burundi's new provisional president was shot down on the 6th of April 1994 (Diamond, 2005; Yanagizawa, 2006). It became apparent that this had been organised and prepared by Hutu extremist, whom set out to kill Habyarimana, and other less extreme members of the government branches and Tutsi's (Diamond, 2005). With the outbreak of the killings initiated by the Hutu army extremists, they also efficiently and successfully managed to recruit Hutu civilians and by doing so, they systematically killed any identified Tutsi (Diamond, 2005:316). The killings, which more resembled massacres at this point, had within six weeks exterminated an estimated 800,000 Tutsi which is tantamount to 11 per cent of Rwanda's total population (Diamond, 2005:317). The termination of the genocide came in July 1994, when the Tutsi-led rebel army Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) claimed victory after setting up a new government under the dictum of national reconciliation and unity in addition to calling upon the people of Rwandan to "think of themselves as Rwandans rather than as Hutu or Tutsi" (Diamond, 2005:317). An estimated 130,000 Rwandans were charged for being culpable of the genocide; however it is argued that around 800,000 people were involved in the massacres (Yanagizawa, 2006). While the scars are still healing and peace in Rwanda has been restored, Diamond (2005:317) states that after the RPF's victory, roughly 2,000,000, mostly Hutu Rwandese have fled to neighbouring Tanzania and DRC and about 750,000 previous expatriates, mostly Tutsi have returned to Rwanda. According to André and Platteau (1998), it was apparent that property issues, such as land, and appropriation during the genocide were a highly present factor. There are also micro-studies that confirm that the issue of land property was a significant factor in both who were killed (Yanagizawa, 2006).

3.5.4 Collapse in context: Rwanda

Diamond (2005:3) defines collapse as "a drastic decrease in human population size and/or political/economic/social complexity, over a considerable area, for an extended time". As previously discussed, Diamond (2005) views the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as a modern example of a society collapsing tragically and dramatically. The genocide has similarly, received the questioning title of being the fastest in the 20th century as roughly 800,000 people were massacred in merely 100 days. Millions of Rwandese people were evidently displaced in addition to the destruction of property and infrastructure and an economy which

contracted by 50 per cent (Diamond, 2005). Evidence, according to Diamond (2005), suggests that the Rwandese society unquestionably encountered a collapse. In Diamond's (2005) own lingo, why did Rwandans 'choose' to fail? Diamond (2005:319) argues that the genocide can partly be understood as a society-wide response to high fertility rates coupled with land scarcity. Diamond (2005) hypothesize that too many people and limited fertile land were significant variables in interpreting the calamity. Diamond (2005) has however, received critique, which is worth mentioning.⁴⁹

Hintjens (1999:247), reports that although Diamond (2005) identifies that Rwanda's mass violence was both driven and encouraged by Hutu elites who were desirous to keep the reins of political control firmly within their hold, Hintjens (1999) also believes that land scarcity coupled with low agricultural productivity in fact drove people to murder. Before moving forward in this analysis, Diamond (2005) maintains that one of the crucial factors in his assessment is the fact that Rwanda⁵⁰ was already one of Africa's most densely populated countries in the 19th century. One of the reasons for its rapid population growth was due to the country's advantage "of moderate rainfall and an altitude too high for malaria and the tsetse fly" (Diamond, 2005:319). Moreover, the population grew at an average rate of over three per cent per annum due to new world crops, public health and medicine (Diamond, 2005:319). Low agricultural activity in Rwanda is represented by it being inefficient due to manual labour; farmers were depended on picks and machetes, in conjunction with this, most Rwandans had to remain as a farmer which resulted in small production and surplus (Diamond, 2005:319). Interestingly, the country's population increased after independence, but the agricultural means were still very much traditional and failing to modernize simultaneously with population growth. The Malthusian dilemma is clearly present within this context: instead of incorporating a variety of productive crop and perhaps increasing its agricultural exports or establishing effective family planning, Rwandans resorted to "clearing forests and draining marshes to gain new farmland, thus shortening fallow period, and trying to extract as much as two or three consecutive crops from a field within one year" (Diamond,

⁴⁹ Diamond has received critique from is Karol Boudreaux (2009), who argues that the difficulty with Diamonds' argument is not that it is impossible, but rather the fact that it overlooks the underlying causes of land conflict in Rwanda in addition to the political economy factors that drove the Habyarimana government to repress its citizens and demonize opponents (Boudreaux, 2009:9). According to Boudreaux (2009:9), the examination of Rwanda presented by Diamond (2005) falls short on one account; the mere fact that an analytical comprehension of the role that Rwandan institutions and policies took part in shaping a predominantly authoritarian, inflexible, and anti-urban society, is not present in Diamond's (2005) analysis. Moreover, Boudreaux (2009:9) maintains that it is such institutional and policy components that help explain why Belgium, for instance, with its high population and scarce land is peaceful and wealthy while Rwanda is not.

⁵⁰ Burundi is also mentioned as the other most densely populated country in Africa (Diamond, 2005:319).

2005:319). Additionally, Hutu farmers began cultivating all arable land excluding national parks, as a number of Tutsi's had fled the country and thus more land was available. Consequently, environmental problems such as over farming and soil erosion were present and continued to rise.

Diamond (2005:315) maintains that population pressure and the environmental degradation that may be associated with a rise in population are important catalysts for social change as seen in the case of Rwanda even prior to 1994. Diamond (2005:320) draws heavily on the study presented by André and Platteau (1998), in which he asserts that (even) ordinary citizens participated in the violence because they were desperate and lured by property. The case study presented by André and Platteau (1998), focuses on the northwestern commune in Rwanda, Kanama. As André and Platteau's (1998) study is thoroughly scrutinized and perhaps requires a more extensive and elaborate presentation, this study merely highlights the key points due to obvious limitations within this study. What has been highlighted above with regard to population pressure and environmental degradation is present in the case of Kanama. However, what is distinct for Kanama is that it was only occupied by Hutu's (Diamond, 2005). Diamond (2005:320) notes that Rwandan farmers in Kanama were not able to boost agricultural productivity in proportion with population increases and Kanama's extremely fertile volcanic soil, constituted a decrease in farm size from a median farm size of only 0.89 acre in 1988, to a further decline in 1993 with 0.72 acres (Diamond, 2005:321). This had an effect on the younger people living in Kanama as they had no real chance of establishing a life independent from their parents, which in turn caused what Diamond (2005:321) explains as "lethal family tensions that exploded in 1994...with more young people staying at home, the average number of people per farm household increased between 1998 and 1993, from 4.9 to 5.3, respectively". Naturally, the population of Kanama struggled to feed themselves on such little land. Repeated serious conflicts became common in Kanama as people were impoverished and hungry thus causing desperation and land disputes were the root cause of most conflicts. Such incidents whereby family and relatives sabotaged and killed each other turned into a competition for land and bitter enemies. This backdrop of chronic and escalating conflict as well as killings forms the background of the mass slaughtering which exploded in 1994 (Diamond, 2005:324). According to evidence presented by André and Platteau (1998), 5.4 per cent of the people that they attempted to trace down post 1994, found that were reported dead as a result of the war. Moreover, Diamond (2005:325), contends that the "death rate in an area where the population consisted almost

entirely of Hutu's was at least half of the death rate in areas where Hutu killing Tutsi plus other".

The fundamental nature of Diamond's (2005:8) statement "*how some societies choose to fail or succeed*" is that societies who make prudent decisions about resource use and population control flourish, whilst those societies that are negligent in terms of their choices fail and often do so spectacularly. In essence, the proximate cause of the gruesome violence in most areas in Rwanda was ethnic hatred whipped by politicians cynically concerned with keeping themselves in power (Diamond, 2005:326). Diamond (2005:516) argues that just as in the past, countries in the present day that are environmentally stressed, overpopulated, or both, become at risk of getting politically stressed, and of their governments collapsing. He further contends that it is when people are desperate, undernourished, and without hope, that they blame their governments, which they hold accountable for or unable to solve their problems. As a result, they attempt to emigrate at any cost, they fight each other over land, and they kill each other and ignite civil wars. And thus, becoming a terrorist, supporter or a person who tolerates terrorism, is further quantified by "*we have nothing to lose*" (Diamond, 2005:516). Such transparent connections result in genocides, civil wars or revolutions, akin to the ones that already ruptured in Bangladesh, Burundi, Rwanda and Indonesia, to mention a few (Diamond, 2005).

3.6 CONCLUDING COMMENT

This chapter served to provide analyses in perspective, by introducing Diamond's analysis of why societies collapse within an ecological framework. The Power-Sharing Agreement was introduced, which highlights its limited ability of inclusion, for this agreement did not account for factors that this study deems important, namely environmental dynamics. Moreover, this chapter stressed key actors and factors in the political conflicts in Burundi. Diamond's (2005) framework explained in this chapter provides a foundation for the analysis of this study in the subsequent chapter.

Chapter 4

ASSESSING LAND AND POPULATION GROWTH

4.1 INTRODUCTION

*“Mu nda harara inzara, hakazonduka inzigo”.*⁵¹

- Burundian Proverb

This chapter uses the contextual and historical background provided in the previous chapters to investigate the research question; *how have population growth and limited access to land impacted on the previous political conflicts in Burundi?* This chapter signifies the most complex and detailed chapter in terms of analyses and findings. Furthermore, this chapter is structured in such a manner that the clustering of arguments are logical and consecutive in nature in order to address and assess the quintessence of this study, namely to examine how land access and population growth have, to a certain degree, impacted on the political conflicts in Burundi. Also, the extent to which a nexus between the aforementioned variables and the conflicts in Burundi can be found – forms part of the first sub-research question and will thus be addressed. An exploratory journey leads to the second sub-research question of whether the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Accord addressed the importance of these two environmental factors in the Burundian conflict context. The intention set out for this chapter is mainly to illustrate that Burundi’s land question is indeed multi-faceted and that through an exploration of the various indicators, consequently, this study, in a context specific framework, illustrates how limited land access and rapid population growth can serve as conditions for the political conflicts in Burundi.

The scholarly discourse on conflict has seen the use of various conflict analyses as a method of assessment. Conflict analysis per se, however, usually involves the verification of whether one is dealing with a conflict; defining conflict system boundaries, this can and does change, so a certain level of amendment occurs; and using specific conflict analysis tools to determine and zoom in on any characteristics of the conflict as well as organise information, which serves as significant (Mason and Rychard, 2005). Within the context of the political conflicts in Burundi, a broad academic and policy literature has been recommended. There is no

⁵¹The Burundian proverb is translated as: “If you fall asleep with an empty belly, you awake in the morning with a hatred-filled heart” (Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2011).

particular structure or framework of how a conflict develops, conflicts are dynamic systems. Interestingly, conflict is about positions and interests, according to Mason and Rychard (2005), it is a matter of what people want and why they say they want it, which therefore leads to conflict of interests at a more individual level. Within the field of political philosophy and conflict dynamics, there are numerous ways to analyse conflicts and the impacts that it has on both the political structure and the socio-economic aspects. This study recognises the importance of the use and management of land and the rising population growth in Burundi and the influence it can have on conflicts. However, it is equally important to measure such conditions for conflicts with a critical eye and when immersing into such an extensive field, as ambiguities do occur and also have a considerable presence which deserves acknowledgement, thus noted in this study.

4.2 THE SOUTH-NORTH DISPARITY

What will follow from this section and emerge in section 4.4, is an additional reference to the topographical characteristics and the ecological differences relating to the rural and urban areas in Burundi, have also influenced the land issues and furthered conditions for violence. As such, this study attempts to illustrate the importance of how these ecological differences exacerbate the land issue in Burundi in line with, but not exclusive to, Diamond's (2005) analysis of environmental damage.

4.2.1 Topographical Outline

This outline is useful for this study in that it provides a background to better understand how Burundi's northern and southern parts differ in terms of their topography. Moreover, this outline will also highlight the importance of how regional differences have influenced the land issues when assessing the rural and urban discrepancies due to Burundi's high rural population and this has also affected the agricultural aspect of the urban areas.

The ecological landscape of Burundi is rather special due to the vast topographical differences that stretch across the country, making Burundi a unique case. Furthermore, Burundi has eleven natural regions, which are fragmented into five climatic ecological zones, namely; the western lowlands of Imbo which is occupied by *Hyphaene-Acacia* woodland in the Ruzizi plain and *Bracystegia* woodlands along the lakeshore; the mountainous Congo-Nile divide, the central highlands, the eastern Kumoso depression, and lastly, the north-eastern Bugesera depression (Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Beck et al., 2010; BTI, 2012). Such

variation presents great diversification for ecological conditions, which awards a natural eco-system, plant and animal species in the respective eco-regions. Likewise, such eco-system areas has and can in the future afford Burundians with services such as medicinal plants, food crops, drinking water, irrigation, and timber, to name a few (Beck et al., 2010).

The country's significant landscape with its green hillsides and dense forests are perhaps some of the more common characteristics Burundi is known for. In spite of the destruction of some of Burundi's natural habitat due to the violent conflicts that took place in the years following independence, the small country has some noteworthy eco-systems in the Rift Valley. The Great Rift of east Africa gave the formation of the majestic Lake Tanganyika, one of the largest lakes in the world and also significant for Burundi at both a political and socio-economic level (Beck et al., 2010). Factored in the Afromontane⁵² forests of the region are one of the main conservation areas in Burundi, the Kibira National Park, which discloses itself as the last absolute stretch yet to remain in Burundi. The Albertine Rift Mountains are not only part of the Afromontane eco-regions, but it is also one of the largest areas in this region covering parts of Burundi, along with the Democratic Republic of Congo, United Republic of Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda (Beck et al., 2010). Bird species are indigenous and distinctive for Burundi's biodiversity and the famous Northern Aquatic Landscape (*Lacs du Nord*) plays a key role for migrating species in terms of bird habitat. In the north-eastern part of Burundi is the Ruvubu National Park, which hosts' special woodlands, savannah and fauna – but is also the second main conservation area in the country (Beck et al., 2010:1).⁵³

The western side of Burundi is predominantly mountainous with extended ridges, some even above 2,500 meters, significant for this mountain range is that it continues on to Rwanda as well as extending from the north to the south of Burundi. The land on the western side also makes a sharp descend to 1,500 metres to join with Lake Tanganyika in the south (Beck et al., 2010). Afromontane communities do not only cover the western part, but with transitional rainforest, they also cover the western mountain slopes overlooking the Ruzizi river and Lake Tanganyika. The lowland regions, Bwery and Bugesera lie in the furthest north of Burundi wedged by *Lacs du Nord*, which comprise of Cohoha and Rweru (Beck et al., 2010). Also in the north is the Kibira National Park, which adjoins the Nyungwe Forest in Rwanda, and is

⁵² Afromontane represents the Afrotropic sub-region, its plant and animal species common to the mountains of Africa and the southern Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, the Afromontane regions of Africa are discontinuous, separated from each other by lowlands, and are sometimes referred to as the Afromontane archipelago, as their distribution is analogous to a series of sky islands (Beck et al., 2010).

⁵³ The third main conservation area is the Ruzizi National Park situated north-west of Bujumbura (Hendrix and Glaser, 2007).

also surrounded by major montane forest. The Ruzizi river also forms part of the north-western part of the country and forms the international frontier with DRC. The Ruvubu river which rises in the northern part of Burundi is the southernmost source of the Nile; the northern region also hosts the Kanyaru and Ruhwa rivers, in the extreme north and northwest respectively (Beck et al., 2010).

Most of southern Burundi is formed by the Malagarasi river and a smaller patch of low altitude enclosed forest, which lives beside the banks of Lake Tanganyika. Natural vegetation, such as East African evergreen bush land and wooded grassland, dominates the eastern and south-eastern part of Burundi. Following the mountains eastward, the land makes a steady drop to around 1,400 meters in the direction of the south-eastern and southern border (Beck et al., 2010). The heart of Burundi mainly consists of a central plateau that covers the whole of the centre of the country and slants from north to south and west to east, with an average elevation of the central plateau ranging from 1,450 meters to 2,000 meters (Kameri-Mbote, 2007; Hendrix and Glaser, 2007). Along with the green hillsides, the steep slopes on the plateau are frequently eroded due to intense agricultural development, according to Beck et al., (2010). Contiguous with this are the valley bottoms that are often marshy. The central plateau is significantly defined by one area of higher ground, which falls steeply south-eastwards to the Kumoso depression.

As the southernmost country within the Great Lakes region and located near the equator, Burundi receives abundant rain during normal seasons coupled with tropical highland and tropical equatorial climates. As previously mentioned, each region in the country is featured by hills, plateaus, lakes, and mountains, all of which complements to a unique climate of temperature, humidity and rainfall and the varying climatic conditions due to the five different climatic regions. Beck et al., (2010) also report that very warm temperatures and tropical climate do occur in areas around Lake Tanganyika and the Ruzizi river. The regions in the vicinity of such lakes or rivers are more prone to experiencing a warmer environment made up of plain terrains (Kok et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2010).

The considerable variations in topography, soil and climate are responsible for the large number of vegetation types. However, agricultural pressure is leading to the rapid disappearance of the country's natural vegetation. Levels of plant endemism are unknown but given the transitional nature of the vegetation are unlikely to be high. Burundi possesses extensive wetlands. The total area of marshland is more than 120,000 ha, almost 5 per cent of

the area of the country. However, a large part of these marshlands has already been drained for agriculture. There are also a number of small lakes in the mountains as well as four substantial ones, including Lake Tanganyika, about 8 per cent of the surface of which constitutes part of Burundi.

Influenced by the altitude which varies from 772 meters measured at Lake Tanganyika and the highest point at 2,670 meters at Mount Heha, there is no surprise that the country oscillate between dry and rainy seasons (Banderembako, 2006). Temperatures are cooler in most parts of the western and northern regions of Burundi mainly due to the elevated lands with most average temperatures at 17°C. The mountainous parts of the country naturally experience tropical highland climate. The capital city, Bujumbura, reports average humidity levels at 71 per cent annually and temperatures are known to be relatively stable with an average of 24°C (Banderembako, 2006). Some researchers even claim that Bujumbura mirrors the climatic particulars of the entire Burundi, with unstable rainfalls peaking in April and dropping in July (Uvin, 2009; Beck et al., 2010).

Burundi's climate is tropical and humid in its nature due to the mountainous landscape and plateau in the central part of Burundi. In essence, Burundi constitutes an equatorial climate, resulting in various elements of weather across the country such as humidity, rainfall, sunshine; wind, to mention a few. Thus, the climate has a natural rain season consisting of two wet seasons and two dry seasons (Diamond, 2005). These four different seasons can be divided and distinguished into the following: the first short dry season from December to January, the long wet spell from February to May, followed by the long dry spell from June to August, and finally the short wet season from September to November (CIA Factbook, 2012). The temperatures, therefore, fluctuate from region to region, mainly due to the difference in altitude. According to Cochet (2004), the average temperature in the central plateau is 20 °C, whereas Bujumbura's average is estimated at 23°C annually. The majestic Lake Tanganyika and the Ruzizi River Plain receives slightly warmer, albeit the amount of expected rainfall annually (Cochet, 2004). The mountainous and hilly areas are moderately cooler than elsewhere in Burundi, averaging around 16°C (CIA Factbook, 2012). The northwestern parts of Burundi received most of the rain, it is estimated that the entire country annually receives somewhere between 1,300 and 1,600 mm of rainfall (CIA Factbook, 2012).

4.2.2 Ecological (dis) advantages/ Urban versus Rural

The purpose of this section is to highlight the differences amongst the urban and rural population and the environmental concerns with regard to land. This is discussed with reference to the major damage and degradation of marginal land areas in the rural areas as a result of the pressing population growth since the first political conflict broke out in 1965 in Burundi. In addition to the aforementioned, the intention with this section is to address how limited access to agricultural land, predominantly in the rural areas, led to a migration from rural to urban areas in an attempt to find means of sustainable livelihood and how rural and urban differences have also impacted the land disputes in Burundi since the 1960s.

The organisational division of provinces, communes and *collines*⁵⁴ in Burundi originates from the legacy of the pre-colonial structures, which were customized under colonisation (Uvin, 2009). Burundi consists of seventeen provinces each named after their respective provincial capital: Bubanza, Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, Bururi, Cankuzo, Cibitoke, Gitega, Karuzi, Kayanza, Kirundo, Makamba, Muramvya, Muyinga, Mwaro, Ngozi, Rutana and Ruyigi. Of these seventeen provinces, the ones in the southern part of Burundi are considered to be more privileged. The southern provinces consist of: Muramvya, Cibitoke, Makamba, Karuzi, Bubanza, Cankuzo, Rutana, Bururi and lastly Bujumbura (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000). The northern provinces, Ngozi, Kayanza, Kirundo, Gitega, Muyinga and Ruyigi, are systematically less privileged and struggle more with infrastructure and access to education (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000).

Regional differences amongst the provinces are quite significant with regards to how rural and urban areas are being structured by the government. Power struggle and control over the government coupled with economic rent-seeking and bureaucratic corruption, are impacting the south-north disparity in Burundi and creating stark differences amongst the provinces in the country (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000; Oketch and Polzer, 2002; Uvin, 2009). The repercussions of such a skew distribution across the provinces are influencing the access to various sectors within the public sphere. For instance, as a means of controlling the intricate bureaucratic matters, unequal access to education has been capitalized with the exclusion of Hutu students and disadvantaging northern Tutsi's (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:104). The southern parts of Burundi, which includes Makamba, Bururi and Bujumbura, are the ones

⁵⁴ *Collines* are hills and is the lowest geographical point for Burundians, which usually consist of about 150-300 households (Uvin, 2009:30).

gaining from the state's investment and infrastructure, this because most people from the south are the ones dominating government bodies (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000). It is reported that these provinces are measured as having the lowest ratio of students per classroom per teacher (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:104). Discrepancy within the education sector is an issue which seems to separate and create alarming relationships between the northern and southern provinces in Burundi. The continuous control over the state and resourcing of the agricultural sector is also leading to regional poverty (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000; Oketch and Polzer, 2002). For Oketch and Polzer (2002), the control of the Burundian state is emphasized and seen as one of the crucial factors in the conflict in Burundi.

With over 91 per cent of the population living in rural areas, Burundi is one of the most rural nations in Africa. In the capital, Bujumbura, lies some of the more concentrated arable land (UNEP, 2008). This has also led to an urban bias of state investment, leading to the under-resourcing of the agricultural sector (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:106). The chronic and extreme vulnerability of the rural population is exacerbated by a scarcity of arable land and high pressures on limited natural resources: households (averaging around five persons) survive on an average of 0.5 ha, which is well below what is required for even the most basic levels of nutrition (FAO, 2011).

Cobbled in the complexities of the violent conflicts in Burundi, was one of the most affected provinces, Ngozi. Here, the communes of Ruhororo had the largest Internally Displaced People (IDP) camp in the country (Uvin, 2009). Interestingly, the commune of Busiga, which also lies in Ngozi, experienced far more stability and not as badly affected during the violent conflicts in Burundi, as a result, Busiga is less poor on average than the rest of the province (Uvin, 2009:36). However, Busiga is still considered one of the poorest communes overall. Uvin (2009) also reports that there are differences between communes as well as provinces with regards to location and distribution of services.

The commune of Nyanza-Lac in the Makamba province has the highest number of returned refugees in the entire country. Nyanza-Lac lies in the southern part, close to Lake Tanganyika and is also one of the most populated communes compared to the other communes; moreover, Nyanza-Lac also has a fairly large urban center (Uvin, 2009:37). Interestingly, Nyanza-Lac is one of the communes in Burundi that experiences vast disparities, as it has sufficient income-generating opportunities with its palm oil, fishing due to the proximity to

Lake Tanganyika, possibilities of trade over road and the lake and rice crops in abundance (Uvin, 2009). According to the BTI (2012), the food intake in Nyanza-Lac is slightly higher for a commune in the southern part of Burundi, comparing this to the northern communes, where it is estimated that one half of the population's daily intake consists of 1,400 kcal in contrast to the southern parts of Burundi, where the BTI (2012) report that less than one fifth of the population lives in households with such low calorie intake.

Of the urban communes is Bwiza, Kamenge and Musiga, all three situated in Bujumbura Mairie (Uvin, 2009). According to Uvin (2009:32), the lives of Burundians in these communes reflect realities of the lives of the large majority of ordinary urban people, additionally, these communes are said to be of a more mixed demographic representation as well as almost entirely consisting of Hutu and Tutsi, respectively.

Political conflict and lack of infrastructure are factors that have exacerbated the situation amongst different communes and provinces in Burundi since the late 1960s. Some provinces within the proximity of the capital, Bujumbura, are economically better off than other provinces further away and thus experience more benefits of a much more improved infrastructure than other provinces further away from Bujumbura and more remote, dealing with IDP camps, refugees and other socio-economic issues that the government has failed to address. Generally speaking, economic and regional cleavages in Burundi are factors that contribute to the divide and also impel control over the state.




Figure 2: Rural and urban percentage of the population⁵⁵

Source: Databank Worldbank (2012)

As seen in figure two above, data reveal that out of the total population percentage of Burundi, the urban population has had a steady increase since independence and has experienced an escalating trend since 1970 measured at 2.4 per cent of the total population, up until 2011 which reached a soaring 10.9 per cent. What this means is that despite the political conflicts which were wreaking havoc during mid-1960s to 1993/1994, a strong urban population grew. Cochet (2004) noted that visible environmental depletion during the 1970s and 1980s has been one of the factors as to why there was an urban growth in the total population of Burundi. A migration away from the rural countryside in an attempt to find other means of socioeconomic survival in the urban areas occurred already from mid 1970s. Access and allocation to land by the rural poor has been limited by fragmentation “miniaturisation” of farm plots during the several outbreaks of violence in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993 as a consequence of population increase coupled with disparity between customary

⁵⁵ Representing the percentage of the total population in Burundi

and statutory systems which are in similar operation (Uvin, 2009). However, what generally happened was that uncultivable land plots were used in the urban spaces in an effort to grow crops (Uvin, 2009; Baribeau, 2011). Although experiencing a relatively steady growth of the rural population, going from representing 98 per cent of the total population in 1960, it made a significant drop to 95 per cent in the mid-1980s to an even further drop in 1994⁵⁶ measured at 93 per cent. Hitherto, a predominantly rural populous country, the rural population in Burundi is currently measured at 89 per cent, quite a significant drop from 98 per cent in 1960. In figure three below, is an additional illustration of the rural and urban growth differences. This figure consolidates with figure two.

In figure three below, the real annual growth of the rural and urban population is shown and demonstrating quite a fluctuating growth rate of the rural population, notably, with two major drops during the early 1970s and late 1990s. As for the urban section, it experienced an immense jump from 1970 at 2.8 per cent to a whopping 7.8 per cent the following year. The urban annual population growth has since continued to grow whereas the annual rural population growth has gone decreased. However, a significant note in this regard is crucial in that, in spite of the figures presented here and what might seem dramatic, is that Burundi essentially rural and still a country that is experiencing low rates of urbanization and dispersed habitats.

⁵⁶ 1994 is specifically used here in order to better understand it in the context of the violent conflict which broke out in 1993 as the last conflict accounted for in this particular framework of the study.




Figure 3: Rural and Urban population growth⁵⁷
Source: Databank Worldbank (2012)

Competition between the rural and urban development and agricultural demands are also increasing the divide between those who have and those that don't have in Burundi. In line with Oketch and Polzer's argument (2002:86), such demands by the rural and the continuing demand by the urban population have and still are, exacerbating the division amongst Burundians themselves, due to the extremely tight control over the state by a certain urban elite. Such political activities by the elite and lack of sufficient state functions create unnecessary gaps and have led to violent conflicts in Burundi. As such, one can argue that the south-north disparity in Burundi is by and large impugned by a conspicuous organisational conflict of interest between the urban, more specifically, the elite and the rural majority, which in turn creates different social opportunities and might also influence land property rights.

Oketch and Polzer (2002) argue that the competition for control over the state is directly between the urban populations, although the rural population are also directly affected by the

⁵⁷ Growth per annum in percentage

distribution or the lack thereof, by natural resource questions. More specifically, the rural population is hardest hit by the lack of sufficient land to sustain a growing peasant population living off subsistence agriculture (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).

Contrary to the vast unique topographical differences that are present in Burundi, there are also important environmental issues that raise concern for the future of Burundi and which needs to be addressed. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), report that land availability and degradation are threats to the rapidly growing population, with roughly 90 per cent of the population residing in rural areas and 90 per cent of the labour force accounting for agriculture, the availability of arable land is rather low in comparison to other African countries (UNEP, 2008:105). As already noted, Burundi is a densely populated country, and naturally this can intensify other ecological issues. Moreover, in 2006, the Food and Agriculture Organization United Nations (FAO) revealed that almost 91 per cent of the total land area in Burundi was made use for crops and livestock and that such intensive crop growing led to severe soil erosion on the natural steep terrain in the country.

The conversion of land to agriculture in addition to grazing has impacted Burundi's biological resources and ecosystems, such that Burundi is ranked as the only country in Africa with the highest rate of deforestation, another major environmental threat (Beck et al., 2010). UNEP (2008:108) estimated that 47 per cent of Burundi's forest cover has disappeared since 1990, deforestation has had such a severe impact on Burundi's ecosystems that a mere six per cent is left of Burundi's native forest, tiny reserves compared to what was once a large native forest (UN, 2007). Moreover, the intense dependence on wood for fuel also contributes to severe deforestation Burundi is experiencing. Overfishing in Lake Tanganyika coupled with the increasing population migration to the Lake has been a rising environmental issue for Burundians. Again, the ecosystem is under threat coupled with soil erosion from deforestation in and around Lake Tanganyika area has caused siltation of rivers and lakes - threatening both the aquatic ecosystem and freshwater supplies (UNEP, 2008: Beck et al., 2010). Furthermore, deforestation in the region has accelerated siltation of lake waters, and waste discharge from Bujumbura is a significant source of pollution.

4.3 THE 1986 LAND CODE

The significance of the 1986 Land Code is such that, with its rigid and strict registration system, this study recognises the importance of including it in this overall assessment as the political dimensions with regard to the Land Code have exacerbated tensions and conflict

around allocation of land. This section therefore outlines the brief stipulations of the 1986 Land Code and its shortcomings.

The land code's principal function has been to establish different kinds of land property rights in Burundi. Property right to land serves as a crucial role in governing the patterns of its management and investment on it. Additionally, property rights also include the welfare of individuals, households, and communities who both indirectly and directly depend on land as their livelihood in Burundi. It is precisely under such demands that this study has chosen to illuminate the land code and its relevance to the research question. As such, the land code indirectly formed property rights, which are crucial in this application of the study, for the reason that policies that shape property rights can play a major role in promoting (or inhibiting) economic growth, equity of distribution, sustainability of the resource base and the wellbeing of the current and coming generation. Several rights are granted to the Burundian state, under the categories of 'public domain' which is indisputable, and 'private domain' which can be conceded to private entities by public officials. Navigable water bodies, flood plains, and areas designated specifically for protection (such as, national parks and forest reserves) are considered the state's private domain. However, the Burundian states' public domain is considerably broader, and includes 'vacant' lands, land expropriated for reasons of public utility, confiscated lands, non-navigable 'waterbodies' (including marshes and wetlands), and forests (Kamungi et al., 2005). The fact that wetlands and non-protected forests remain the property of the state, and can be ceded to private individuals undercuts incentives for local inhabitants to manage these resources responsibly. In theory, however, the notion of community management over marshes and forests could be incorporated under this law, as Article 240 of the land code permits communes and public societies to gain title over land and resources for 'public use or services' (Kamungi et al., 2005).

The institutional capacity of the land code is a contested legal act as it has been proposed that the land code is "little understood and hardly implemented" (Kamungi et al., 2005:234). Land tenure in Burundi is regulated by both customary and modern systems, which has even on occasion, overlapped each other. The land code, henceforth, allow customary law and practice to continue in land tenure and management alongside with statutory law (Kohlhagen, 2011). Such a combination is considered confusing with contradictions that are worth mentioning. An example put forward by Kamungi et al., (2005:234), illustrates that while the land code recognizes the legality of customary claims, it still requires all land and its transactions to be registered with the state.

The land code has been perceived as biased towards favouring active use of land in Burundi and this study highlights the level of importance that the land code has had on the pressing land and population issue. Moreover, the land code has been criticised of being too archaic with problematic traditional and legal regulations, thus making dispute resolution mechanisms highly intricate (Kamungi et al., 2005). Due to the population pressures in Burundi and the scarcity of cultivable land, this preference is not surprising. Kohlhausen (2011) maintains that land policies in Burundi have been and still are, in constant danger due to weak prioritizing of land conflict regulation as a result of the land code being a composition of former colonial laws.

The concept of 'putting land to value' can easily conflict with sound environmental management such as conserving marginal or ecologically significant areas (Kohlhausen, 2011). The policy of 'putting land to value' is apparent in many articles of the 1986 Land Code, notably in Article 330 which grants private customary rights to the (male) person who is exploiting land (Hobbs and Knausenberger, 2003). Moreover, Article 380 dictates "productive use and continuous exploitation" of land to retain tenure rights (Kamungi et al., 2005:236). Article 231 which grants the Burundian state property rights over any vacant or unused land, and Article 294 which considers it a grave offense to not put land conceded by the state to productive use (Kamungi et al., 2005). However a positive element in the land code is the allowance for fallowing, which is considered an exploitable use of land as long as the practice alternates with periods of cultivation.

An aspect of the 1986 land code which was frequently nominated for revision was the right of land concession granted to public officials. These highly discretionary rights are delineated under Articles 253 and 254 as follows: Provincial Governors have the right to cede or grant concessions to public domain land under 4 hectares, while the Minister of Agriculture may grant up to 50 hectares of rural land, and the Urban Affairs Minister may grant up to 10 hectares of urban land (Kamungi et al., 2005). Concessionary use rights to marshes were encountered during the field visit to Kirundo by Hobbs and Knausenberger (2003), where it was explained that small plots were being 'rented' to individuals for rice cultivation for a nominal fee. This cultivation was occurring under the auspices of a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) sub-grantee, and so was being subject to responsible management through irrigation canals and fertilization. However it was unclear how decisions of access were made to these fertile areas. On a different note, one individual stated that this law was creating a conducive environment for land speculation.

The expropriation of land by the government and redistribution to undeserving cases exacerbates the land disparity amongst the urban elite and the rural poor farmers (Kamungi et al., 2005). This is nothing new within the framework of the land code; however what is vital and central to this study is how this contested land code has throughout Burundi's history released a certain avenue of land tenure fear. Again, the crucial aspect here is the level in which demographic pressure has served as an additional stressor to rapid land scarcity and violence. Consequently, increasing land scarcity from the mid-1970s already has thus forced Burundians to find other possibilities for cultivating land, such as hillsides which are more susceptible to soil erosion. Another reason why access to arable land has proved to be a major challenge to Burundians is yet again that certain land belongs to the Burundian state under the policies of the land code. As such, a depleting level of land access has been noticeable from during mid-1970s down to an alarming level at 0.11 hectares per person⁵⁸ measured in 2010.

Interestingly, the 1986 land code still regulates the access and ownership to land in Burundi and debates concerning a reform of the 1986 land code has been brought to the governments attention as such, a new land code is currently before parliament, however, a universal land registry does not yet exist (Baribeau, 2011: Kohlhagen, 2011). Moreover, the Burundian state has failed to fulfill its tasks it assigned itself to secure land tenure for Burundian farmers and has therefore “robbed devalued and despised land of farmers” (Kohlhagen, 2011:11).

Agricultural issues in Burundi have been a whirlwind of factors in an intricate way. Summing up the trigger factors: with a population that predominately depends on agriculture as means and modes of production linked with socioeconomic values as well, additionally, the constant growth of Burundian population, there is no wonder that the allocation of land rights thus creates socioeconomic cleavages and trigger tension. The 1986 land code has thus served as important and relevant indicator in answering the research question, especially with evidence pointing to an increase in land conflicts and illegal land allocation since the land code was promulgated (Kohlhagen, 2011).

⁵⁸ This will be further elaborated on under section 4.5.1 within this chapter.

4.4 ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

4.4.1 Initial remarks

Building on Macnaghten and Urry's (1998) argument, that all notions of nature are intertwined in various forms of social life and that different cultural perceptions of the physical world, here nature, are extremely crucial in order to comprehend or at least attempt, to reach a certain understanding as to why perceptions of nature is not as lucid as many scholars may argue. Macnaghten and Urry (1998) argue that through the development of the 'new' sciences, such as mathematics, astrophysics and physics during the sixteenth and seventeenth century, that society and nature spilt, with the state of nature and law of nature becoming two independent schools of thought.

However, environmental consciousness and the exploration of the link between nature and society took a different turn during the mid-19th century in the West, because, according to Clover (2005), the linkages between these two aspects were now viewed as something that required control and management by humans. Clover (2005:77) posits an insightful and interesting view on how nature and society have displayed itself through different avenues. Arguably, such concerns and strong statements concerning the rising environmental problems also grew into twentieth century Africa. In recent times Burundi's land question has received a growing research and policy attention, mainly due to the alarming food insecurity issues, rural poverty, and high population growth. Yet, incidence of increased conflict over land rights has not been sufficiently studied. Notwithstanding, there are scholarly research done on land disputes and overpopulation in Burundi, which is what this study will draw on.

Socioeconomic issues are largely due to the structural and historic economic problems and socio-cultural conditions. High levels of poverty, overpopulation, a lack of arable land and ecological constraints⁵⁹ (such as droughts and floods) coupled with a serious shortage of exploitable natural resources, are some of the socio-cultural and socioeconomic problems are all part of Burundi's complex society. While ethnicity and political factors have been at the centre of assessing the conflicts in Burundi, the natural environment has repeatedly been a significant factor in assessing conflicts throughout the world (Kok et al., 2009) and the case of Burundi is no different. The mounting climate crisis is perhaps the greatest long term challenge the world is confronted with and within this context; the control for natural

⁵⁹ Such as droughts and floods.

resources and land has been a principal issue in many of the prolonged conflicts in Africa, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kok et al., 2009). There has been a significant erosion of the environment in the Great Lakes region, of which Burundi forms part of. One of the consequences has been the intensification of exposure to environmental hazards, thus fuelling their vulnerability and reducing the (carrying) capacity to manage these hazards (Kameri-Mbote, 2005). Moreover, this situation is aggravated by the high rate of population growth of which Burundi accounts for (Kameri-Mbote, 2005).

It is precisely under such a controversial umbrella that this study seeks to explore how environmental concerns have either fostered or hindered Burundians to constitute new forms of social identity and relations.

4.4.2 Conditions for political conflicts in Burundi

Increased conflict over land rights, the neglect of social justice and equity matters, shapes the exceptional land question in Burundi. Land related matters in Burundi are highly-context specific and complex both social and political contradictions which have risen throughout Burundi's pre-colonial to post-conflict era. As a result, this study has chosen to purely focus on key issues pertaining to the exploration of factors concerning land and population growth as potential triggers to the conflicts, which are also influenced by Burundi's specific historical tendencies. Also mention that population growth can't be addressed alone as these two are interlinked and therefore needs to be assess in its entirety.

This section looks at the problems concerning land in Burundi, as potential dominant precursors or exacerbating factors to the violent conflicts that prevailed in this country during 1960s to the early 1990s. As such, it is important to reinstate the main research question set out in chapter one. The purpose and objective of this study is to investigate how population growth and limited access to land has impacted on the past political conflicts in Burundi. Moreover, the objective of this section will also address the second research question of this study; namely to examine whether a nexus can be found between environmental factors⁶⁰ and the violent conflicts in Burundi. As a catalyst to increasing land scarcity, this study trace the

⁶⁰ Environmental factors are here defined as access to land and population growth in Burundi. These variables will be used interchangeably throughout this study.

key interlocking land problems since pre-colonial times leading up to the violent political conflicts.⁶¹

Empirical regularities such as scarcity of environmental resources may cause conflict, however, rather as an exception than a rule. In accordance with Huggins (2009), this study argues that land disputes in Burundi form part of an extensive, complex, geographical and institutional framework. Notably, issues concerning land ownership and the violent conflicts that occurred in Burundi have to be seen in conjunction with, the demographic pressure the country has and still is, facing. Huggins (2009:75) proposes that access to land, and its intricate repercussions, are by and large due to four reasons: The extremely flawed and corrupt land registration system, archaic land laws, a relatively new government, whose proficiency is limited, and lastly, the fact that Burundi struggles with other major challenges such as a continuous growing population. Attached to these concerns is the problem with migration which has further repercussions such as IDPs and returning refugees.

4.4.3 Land issues in Burundi

The issues concerning land in Burundi are important to identify in order to better grasp the problematique of this study, namely to; investigate how access to land and rapid population growth has impacted on the violent conflicts in Burundi. As some of the elements are interlinked, it is not only intricate but a highly problematic area to study in its own right. Nevertheless, it presents an area of research that requires illumination with regards to its ability to problematise how environmental factors can generate increase to conflict. Land in Burundi is not only essential, but also represents economic and social livelihood as land is the principal source of income. Food productivity, which also entails the growth of food crops⁶², is essential to almost all Burundians and it is also linked with social identity and power (Huggins, 2010). Land disputes in Burundi are a result of a number of factors that are interlocking and complex, which presents difficulties at various levels. However, it is important to comment on certain influences that has affected or exacerbated land issues in Burundi in order to fully understand to what extent land is valued amongst Burundians, more

⁶¹ The temporal framework that this study will be working within only addresses the political conflicts in Burundi to 1993. There has however, been an increasing trend on the study of post-conflict challenges that Burundi is currently facing. Some of the additional challenges that have been investigated are the importance and challenges that has brought debates concerning IDPs and returning refugees in Burundi. Moreover, this study does recognise the importance of addressing these issues, though; it does not form part of the objective for this study.

⁶² Main food crops in Burundi are coffee, tea, maize, rice, wheat, sorghum, beans, groundnuts, sunflowers, sweet potatoes, yams, cassava, bananas, fruit, soybeans (Banderembako, 2006).

importantly, to understand that land scarcity in Burundi extends across a socio-political, economic and physical field. One of the main influences is the vague yet struggle for land ownership, which involves the allocation and barriers to land access as well as land rights. An additional influence is the lack of rural development pertaining to land allocation and ownership since the implementation of the land code in 1986, has throughout Burundi's most conflict prone years not been correctly appropriated in order to meet the demands for land (Baribeau, 2011).

Burundi has for centuries been an agrarian society and agriculture has been the lifeblood for Burundians. Burundi is one of the poorest and most agrarian countries in the world, not surprisingly as land is the single most vital production factor (Baribeau, 2011). Various scholars argue that land tenure and food security in Burundi are now such an integral part of assessing the conflicts in Burundi that it is unavoidable and considered crucial in the measurement of the conflicts. In fact, some researchers' strongly argue that land tenure and food security in Burundi are instinctively linked and that both have shown importance but also interrupted by the country's violent conflicts (Cochet 2004: Moyo, 2008: Bundervoet, 2009: Baribeau, 2011). Burundi has for decades presented a difficult agricultural context with more than 90 per cent of the population dependent on agriculture, the distribution of land has been and still is a challenge considering the densely populated framework.

4.4.4 Land Administration

Essential to the independent variables examined in this study, is the relevance of how land administration has been organised and carried out in Burundi since independence. The allocation of land rights during the conflict prone years in Burundi has been a victim of the inefficient land administration system. As such, one can argue that land administration has also been a contributing factor for conditions of land disputes. The political dimensions under which land administration was managed, has been criticised for being too centralised since the beginning of 1970s with a constant decline in terms of their efficiency. Land administration in Burundi is crucial for a possible understanding of why access to land has become increasingly violent amongst Burundians since the 1965 conflict. As Huggins (2004) notes, the land administration system is multi-layered with three main bodies in charge of managing land disputes and the land demand.

At the judicial level is the civil court in Burundi which deals with mechanisms to resolve land disputes. It is estimated that about 70 to 90 per cent of civil court cases, settled or unsettled,

are by and large concerned with land related matters (Baribeau, 2011; Kohlhagen, 2011). As a result of the high demand in solving land disputes, the courts in Burundi has been criticised of being inefficient with high levels of corruption and too high costs for the majority of the Burundians. Moreover, Kamungi et al., (2005) highlight how the land administration system has also been affected by the violent political conflicts as migration trends already began after the first conflict in 1965. As such, the land administration system experienced a decrease of human resources. Moreover, lack of coordination between different government departments has also been a growing concern since the second conflict (1972) in Burundi. An additional factor which has served as an important influence to the land disputes is the fact that many Burundians have actually resisted the enforcement of court rulings. Removal of land boundaries are one of the crucial aspects with regards to legal statistics (Kohlhagen, 2011).³

The National Commission for Land and Other Possessions (CNTB), the commission was implemented in all provinces and was implemented in order to reduce the courts offering mediation for the land and property disputes linked to the political conflicts examined in this study. It is compounded by administrative and judicial officials. Also, the CNTB has receives funding from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

As a customary institution and at the local level is the *bashingantahe* (council of respected elder men at the local level, also seen as ‘wise councils’), however, some are appointed primarily for political influence as opposed to local legitimacy. More importantly, the *bashingantahe*, were never responsible of land administration, however, their main task, already under colonialism, was to serve as facilitators of land dispute resolution. Due to the conflicts in Burundi, the legitimacy of some of the members was questioned and compromised thus making certain land disputes irresolvable. Moreover, the *bashingantahe* served as customary land authorities. In ancient customary law, the allocation of land plots, control over land and tenure administration, were exclusively managed by the *mwami*, the local chiefs and their *batware* sub-chiefs (Kohlhagen, 2011). These roles vanished in the 1960s and have not been replaced. Rights to land were regarded as very personal during the pre-colonial era and it has been defined as a clientelistic system.

Illustrated in his book, *War*, Azar Gat (2006:193) indicates the importance how pastoral societies were formed and represented “different ‘modes’ or ‘stages’ in the evolution of pastoral societies”. As such, Gat (2006) argues that kinship relations and agricultural

settlements do posit themselves as important indicators assessing violent conflicts. The account of possession in the Burundian agricultural society corresponds with what Gat (2006) terms as ‘triggers’ for defining of property. For Gat (2006:194), the domination by the pastoral elite (the *ganwa*) during the pre-colonial era mixed with increasing poverty as a result of growing population pressure on land, are key ingredients in the background to the Burundian conflicts. Moreover, Gat (2006) highlights that kinship also formed ethnic societies due to the fact that kinship was used to family relations, which expanded to ethnic relations. With the formation of the Burundian state, an accumulation of property with livestock arose, thus setting the framework for potential conflict for resources.

A last point worth mentioning is the formal land registration system. This system has not been flawless as it has been struggling with the flight of human resources, double registration of plots, corruption, and nepotism (Kamungi et al., 2005:235).

4.5 EXPLORING THE NEXUS: DIAMOND RETURNS

Initially set out in chapter one to answer whether a nexus can be found between environmental factors and the political conflicts in Burundi, this study has arrived at an essential point of this research; namely to illustrate how a positive correlation exists. Extensive field of research has opened up to this notion. This study has tried to illustrate that limited access to land coupled with a rapid growing population has, indeed, served as motivational trigger factors to the political conflicts in Burundi.

The notion behind how societies collapse, presented by Diamond (2005), are due to five possible contributing factors, which shapes the authors five-point framework. Moreover, processes by which societies have undermined themselves by damaging their own environment fall into eight categories or indicators, also known as ‘ecocide’ (Diamond, 2005). Since Diamond’s (2005) theoretical structure was previously outlined under the theoretical framework in chapter one, the main purpose of this section is merely to illustrate ways in which the case of Burundi applies to Diamond’s (2005) five-point framework and to his eight indicators to ‘ecocide’.

Burundi has presented itself as a country⁶³ that has been battling with land scarcity, soil exhaustion and limited food supply, already since the pre-colonial era (Griggs, 1997). Population pressure in Burundi during the pre-colonial era has influenced such challenging

⁶³ Or a society, according to Diamond (2005)

environmental problems. Moreover, it is reported that Burundi experienced one of its greatest growing trends in terms of land and population under the rule of the Ntare IV Rutaganzwa Rugamba from 1796 to 1850 (Griggs, 1997). Such important observations of the already present environmental problems in Burundi connect to the historical context which was outlined in chapter two. In his five-point framework Diamond (2005) maintains that properties of the environment are defined by two categories: fragility and resilience. The former, susceptibility to environmental damage (fragility), applies to the case of Burundi in which the growth of the population influenced the environment and its use in terms of rapid soil exhaustion.

As mentioned in chapter two, the kingdom of Burundi was defined by hierarchical political authority and tributary economic exchange, with an emphasis on the *ganwa* who mainly owned most of the land and demanded a tribute, or tax from local farmers and herders (Griggs, 1997). Within this specific framework, this study draws a reference to Burundi's hierarchical land structure during the pre-colonial era; on how land allocation and ownership was based on a hierarchical structure, with the *mwami* (the King) in possession of the land, there was a level of imbalance in terms of the agrarian system in Burundi (Cochet, 2004).

Kohlhagen (2011) argues that during the colonial era and what he terms 'colonial literature', land relations were generally understood through the lens of private property, as such, differences in opinion and tension naturally occurred between colonial authorities and Burundians. The rights of the chiefs, for example, were interpreted by the colonial authorities as more exclusive than they were historically, which caused tension amongst the Burundians. Moreover, the colonial system strengthened the power of the chiefs in the judicial sector, to the detriment of the *bashingantahe*, who traditionally played a preeminent role in the field of land administration (Kohlhagen, 2011).

Griggs (1997) maintains that the colonial policy intensified this environmental and demographic stress by encouraging large-scale coffee and tea plantations. Through various policies of taxation, the German and Belgian administrators destroyed subsistence farming and communal ownership to force most of the rural population into coffee production (Griggs, 1997). Thus, resulting in land shortage decreased per capita food production. This point reference to one of this study's claim, namely; that there is a connection to the historical context in Burundi and how limited access to land coupled with population growth, are forces

which exacerbated the grim trajectory of Burundi and has served as dynamite for the political conflicts in Burundi (Diamond, 2005; Bundervoet, 2009).

According to data presented by Bundervoet (2009), between 70 and 80 per cent of the Burundian population was already dependent on the agrarian economy, which resulted in sub-divisions of land to even smaller plots and there were noteworthy deterioration of soil due to over utilisation during this time. In addition, the capacity of the land to support its population became even more perilous (Cochet, 2004).

Some connections to Diamond's (2005) theory serve as an important application to this study. Firstly, Diamond (2005) stresses how societies, in this context Burundi, have undermined themselves by damaging their own environment.⁶⁴ Amongst the eight indicators to an 'ecocide', the one that stands pertinent to Burundi and this study's objective is the seventh category, human population growth. In essence, what this signifies is that with the continuous population growth in Burundi, the society (Burundi) has thus gradually exerted their carrying capacity almost to a collapse. Yaukey et al., (2007:55) define carrying capacity as "the maximum population size within a given area that can sustain itself indefinitely without environmental degradation, given its technology and consumption patterns".

As figure four below illustrates, Burundi's population density did increase during the conflict prone years, the country's carrying capacity has decreased the environmental resource base, which created a demand for better ecological systems during and in between the four political conflicts.

⁶⁴ According to Diamond (2005), this has and can happen unintentionally.




Figure 4: Arable land⁶⁵ and Population density⁶⁶
Source: Databank Worldbank (2012)

Assessing Burundi's subsistence agriculture with specific reference to the years when there was political violence in Burundi, the carrying capacity of subsistence agriculture rapidly depleted as the demographic pressure during the specific conflict years, rose. As such, subsistence agriculture became unsustainable and irrigated lands were affected by salinisation. Again, this points reference to one of Diamond's (2005) indicators to an 'ecocide', the dangers of soil erosion. As the case with the Burundian population which grew too large and agricultural production became unproductive, thus resulting in a societal collapse. Yaukey et al., (2007:68) hold that population density places strains on resources, in this case land, living standards and populations health. Suffice to say, this study merely claims that Burundi, to an extent, has characteristics which resemble a collapse.

In answering the second research question, set out in chapter one, on whether a nexus can be found between environmental factors and the violent conflicts in Burundi. Burundi's high

⁶⁵ Hectares per person

⁶⁶ People per sq. km of land area

population density translates into a very small size of arable land per person. As highlighted in the figure four above, arable land (hectares per person) in Burundi dropped significantly from the first political conflict in 1965 at 0.23 hectares per person of arable land down to an alarming 0.10 hectares per person in 2008. In conjunction with such a drop in the size of arable land for Burundians, the figure four also indicate how population density has, on the contrary, increased especially with a remarkable jump from 139 people per square kilometre of land area in 1972 to 207 people per square kilometre of land area in 1988. Such significant data further show that limited access to land and population growth in Burundi has influenced the four political conflicts in Burundi. As agricultural production then became increasingly problematic during several periods of political and economic instability during 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993 in Burundi.

Diamond (2005) asserts that most often society collapses after its peak and that almost always, there are various subtle environmental factors that make some societies more fragile than others. Following Diamond's argument on the subject of environmental problems, there seems to be an appropriate argument that there are specific processes by which a society (Burundi) has undermined them by damaging their own environment.

The Burundian government preventing Burundians from developing alternative strategies for dealing with land conflict and rising poverty, can in part, be understood as Diamond's (2005) argument on how societies 'choose' to fail, thus experiencing a societal collapse. What this denotes is that and thus leading to a failed/collapsed state in which the fight for resources and land scarcity have become the epitome as one of the factors seeking to explain one of Africa's most brutal conflicts seen in Burundi (Hobbs and Knausenberger, 2003). The case of Burundi illustrate how rapid population growth, environmental damage influenced as dynamite for which ethnic violence was the fuse (Diamond, 2005:22).

The disequilibrium between population and available resources has led to broad-based environmental destruction in Burundi. The direct consequences of this disequilibrium are food insecurity, insufficient fuel energy, pollution, and heightened civil strife (Hobbs and Knausenberger, 2003). These negative consequences could be mitigated through a well-ordered public welfare society with an appropriate policy and regulatory environment allowing for decentralized management of resources and the encouragement of private initiative to achieve an equitable distribution and use of natural, social and political resources

(Baribeau, 2011). Poverty itself can cause competitive and inappropriate behavior, rather than management of natural resources for the collective good.

Political instability has made it difficult to protect conservation areas, and large numbers of displaced peoples have been forced to rely on the surrounding environment to meet their daily needs. There have also been reports of targeted destruction of forests and tree plantations as retribution against the Burundian government and private individuals. Acute land degradation and resource scarcity in Burundi has also contributed to the increase in the value and control over land as a resource.

As such, the historical context of land conflicts in Burundi, are still present and on the rise. Baribeau (2011:8) maintain that within rural and poor milieu in Burundi, “land tenure and food security are inextricably linked”. Such a symbiotic relation, naturally, impose threats to the economical context in Burundi; however, it is difficult to ignore, as such a significant interdependence is profoundly embedded within the Burundian culture (Baribeau, 2011).

4.5.1 The great multiplier: Population

The size of the human population is central to all thinking about sustainability, though for a variety of reasons it is often ignored. Burundi’s population growth rate is currently measured at 3.10 per cent (CIA Factbook, 2012). Population affects various aspects of a society, such as water, health, land use, energy, peace, economic systems, and climate.

The conflicts in Burundi and the growth of the population are independent from each other, however, the growth of the population itself meant that scarce resources (land) had to be distributed among a larger number of people, this highlights Diamond’s (2005) argument that habitat destruction and soil erosion, are two of eight indicators, which lead to societal ‘ecocide’. Figure five below, shows the increase in population during the conflict in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993. Moreover, assessing the four conflicts highlighted in figure five below, data show that Burundi’s population density continued to increase and that the number of people per square kilometre of land area in Burundi became increasingly tight.

The main purpose of this study has been to examine how population growth and limited access to land have impacted on the violent conflicts in Burundi; as such this study argues that the prevailing dependence on Burundi’s land, did inhibit Burundians from agricultural productivity and agricultural production therefore became increasingly problematic. As such, access to land became even more precious for families and the struggle to acquire more land

area became more difficult for Burundians, hence, land disputes occurred prior and during the conflicts from 1965 to 1993 (Bundervoet, 2009).

Such measures denote that that Burundi's population continued to grow and thus created an increasingly difficult agricultural problem as the demand for more land access became a growing concern during the four conflicts. Population as the great multiplier in Burundi has thus led to land disputes that are often violent as this study has illustrated by highlighting the four crucial years when Burundi experienced high levels of political violence. Land rights, mainly limited access to land for certain groups, were a contributing factor to the genocidal conflicts in Burundi. Hobbs and Knausenberger (2003), maintain that land disputes regarding claims of ownership and boundaries, often occurred within families during the political conflicts, which in some instances lead to intra-family disputes where killings occurred.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ During their fieldwork in Rwanda, specifically in the commune of Kanama which predominately consisted of Hutu's, Andre and Platteau (1998) maintain that violent killings amongst Hutu's did occur prior to the genocide and even continued in 1994. The point that Andre and Platteau (1998) makes is that there was more than one factor to the conflict in Rwanda, although ethnic in nature, there were other incidences of conflict and killings (disputes over land) which occurred simultaneously as the genocide.




Figure 5: Population density⁶⁸ and annual population growth
Source: Databank Worldbank (2012)

Land pressure has led individuals to cultivate on hillsides, where soils are shallow, low in fertility, and easily affected by erosion (Hobbs and Knausenberger, 2003). Heavy population pressure in Burundi has also resulted in drastic decrease in arable land per person and cultivation is also spreading to low-lying wetlands, where constructed drainage systems accompanied by siltation from surrounding hillsides is destroying many of these ecologically valuable areas in Burundi (Hobbs and Knausenberger, 2003).

The outbreaks of the sporadic violent conflicts in Burundi from 1965 to 1993 are a result of many interrelated factors. Through unequal land distribution in relation to a context where many smallholder farmers lack adequate land to feed their families, a general lack of purchasing power thus occur. What this means is that sophisticated equipment which could improve productivity, rather leads to a deteriorating ecological base due to a decline in

⁶⁸ People per sq.km of land area

traditional conservation methods such as fallow areas and a largely dysfunctional rural governance system.

Cochet (2004) notes that Burundi's population growth stagnated during the 1920s and 1930s, but took a sharp turn in the 1950s and 1960s, as indicated in figure five above. As a result of increase in population so increases the population density and Cochet (2004) notes that at some points, the population density rose to levels greater than the capacity during the pre-colonial era and continued during the political conflicts highlighted in his study. Again, this confirms how the majority of the Burundian population depend on agriculture as a livelihood and the problems around land have had a long and complicated history high demand on land has thus lead to shortages of supply (Hobbs and Knausenberger, 2003). Alongside continuous population growth, limited access to land has to a certain degree, served as a trigger factor for the violent conflicts that prevailed in Burundi from the 1960s until the early 1990s.

An application of Diamond's (2005) framework has been illustrated in this section.⁶⁹ This study has identified that Diamond's (2005) argument on how and why specific societies collapse, draw similarities to study's research question. As such, the application of Diamond's (2005) framework illuminated how the independent variables (limited access to land and population growth) can be measured against the dependent variable (political conflicts). Land conflict in Burundi has proven to be significant as land conflict has historically been one of the past drivers of violence as illustrated within this section.

The challenges with regard to women and land, is something that has received more attention in the post-conflict years. Various authors have highlighted that traditional laws and customs which have discriminated against women's ownership of land and other fixed assets are important to recognise (Kamungi et al., 2005; Huggins, 2009; Baribeau, 2011). Although not pertaining to the timeline examined in this study, notes that women, particularly widows, experience great difficulty in claiming their land rights as a result of difficulties in the customary and statutory legal framework. According to Burundian tradition, women are usually not allocated land and since most of the court cases brought to the Burundian civil courts, are matters concerning land disputes in recent years, the land cases in court therefore have a disproportional representation of unmarried, widowed or divorced women (Huggins, 2009). Moreover, women and children of polygamous relationships are the usually the most

⁶⁹ This study acknowledges that Diamond's (2005) framework is not without fault, however within this study, Diamond's framework has proved valuable to the research questions.

vulnerable ones when dealing with disputes over land inheritance (Baribeau, 2011). Burundi's land and resources are fairly evenly distributed, with the important distinction that patrilineal inheritance prevents women from gaining tenure rights to land. With a high number of female-headed households due to the ongoing political conflicts and poor economy, lack of tenure rights for women could jeopardize their future access to resources, particularly if large numbers of IDPs return in search of land. Paradoxically, unequal gender land rights and the absence of women's access to property rights are of importance, although Burundian women have been active participants in public life since independence was achieved in July 1962.

4.6 ASSESSING THE ARUSHA ACCORD

The purpose of this section falls under the second sub-question of the research namely; to assess whether the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement⁷⁰ (APRA) of 2000, addressed the two environmental factors examined throughout this study.⁷¹

Ushered in a period of relative stability under a transitional government, the APRA was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, in 2000 as a result of lengthy peace negotiations (Vandeginste, 2009). While the APRA entail principles of ethnically balanced power-sharing arrangements, the Peace Accord have attempted to address the root causes of the political conflicts in Burundi, however, only by focusing on issues related to democracy⁷², governance and security⁷³, these factors fall under the Accord's five protocols.

According to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (2000), five protocols have formed an integral part of the APRA. Protocol one addressed the 'Nature of the Burundi Conflict, Problems of Genocide and Exclusion and Their Solutions'. Protocol two is concerned with 'Democracy and Good Governance'. Protocol three concentrates on 'Peace and Security for All'. The fourth protocol outlines the 'Reconstruction and Development' and lastly, protocol five concerns the 'Guarantees on the Implementation of the Agreement'. These five protocols have served as important for the Peace Accord as a whole. Boshoff et al., (2010) claim that little evidence point to any assessment of land scarcity and population growth as important factors in the political conflicts in Burundi, by the APRA. With reference to the first protocol, the only indication towards any

⁷⁰ Also referred to as the Arusha Peace Accord in this study.

⁷¹ Limited access to land and population growth.

⁷² Such as power sharing.

⁷³ Such as reform and integration.

acknowledgment of the environmental factors is APRA's call for revision of the 1986 Land Code, of which the proposal was to resolve unspecified land management problems. This is stipulated in Article IV of the APRA, which promised that returning refugees will be able to access their land or at least, will receive sufficient compensation for it (Kamungi et al., 2005).

The Arusha Agreement of 2000 noted the importance of the resettlement of IDPs and refugees, the majority of whom are women and children. Evidence points to the fact that the Peace Accord, however, has not been able to set up an adequate body to properly address the issues of access to land and the rising population. This study argues that although the latest Peace Accord of 2000, signified the beginning of a return to peace, recognition of land concerns has become part of non-essential status (Kamungi et al., 2005). This study argues that the fact that land, which has such a significant social value in Burundi, has not been addressed by the APRA is another bearing on the conflict assessment. The failure to manage or assuage the ramifications of the political conflicts in Burundi in relation to environmental factors, present a certain danger. The APRA has inadequately prepared to deal with population growth and ineffective institutions for addressing land disputes, rather causes were mainly addressed through instituting mechanisms for power sharing, as stipulated by the Arusha Agreement. Various challenges resulted in a delay in the implementation of certain aspects of the agreements, which have either not been fully implemented or are yet to be implemented. As for the effectiveness of the agreements, the newly-established institutions, though democratic, are still facing critical challenges. These include: political stabilisation, security stabilisation, reconciliation, fighting impunity, the lack of resources, and poverty. Nonetheless, broadly speaking, the relevant agreements have been implemented to a large extent, and have had a positive impact on the overall peace process in Burundi through attempting to address the root causes of the conflict.

4.7 CONCLUSION

Burundi's land question cannot be understated from the perspective of the mistaken perception that the continent has an abundance, rather than and not a scarcity of land resources. Nor can the land question be assumed away or subsumed by the wider problem of Burundi's agricultural crisis, characterised by the absence of an agrarian transition, based upon lack of agricultural technological transformation and agro-industrial articulation. In terms of the agrarian basis of the land question, it is notable that the extent of developed arable and irrigable land available for agriculture is limited in Burundi. While farming

techniques generally remain 'backward', pressures on land arising from both demographic growth and the concentration of arable landholding have led to land scarcities in numerous localities, despite the incidence of land use intensification in some regions of a number of countries.

The extensive degradation of fragile land resources and increasing elite control of the prime lands under conditions of arable and grazing land scarcity reflect the uneven distribution of land and the resultant contradictions of extensive land use and low productivity, which arise from constrained technical change and ineffective social relations of production.

There is reason to believe that food security and poverty eradication can be achieved through vibrant agriculture and natural resources sectors, which balance access to land resources and promote an agrarian transition based upon land use policies directed at the internal market. 'Pro-poor' 'poverty reduction strategies' have been notably negligent of the fact that diminishing access to land and inadequate strategies to mobilise financial and human resources to effectively develop land use are fundamental constraints to development.

The relative decline of agricultural production for domestic food and industrial requirements, vis-à-vis population growth and urban relocation, is central to Burundi's development dilemma. The concentration of income and consumption among the wealthier few and in better endowed regions, in relation to access to land and extroverted land uses, limits the growth of the Burundian domestic market and the accumulation of capital for investment in the optimal utilisation of land-based resources. This land use problem is reinforced by unequal trade relations and limited agro-industrial growth in Burundi and Africa as a whole, given that its development strategy is not based on a viable industrialisation project.

It seems that limited access to land and population growth (independent variables) and the political conflicts in Burundi (dependent variable) scarcity may lead and or trigger, to conflict as an exception rather than a rule, and it has therefore been necessary and crucial to understand and highlight under what conditions that violent conflicts to occur. Cross national studies show that the link between resource scarcity and violent conflict is positive, but weak (Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998; Yanagizawa, 2006:3). The link is only weak positive when population growth is also high (Urdal, 2005). Uvin (2009) notes that at best, they are general correlations.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This study highlighted one explanatory factor for analysing conflicts, namely environmental factors. This factor is by no means the only consideration that should be taken into account when examining conflict; however, it is an issue that has been understated in research. Therefore, this study serves as a means to draw attention to environmental factors and highlight the value and significance of these factors in conflict analyses. As such, the research question guiding this study was: *how have environmental factors, more specifically, population growth and (limited) access to land impacted the previous 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993 political conflicts in Burundi?*

This chapter provides a summary of the findings of the study and reflects upon possible implications for the study. This chapter also suggests possible areas of research on the subject of political conflicts that could be explored in the future.

5.2 PROGRESS OF THE RESEARCH STUDY

The opening chapter of this study laid the grounds and foundation for this study. Within this chapter, this study highlighted the problem statement, underscored the scope of the study and put forward the conceptual theoretical framework through which this study has been examined. Moreover, the opening chapter outlined the research methodology, operationalised key concepts and provided a set of limitations and delimitations of the study.

The second chapter was an account of Burundi's history, highlighting the periodic political conflicts. This chapter accentuated the importance of a historical account in Burundi's case, because conflicts in the country were deeply rooted in its historical trajectory. The historical context of Burundi's conflicts is important to consider because traditional social order and its long-established kingdom has predominantly shaped the Burundian society. This chapter laid a foundation for the analysis in later chapters

Chapter three served to provide analyses in perspective by looking at key actors and factors involved in the political conflicts in Burundi. The Power-Sharing Agreement was introduced,

which highlighted its limited ability of inclusion; for this agreement did not account for factors that this study deems important, namely environmental dynamics. In addition, this study introduced Diamond's (2005) analysis of why societies collapse within his ecological framework and the authors' account of Rwanda as a modern society which collapsed. Moreover, such a thorough description and analysis of Rwanda was necessary because the two countries resemble each other on various accounts, and Diamond's (2005) analysis of Rwanda in the context of collapse, has thus served as an outline. The incorporation of Diamond's analysis on collapse has been essential in understanding how his framework has been applied to Burundi in chapter four.

Chapter four outlined Burundi's geography and illustrated the ecological differences between the rural and urban areas. This chapter emphasised the significance and shortcomings of the 1986 Land Code. The chapter explained how its rigid policies on land tenure with an amalgamation of statutory and customary laws, has also impacted the land disputes in Burundi. In addition, this chapter examined the environmental variables and Diamond's (2005) five-point framework was applied to the case of Burundi. Furthermore, this chapter answered whether a nexus can be found between environmental factors and the political conflicts in Burundi and also highlighted the importance of women's rights in relation to land access. Lastly, a brief account of whether the Arusha Peace Accord of 2000 addressed the issues of environmental factors was also conducted in this chapter.

Overall, these chapters advanced the central claim of this study that land scarcity and population has served as motivational trigger factors in the political conflicts in Burundi. In the subsequent section an evaluation of this study will be outlined.

5.3 EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH STUDY

The objective of this section is to provide answers to the research questions posed in Chapter One, by drawing from the discussions and conclusions presented in the preceding chapters.

Almost depicted as a storytelling of the various indicators which have shaped the exploration of the Burundian case study, has encouraged this study to illustrate how two specific environmental factors, that is: limited access to land and a rapid population growth, have assisted as positive trigger factors when measured against the political conflicts in Burundi. In short, this research has proven that Burundi's intense dependence on land coupled with demographic pressure has impacted the political conflicts in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993.

What this signifies is that the presentation and discussion of the data and analyses investigated in this study; do reveal that resource scarcity may lead to conflict as an exception rather than a rule. In addition, this study has highlighted that environmental factors merely served as one of many trigger factors to the conflicts in Burundi and that these two environmental variables have been present within the Burundian context. It is against this backdrop that has motivated this study.

A descriptive analysis of the overall indicating factors contributing to the Burundian case study has brought forward some noteworthy findings. The method employed in this study, relied on available empirical data discussed in this study, which has served to illustrate how Burundi's carrying capacity has since the first violent conflict in 1965 to the 1993 resurgence of conflict, gradually fallen victim to land scarcity and demographic pressure.

The remainder of this section answers the research questions, summarises key findings, and evaluates the research study.

5.3.1 Answering the research question

How have environmental factors, more specifically, population growth and (limited) access to land impacted on the political conflicts that prevailed in Burundi in earlier years?

In answering the research question, this study came to the following findings:

Environmental factors have impacted the political conflicts in Burundi in that they have been one of the factors that have facilitated and shown to be a catalytic agent in the sporadic conflicts in the country between 1965 and 1993. In addition, there exists a correlation between the independent variables (land access and population growth) and the dependent variable (political conflict). Pertaining to the second sub-research question of whether the latest Peace Accord of 2000, addressed the independent variables mentioned above, this study found that the agreement failed at addressing these environmental factors. None of the five protocols discussed in chapter four, stressed the issues or importance of the environmental factors. The nexus between the independent variables and the dependent variable as well as the extent to which the Arusha agreement addressed environmental factors, speak to the secondary question posed in this study.

5.3.2 Key findings

From the utilisation and application of Diamond's (2005) theoretical framework and supporting scholarly literature explored in this study, the issues concerning land in Burundi are important to identify in order to better grasp the nature and the cause of the political conflicts in Burundi. The key findings therefore are as follows:

- Land disputes in Burundi are a result of a number of factors that are interlocking and complex, which presents difficulties at various levels.
- Burundi's agrarian economy makes land access a resource that is not only valued, but one that leads to a certain higher social status. In addition, land in Burundi is not only essential, but also represents economic and social livelihood as land is the principal source of income.
- The allocation of land rights during the conflict prone years in Burundi has been a victim of the inefficient land administration system. As such, this study concludes that land administration has also been a contributing factor for conditions of land disputes.
- This study consequently illustrated how population growth and limited access to growth has served as motivational contributing trigger factors to the political conflicts. This claim has been substantiated with quantitative data in chapter four.
- Limited access to land and population growth in Burundi have served as two of several trigger factors in the political conflicts in Burundi.

5.4 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This study has focused on limited access to land and population growth as two of several trigger factors to the political conflicts in Burundi; however, there are other important variables that can also be examined for future studies. As such, some recommendations can be made from this evaluation.

Firstly, when analysing the political conflicts in Burundi, plurality of factors should be identified in order to enhance the value of the research. The broad-based social and economic sources of struggles for land in Burundi in conjunction with a high population growth rate, and their wider politics, require renewed research efforts to uncover the changing land questions faced by the country.

A second recommendation for future research is the analysis required ought to traverse the class, ethnic and gender basis of land struggles, and appreciate the role of the state and social movements in the politics of land.

Lastly, as this study only examined one country, a comparative study on the Great Lakes Region could also serve as a valuable aid and cursor to identify understanding of resource allocation factors, and make transparent the land allocation process to support dispute avoidance and resolution. Consequently, the field of conflict analysis requires the development of a more comprehensive framework to address motivational trigger factors of conflict.

Thus, sound environmental management should be promoted out of a sense of the common good and both as a consequence of, and contributor to, peace. Finally, to address these problems it will be important to create a climate of peace and expand the consciousness of the people of Burundi by mobilising all social actors.

5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

By applying the two environmental factors (land access and population growth) as catalysts for engagement in conflict dynamics this study has highlighted two key factors in contributing to conflict. Although this study has recognised that these are contributing factors, it is difficult (or impossible) to determine which (if any) factor is the single greatest contributing factor. This study has added to the literature about the importance of land access and population growth as contributing factors for conflict. This chapter has summarised this thesis' findings by exploring the progress of the research, evaluating the study, and finally, by suggesting recommendations for future research. The extent to which land access and population growth have been able to impact the political conflicts in Burundi has shown to be significant. Again, the purpose of this study has merely been to illuminate one of several avenues when analysing conflicts. The final conclusion of this thesis is that limited access to land coupled with population growth has impacted the violent political conflicts in Burundi, therefore a nexus has been found between land scarcity and population growth and the political conflicts in Burundi.

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